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Abstract
In this thesis, I take a theoretical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) ap-
proach to investigate optimal aggregate dividend policy. I make the following contribu-
tion:
1. I extend the standard DSGE model to incorporate a residual dividend policy,
external financing and default and find that simulated optimal aggregate payouts are
much more volatile than the observed data when other variables are close to the values
observed in the data.
2. I examine the sensitivity of optimal aggregate dividend policy to the level of the
representative agent’s habit motive. My results show that, when the habit motive gets
stronger, the volatility of optimal aggregate payouts increases while the volatility of
aggregate consumption decreases. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors
use cash payouts from well diversified portfolios to help smooth consumption.
3. I demonstrate that the variability of optimal aggregate payouts is sensitive to
capital adjustment costs. My simulated results show that costly frictions from changing
the capital base of the firm cause optimal aggregate dividends and real investments to
be smooth and share prices to be volatile. This finding is consistent with prior empirical
observations.
4. I run simulations that support the hypothesis that optimal aggregate dividend
policy is similar when the representative firm is risk averse to when it has capital
adjustment costs. In both cases, optimal aggregate dividends volatility is very low.
5. In all calibrated DSGE models, apart from case 4, optimal aggregate payouts
are found to be countercyclical. This supports the hypothesis that corporations prefer
to hold more free cash flows for potential investment opportunities instead of paying
dividends when the economy is booming, but is inconsistent with observed data.
Keywords: Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE), real business cycle,
utility function, habits, dividends
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1.1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS THESIS 2
1.1 The objective of this thesis
This thesis overlaps a number of areas in corporate finance, utility theory and macroe-
conomics. I take a theoretical approach to examine optimal dividend policy from an
aggregate, rather than individual company, perspective. In particular, this thesis con-
tributes to the literature on optimal corporate dividend behaviour by providing two
primary findings. First, I show that market-wide dividend policy plays an important
role in helping investors to smooth consumption. Second, I demonstrate that, as capi-
tal adjustment costs within the economy increase, the variability of optimal aggregate
dividends decreases while share prices become more volatile. This finding is consistent
with prior empirical results showing that managers aim to keep dividend policy smooth
in the long run [Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2005)].
Standard theories of optimal dividend policy are generally based on a microeconomic
foundation. Such theories include taxation theory [Brennan (1970), Miller and Scholes
(1978), Poterba and Summers (1985) and Harris et al. (2001)], dividend clientele
effect [Pettit (1977)], agency theory [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984),
Jensen (1986) and La Porta et al. (2000)], asymmetric information and signalling theory
[Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), DeAngelo et al. (1996), Benartzi et al.
(1997), Fuller and Goldstein (2005) and Dong et al. (2005)]. Frankfurter and Wood
(2002) examine whether these theoretical models of dividend policy are consistent with
observed payout behaviour, and point out that they all lack empirical support.
Recently, there has been increased focus on theoretically examining optimal payout
behaviour across firms. Such an approach was originally suggested more than two
decades ago by Marsh and Merton (1987, pages 4-5):
“For example, in a purely demand-driven model for dividends, the demand
for dividends is not firm-specific because investors only care about the
dividend-capital gain mix at the portfolio level... Thus equilibrium aggre-
gate dividends may be determinate, but which firms service this demand
and the quantity that each chooses to supply may not.”
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This macroeconomic approach to corporate finance has been taken by several papers in
recent years including Bernanke et al. (1999), Alessandrini (2003), Covas and Wouter
(2006), Levy and Hennessy (2007), Jermann and Quadrini (2009), Santoro and Wei
(2009) and Amdur (2010). This thesis lies within this stream of literature. The objec-
tive of this thesis is to take a macroeconomic approach and to solve the optimisation
problems of a representative corporation and a representative investor simultaneously.
This approach makes it possible to analyse optimal dynamic dividend policy as an inter-
action between corporate and investor’s activities, especially in the presence of frictions
in the markets.
In particular, in this thesis, I examine how optimal aggregate dividend policy changes
when (a) investors have habit formation utility functions and (b) there are frictions from
changing the capital base of the firm. The reasons for examining these two issues are
(a) it is well-known [Constantinides (1990)] that the stronger the habit formation, the
greater the desire of investors to smooth consumption and therefore the importance
of dividends as a mechanism for helping to achieve this is hypothesised to increase,
and (b) capital adjustment costs limit the ability of the firm to rapidly adjust their real
investment policies which will then have implications for dividends. There issues have
not been examined in detail by the existing literature.
My main findings are: (a) increased habit formation leads to greater volatility in
optimal aggregate dividends as these provide an important mechanism to help investors
smooth consumption, (b) increasing capital adjustment costs leads to lower variability
in optimal aggregate dividend payouts and real investment policy but greater volatil-
ity in share prices and (c) in contrast to empirical observations but consistent with
many previous theoretical studies, dividends are strongly countercyclical in all models
considered.
In the next subsection, I outline the development of the thesis and articulate my
contributions.
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1.2 Thesis structure, contributions and findings
In chapter 2, I provide a brief literature review in two areas. First, I look at microe-
conomic theory and evidence concerning dividend policy. While this is not the central
focus of my thesis, it is important to contrast the macroeconomic approach that I take
against the more common discussions concerning payout policy that take place in the
corporate finance literature. I then review business cycle theory that underlies dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) which are the methodological founda-
tions for my theoretical work. More detailed and specific literature reviews follow in
subsequent chapters research focusing on variants of real-business-cycle (RBC) based
DSGE models (chapter 3), habit formation utility functions in DSGE models (chapter
4) and the nature of capital adjustment costs in DSGE models (chapter 5).
In chapter 3, I initially replicate the seminal basic model of Hansen (1985), where
employed working hours are indivisible and without dividends. In a second replication,
I then extend this to take dividend policy into account by explicitly incorporating an
optimisation function for the firm. This idea is inspired by Alessandrini (2003) who
introduces optimal dynamic capital structure in a production economy and discusses
its implications for aggregate investment, debt and dividends. My third investigation
in this chapter involves calibrating the key model of Alessandrini (2003) which includes
issues of dividend policy, default process and external financing. In this calibration, I use
a different methodology for solving the default process which is an analytical solution
that captures firms’ bankruptcy in closed form. Using this method, I find dividends
and debt are very volatile. This is because firms can seek money from outside and that
increases the flexibility of investment cash flows and consequently dividend payments
move more strongly with the underlying investment.
In this chapter, and through out the rest of the thesis, I calibrate these DSGE mod-
els by using a software package mixture of MATLAB and DYNARE. Results of the first
and second replication are very similar to the results of the original papers. However, by
using DYNARE in addition to MATLAB, the computation for stochastic simulations are
known to be faster and more robust [Juillard (1996), Collard and Juillard (2001b), Col-
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lard and Juillard (2001a) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)] because simulations are
computed from a Taylor approximation, up to third order, of the expectation functions.
My choice of using different numerical methods leads to some differences between the
results that I report and those in the original paper of Alessandrini (2003) for the third
calibration. I find optimal aggregate dividends and investment are significantly more
volatile than Alessandrini (2003) reports.
In chapter 4, I examine aggregate payouts behaviour when households have habit
formation utility functions. Habit formation has been considered in DSGE models
by Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Lettau and Uhlig (2000), Uhlig (2007),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) and Gershun (2010). The focus of these papers is
on the business cycle. By contrast, the DSGE models that focus on optimal corporate
debt and equity issues that are reviewed in chapter 3, together with DSGE models with
dividend taxation [Santoro and Wei (2009) and Gourio and Miao (2010)], do not include
habit formation. My contribution is to combine these two streams of literature. This
is an interesting area for investigation because habit formation is closely related to the
strength of investors’ consumption smoothing motive. I conjecture that the stronger the
habit, and hence the stronger the desire to smooth consumption, the more important
dividends become as a source of countercyclical cash flow to offset the procyclicality of
labour income.
In this chapter, I model utility functions with habit formation in three different ways:
multiplicative utility function with additive habit [Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)], sep-
arable utility with additive habit [Christiano and Fisher (1995), Boldrin et al. (2001)
and Kano and Nason (2009) and Nutahara (2010)] and separable utility with non-
additive habit [Lettau and Uhlig (2000)]. My first contribution in this chapter is to
compare the sensitivity of optimal dividend policy to the precise specification of the
habit motive and also to a benchmark without habit. My results are largely insensitive
to the precise specification of the utility function and the slight difference is due to the
various marginal substitution between consumption and leisure among utility functions.
Optimal aggregate dividend payouts are countercyclical in each model. In with-habit
models, aggregate dividends are less strong correlated to consumption. Consumption
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smooths over periods while aggregate dividends are comparative volatile.
My second contribution is to concentrate on the multiplicative utility function with
additive habit formation and then vary the strength of the habit motive. In all cases,
as hypothesised, I find that optimal aggregate dividends become more variable and so
does aggregate investment when the habit motive gets stronger. This implies that the
role that dividends play in helping investors to smooth consumption gets stronger as
the habit motive grows.
The third contribution in chapter 4 is that I calibrate the sensitivity of optimal ag-
gregate dividends to various levels of risk aversion for different levels of habit formation.
Lettau and Uhlig (2000) examine two levels of risk aversion (one is extremely high and
another is a standard value) for the study of business cycle facts, but their focus is not
related to (a) impact of various levels of habit motive and (b) the study of the optimal
aggregate payouts. I find that, for all levels of habit formation, as risk aversion increases
so the volatility of aggregate dividends decreases. Even in the presence of habit forma-
tion, the counterfactual observation that dividends are highly countercyclical continues
to hold.
In chapter 5, I extend the analysis of chapter 4 to include capital adjustment costs
in addition to habit formation, although in this chapter there is no debt financing for
reasons of analytical tractability. Capital adjustment costs have been considered in
DSGE models following Jermann (1998). Several popular papers [Boldrin et al. (2001),
Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Cárceles Poveda (2003), Lettau (2003), Bouakez
et al. (2005), Cárceles-Poveda (2009), Santoro and Wei (2010) and Gershun (2010)]
are primarily interested in the stylised economic facts of business cycle fluctuations and
its implications for asset pricing but they do not report results for dividend policy. These
topics, however, are not the focus of attention here. In addition, of these papers, only
Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001) and Gershun (2010) include habit formation
as well as adjustment costs. Their studies focus on asset returns in a production
economy. My focus, however, is to investigate optimal aggregate dividend volatility
and the price of equity when companies face frictions in adjusting their capital base.
Again, this topic has not been addressed within the DSGE corporate finance literature
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reviewed in chapter 3. This is an interesting topic for investigation because the level of
capital adjustment costs affects the flexibility of the firm to adjust capital investment.
Therefore my hypothesis is that greater capital adjustment costs will lead to lower
volatility in both investment and dividends.
My first and second contribution in this chapter is to examine the variability of
optimal aggregate dividends within a wide range of capital adjustment costs in both
the case of fixed and variable labour supply. Jermann (1998) assumes that the labour
supply market is fixed and the technology shock is high. This (a) restricts investors
labour income to be exogenous in equilibrium and (b) the production function is hit
by extremely high exogenous stochastic shocks. In this chapter I present an alternative
and less restricted model where (a) labour supply is variable and (b) the presence of a
standard technology shock.
My capital adjustment cost function is based on Jermann (1998) and Gershun
(2010). The main findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the variability of
optimal aggregate dividends is very small for firms with high capital adjustment costs.
Simultaneously, equity prices become more volatile as capital adjustment costs increase.
I also find that the volatility of optimal aggregate payouts in economies with low cap-
ital adjustment costs only differ in a limited way to that in high capital adjustment
cost economies when I take Jermann (1998)’s assumption that labour is fixed. This
phenomenon, however, becomes different when labour is assumed to be an endogenous
variable. In this advanced model, I find optimal aggregate dividend volatility is sensitive
to the level of capital adjustment costs. When capital adjustment costs are extremely
high, optimal aggregate dividend payments are very smooth. Results show that, com-
pared to models in chapter 4, observed dividends are not excessively smooth once high
capital adjustment costs are included in DSGE models. The opposite effect occurs in
share prices which are very volatile in this model. In addition, the countercyclicality of
optimal aggregate dividends is also found here.
The third contribution of this chapter is that, since capital adjustment cost functions
are modelled differently in previous papers, I build another DSGE model (called the
control model) with a different capital adjustment cost function introduced in Collard
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and Dellas (2006). I find that results in the control model are close to my previous
model with extremely low capital adjustment costs. This finding implies that aggregate
dividends are smooth in a DSGE model only when there are costly capital frictions
existing in the economy.
The fourth contribution in chapter 5 is that I contrast the variability of optimal
aggregate dividends in situations where firms are either value-maximising or utility-
maximising. This work is inspired by the finding of Cárceles Poveda (2003) that the
economy of firms with capital adjustment costs is analogous to another economy in
which firms are risk averse but do not have capital adjustment costs. It is interesting
to see that both cases show that optimal aggregate payouts are smooth due to firms’
inelastic net cash flows. In my results, I find even if both economies have the same
equilibrium states, optimal aggregate dividends are much less volatile in the utility-
maximising basis of the firm.
Chapter 6 concludes and presents areas for further research. Work on corporate
finance problems and DSGE models is developing rapidly and new ideas in this field
are burgeoning. For example, in recent working papers Jermann and Quadrini (2009)
and Amdur (2010) find that financial shocks make the results of DSGE models not
only match the empirical results but also have procyclical optimal aggregate dividends.
In addition, the effect of US progressive dividend taxation on corporate investment
decisions has recently been studied by Santoro and Wei (2010). It would be useful to
incorporate these features, in addition to habit formation and capital adjustment costs
into more comprehensive study of optimal dividend policy in a DSGE model.
CHAPTER 2
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I briefly review existing research on dividend policy and business cycle
theory. A number of existing theoretical and empirical studies in the corporate finance
literature have considered dividend policy from a microeconomic perspective. My cen-
tral contributions in this thesis are based on a macroeconomic approach but it is still
important to understand corporate finance problems viewed by individual firms and to
contrast them with those being discussed from an aggregated market perspective. For
my central analytical methodology, the General Equilibrium approach, I shall review
the literature of well-known macroeconomic studies on business cycles and economic
growth theory. More specific literature reviews are contained in subsequent chapters.
The chapter includes two subsequent sections and a summarised table is displayed:
Section 2.2 Dividend policy theory
Part I: Section 2.2.1 Dividend puzzle
Part II: Sections 2.2.2 to 2.2.7 Issues related to dividend puzzle
Part III: Section 2.2.8 Relationship between net cash flows and
aggregate dividends
Section 2.3 Business cycles and economic growth theory
Section 2.3.1 Business cycles
Section 2.3.2 Economic growth theory
Section 2.3.3 Dynamic macroeconomic models
Section 2.2 includes three parts.
Part I introduces the nature of dividend policy and the debates surrounding whether
dividend policy matters or not. In standard discounted cash flow theory,
the value of the firm appears to be affected by the total dividend payments.
Miller and Modigliani (1961), propose a dividend irrelevance theorem and
emphasise that the dividend decision does not determine the value of the
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firm in a perfect world. Firm values are actually influenced by earnings
of the firm’s investment policy not by the output of the earnings distri-
bution. The existence of homemade dividends presents that investors can
manufacture cash incomes by selling their shares so the value of the firm
is determined by its free cash flow. Despite this paper’s case for dividend
payments irrelevancy, previous empirical investigations indicate that divi-
dend increases strongly influence earnings growth and return on assets [e.g.
Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2002)], posing a conundrum. In
addition, managers clearly pay close attention to their dividend policy, with
Lintner (1956), Marsh and Merton (1986) and Kumar (1988) finding that
dividends are smoothed over time. Black (1976) terms this “The Dividend
Puzzle” because the “pieces” of the explanations of corporate behaviour
regarding paying dividends do not fit together from one theory to another.
Part II reviews major works seeking to resolve the dividend puzzle from various
viewpoints; including dividend taxation, transaction costs, asymmetric in-
formation, incomplete contracts and institutional constraints.
Part III studies the relationship between corporate net cash flows and dividend
payouts, clarifying why previous papers have defined dividend payments in
different ways. In general, net cash flows are the sum of aggregate divi-
dends and stock repurchases minus equity issues. In my thesis, aggregate
dividends represent net cash flows, which mean the net flow of dividends,
stock repurchases and equity issues combined.
The second section of this chapter reviews the foundation of macroeconomics: business
cycles and economic growth theory which supports my analytical technique. I take a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) approach in this thesis to examine
the movement of optimal aggregate dividends. This method was initially used for
capturing business cycle fluctuations and has been adopted by researchers studying
asset pricing issues in recent decades [Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001) and Uhlig
(2007), amongst others]. The section opens with a basic introduction to the business
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cycle literature and stylised facts in the economy. Business cycle theory focuses on
economic stabilisation, especially over the short-term. Next, economic growth theory,
which emphasises that there is a growth pattern in the long term economy when there
are positive technology shocks is reviewed. An important restriction on the type of
utility function for looking at the steady-state path of a DSGE model is also pointed
out in this section.
In subsequent chapters, more specific literature in different areas is reviewed: a
detailed study on the evolution of DSGE models (chapter 3); DSGE models with habit
formation (chapter 4) and DSGE models with frictions of the capital accumulation
process (chapter 5).
2.2 Dividend policy theory
2.2.1 Dividend puzzle
Dividend policy (also called payout policy) is the decision by a corporation regarding
the amount, the form (e.g. cash, stock, or property dividends) and the timing (e.g.
once, twice or quarterly a year) of corporate dividend payments. It is influenced by
investment and financing decisions such as debt issuance, investment in positive NPV
projects, the previous dividend level and forms of repurchases.
Several issues have to be considered carefully by the firm when making a dividend
decision, including:
(a) Whether shareholders prefer receiving dividends or not?
(b) What is the impact of paying dividends on the stock price?
(c) What proportion of cash flows should be paid out?
Dividend policy is discussed in the research context of capital structure theories,
capital budgeting, asset pricing and mergers and acquisitions discuss dividend policy
[Allen and Michaely (2002)].
Five decades ago, a widely held economic belief was that the value of a firm is
positively correlated with its dividend payments. Miller and Modigliani (1961) proved,
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though, that dividends do not influence the value of the firm in a fully informed and ef-
ficient world (i.e. one in which there are rational investors, no taxes and no transaction
costs)1. They showed that the current value of the firm is independent of the current
dividend decision by re theorising the discounted free cash flow calculation. Their prin-
ciple of dividend irrelevance is that the total amount of retained earnings and dividend
payments does not affect the value of the firm as long as the investment decision does
not change. The reason for that is because dividend policy does not affect current share
prices and stock returns. The crucial factor is however investment decisions, neither
retained earnings nor dividend payouts. Higgins (1972) supports dividend irrelevance
by addressing the theory of homemade dividends that investors can still cash in their
shares if they prefer cash receipts. Therefore, the firm does not need to worry about
the importance of the dividend payout policy to shareholders since shareholders are
able to manipulate their flows of income by selling or investing in assets. This cash-
in-and-cash-out effect generated by investors eventually does not affect the total firm
value.
However empirical observations show that the market often responds in extreme
ways to dividend decisions. For instance, the results in Ambarish et al. (1987) support
the notion of a significant impact of dividends on stock prices. Jais et al. (2009) pro-
vide empirical evidence that investors react positively (negatively) to dividend increase
(decrease) announcements. So the empirical findings are not consistent with Miller and
Modigliani’s dividend irrelevance theorem. Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s free cash flow
theory emphasises that managers’ interests are different to investors’. Managers focus
on profit maximisation and in order to accomplish this aim, they may even overinvest
cash flows in negative NPV projects.
Black (1976) introduces the term of “Dividend Puzzle” to describe anomalies in
observed payout policies. Why do some corporations pay dividends but others do not?
Why do some investors appear to care about dividends and others do not? Responding
1Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose that the effect of a firm’s dividend policy on its current
market valuation is irrelevant. They make three basic assumptions for an ideal economy: (a) The
capital markets are perfect. It is costless to access markets and obtain information of transaction rules
on prices, (b) investors are rational in the markets, and (c) investors certainly assure their situation
as to the future investment program and their invested firms’ future profits.
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to Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s dividend irrelevance theorem, Black (1976) offers
several explanatory factors to support his Puzzle Theory, including taxation, asymmetric
information, transaction costs and incomplete contracts. Having discussed dividend
policy theory in general, the next section briefly reviews these, and other, explanations.
The taxonomy follows that of Frankfurter and Wood (2002).
2.2.2 Models of full or symmetric information - the effect of
taxation
The traditional implication of the tax effect on dividends is that taxes can deter firms
from paying dividends because of the heavy double taxation at both the corporate and
personals levels [Miller and Scholes (1978) and Poterba and Summers (1985)]. Elton
and Gruber (1970) and Pettit (1977) term the situation that investors invest in shares
depending on their desire for dividends the “clientele effect” , which assumes investors
have different concerns to buy shares, such as to tax inefficiency of dividends, company
payout policy, investment plans and so on.
Are dividend-paying stocks less attractive and less valuable than non-dividend-paying
stocks? Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) use the after-tax
Capital Asset Pricing Model to define a relation between expected returns and expected
dividend yields. In theory, the tax effect can be mitigated if higher expected returns
in the form of higher dividend yields compensates for the differences between dividend
taxes and capital gains taxes. Elton and Gruber (1970) develop a different model to
capture the differences between ex-dividend and after-dividend stock prices and their
statistic results support the clientele effect. Allen et al. (2000) examine tax driven
clientele effects from a theoretical and empirical perspective and conclude that firms
prefer to pay dividends because taxes for institutional investors are smaller than dividend
taxes for individual investors, so for the former investment group, dividends become
more desirable than stock repurchases.
Empirical studies also provide a mix of results regarding the dividend tax issues.
Harris et al. (2001) examine the influence of dividend taxes on firm value and argue
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that taxation does not deter companies from paying dividends because they find that
dividend taxes are capitalised in share prices. This dividend tax capitalisation can be
regarded as a signal. Paying dividends becomes less costly for strong companies than for
weak companies because strong companies anticipate greater expected future earnings,
leading to greater projected internal funds for investment projects. Therefore, strong
companies do not need to issue new equities and can use their expected earnings to
pay dividends.
Another argument relates dividend yields to marginal tax rates. Investors appear to
calculate the benefits of selling stocks around the ex-dividend date. Chetty and Saez
(2004) use a survey to provide evidence that there is an increase of dividend initiations
following a tax cut in 2003 in the US. Consistent with their finding, Brav et al. (2005)
find that the dividend tax issue is not the first-order dividend policy concern to firms.
However, using surveys and interviews targeting US firms, they show that nearly 42%
of companies consider stock repurchases because of the tax efficiency. Respondents
emphasise that taxation on dividend payments is not the major driver of their dividend
decisions but favour signalling, agency and clientele effects instead.
Dividend taxation as a determinant of dividend policy remains a contested area.
One view favours a negative effect of the dividend taxation on investment and dividend
decisions [Poterba and Summers (1985)]. Another view argues that dividend taxation
should not influence a firm’s cost of capital as it does not alter the distributions of cash
flows to dividend policy and investment projects [Auerbach (1979)].
Chetty and Saez (2007) analyse the effects of dividend taxation by using an agency
approach and provide evidence supporting both of the views expressed above. They
claim that conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders are the major fac-
tors affecting the impact of dividend taxation on shareholders. If managers are also
the major shareholders of the firm or are monitored by a large group of shareholders,
dividend payments increase after a tax cut, suggesting a link to institutional ownership
[Michaely et al. (1995), Brav and Heaton III (1998), and Binay (2001) and Perez-
Gonzalez (2002)]. As to a firm owned by a number of different shareholders, the tax
efficiency costs on dividends are relatively high because monitoring costs are high due
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to a complex ownership structure.
Consistent with Chetty and Saez (2007), Blouin et al. (2007, 2010) also find that
the effect of the tax cut is an input to the decision about dividend policy. Their
empirical results, responding to the US 2003 reductions in shareholder taxes, show a
positive correlation between dividend increases and the percentage of the firm owned
by individual investors.
2.2.3 Models of incomplete or asymmetric information
2.2.3.1 Signalling models
Research by Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams
(1985) investigate the “signals” spread from dividend announcements. If the market
is inefficient, investors cannot obtain complete up-to-date information about those
companies in which they are interested, forcing decisions to be based upon limited
information, such as an announcement of increasing dividends. Aharony and Swary
(1980) find that dividend announcements deliver a signal of a firm’s alternation to its
future prospects. Several empirical studies examine whether dividend announcements
convey vital signals which determine whether stock prices would go up or down in
the future. Three influential signalling models of the above papers postulate that
changing dividend decisions would send signals to investors about the companies’ future
prospects.
Bhattacharya (1979) constructs a two-period model in which taxed cash dividends
are signals of anticipated cash flows. In his Signalling Equilibrium Model, it is assumed
that investors have imperfect information about the firm’s profitability. He shows that
paying dividends is considered to be a signal of the firm’s prospects. He develops
a signalling cost structure showing that signalling costs are a significant additional
expense. If a firm pays dividends but investors then do not receive the expected share
price rise, this dividends signalling strategy fails and then the firm may be forced to
seek external capital in order to provide the necessary cash flows for future investments.
These signalling costs are actually expensive and these situations often happen to bad
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firms.
The Miller and Rock (1985) model assumes that the investor does not have infor-
mation about the profitability of the firm’s investment projects and current or the future
investment decisions. In their two-period model, the firm pays dividends to investors
by using the earnings obtained in the second period from the project. They claim that
the firm benefits because investors cannot observe the firm’s earnings and investment
decisions. Weak firms use their cash flows to pay more dividends, instead of investing
in more projects, and thus signal or appear to have a high level of earnings all the
time. This strategy of signalling high earnings by cutting the investments and paying
high dividends can induce investors, as outsiders, possessing asymmetric information to
invest in firms with counterfeit earnings because of the inefficiency of the market.
Both the Bhattacharya and Miller and Rock models use dividends as a positive
signal concerning the firm’s prospects. However, dividend taxation can also be viewed
as undesirable, especially when dividend payments are taxed at a higher rate compared
to capital. So is it attractive to use dividends as a form of signal? Compared to
dividends, stock repurchases could save investors more taxes. The weakness of the
Bhattacharya (1979) model is that a perfect substitution between dividends and stock
repurchases is assumed, but this is false when tax is considered. Unlike Bhattacharya
(1979), John and Williams (1985) build a model in which taxes are the dissipative costs2
and find that it is less costly to use stock repurchases as the form of signal instead of
dividends.
Contrary to previous papers, DeAngelo et al. (1996), who examine a sample of
145 firms’ annual earnings growth, point out that there is no significant indication of
dividend signalling for future earnings performance. Similar work by Benartzi et al.
(1997) finds no evidence that dividend changes convey information about future earn-
ings growth. More empirical research contributes to this area but with arguments for the
effect of the signalling theory. Fuller and Goldstein (2005) suggest that the signalling
theory better explains the dividend puzzle, than the prospect theory3. They use monthly
2Dissipative costs are costs that occur to firms rearranging its future financing decisions and
investment decisions when they signal dividends.
3Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This theory focuses on de-
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returns data and distinguish between dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying
firms4. Their results show that dividend-paying stocks outperform non-dividend-paying
stocks when the market is in a downside. A recent study of Nam et al. (2010) also
provides results that dividend-paying stocks perform better than non-dividend-paying
stocks.
Regarding investors’ willingness to receive cash and stocks dividends, Dong et al.
(2005) investigate a sample of Dutch individual investors and find that investors prefer
dividends due to the consideration of transaction costs of selling stocks. They emphasise
that signalling theory is supported by their survey when they study the preferences of
receiving dividends or not by investors.
Besides studying the information content of dividends per se, several researchers
believe that dividend policy changes do convey information to investors. For additional
papers focusing on the signal of dividend changes, see Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Akhigbe
et al. (1993), Brav et al. (2005), Li and Lie (2006) and Leary and Michaely (2010)
amongst others.
2.2.3.2 Agency models - asymmetric information
When shareholders face incomplete contracts or regularities, they prefer getting divi-
dends because it is a way to remind managers to maximise the share value. Additionally,
if firms are under insolvency, shareholders can only get residual profits after debtholders.
To shareholders, receiving dividends is an imminent profit they can have. However, it
is difficult and costly to make a contract complete which involves the consent from the
board of directors, the management team and investors. The separation of managers,
bondholders and shareholders is the major factor that causes agency problems, which
is compounded by the fact that there is asymmetric information among these parties.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) emphasise that it is better to control and manage a firm if
the ownership of the firm’s shares belongs to a large group rather than many individuals.
scribing how individuals make decisions with some alternatives having good and bad sides. The good
side is the gains of the outcome while the bad part is taking a risk to lose money. This theory indicates
that individuals are risk averse when they face losses rather than gains.
4Fuller and Goldstein (2005) assume that a firm having quarterly-dividend-paying stocks is consid-
ered as a dividend-paying firm, otherwise, as a non-dividend-paying firm.
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It also helps to minimise the costs resulting from the separation of corporate ownership
and control. Villalonga and Amit (2006), studying the agency costs associated with
Founder-CEO5 and nonfamily firms, find that the owner-manager conflict is less costly
in the Founder-CEO firms than the nonfamily firms.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider the agency costs incurred by three interacting
parties: managers, debtholders and shareholders. Managers are hired by shareholders
to assist them running the business. Intuitively, managers’ incomes do not come solely
from the value of the firm. Therefore, managers might make less effort or take advan-
tage of the company’s properties to benefit themselves privately. They carefully consider
how much risk they may have to take and appear to avoid any letting other people to
take risk (i.e. moral hazard theory [Pauly (1968), Arrow (1968), Zeckhauser (1970)
and Mirrlees (1999)]). Moreover, managers may abandon some valuable investment
plans due to high risks which affect the security of their jobs if firms go bankrupt (i.e.
adverse selection [Greenwald (1986) and Balakrishnan and Koza (1993)]). Jensen and
Meckling term these as agency problems. Shareholders may wish to minimise agency
problems, but this enhanced control may be costly, impacting on profitability.
Cadenillas et al. (2004) introduce a model of firms with risk-averse managers. Mauer
and Sarkar (2005) incorporate agency conflicts and optimal capital structure into a real
option model to examine the timing difference of exercise between value-maximising and
equity-maximising firms. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) examine the incentive problems
with external financing by presenting a dynamic investment structure model. Their
findings show that these incentive problems are highly related to the firm’s investment
decisions, rate of dividend payments etc, rather than to any kind of specific moral
hazard problems.
Berkovitch et al. (2000) consider managers’ incentives in their model. By contrast,
Berk et al. (2010) focus on analysing the human capital risk rather than managerial
incentives. They build a model to present the implications of compensation contracts.
In their model, they set the managerial entrenchment as the decisive element for the
optimal leverage ratio.
5A firm is founded by its CEO is called the Founder-CEO firm.
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2.2.3.3 Agency costs - free cash flow hypothesis
While investors wish to maximise the share price of the firm, managers may instead
prefer to maximise turnover. This is because turnover is highly positively correlated with
CEO compensation [Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Crawford et al. (1995), Hubbard
and Palia (1995) and Murphy (1999)]. Therefore, the more cash that is left in the firm,
the higher the probability that free cash flows will be over-used. To avoid this kind
of agency problem, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that
dividend payments are adjusted to make it more difficult for managers to overinvest.
It is, however, still a worry that managers would use other ways to overinvest since it
is impossible to absolutely monitor managers as monitoring costs are very high. The
following studies find that the most important trigger is the manager’s self-interest on
making profitable investment projects and providing shareholders stable growth dividend
payouts. This not only solves the agency problem, but also gives positive dividend
payments to shareholders [see Zwiebel (1996), Fluck (1999), Myers (2000) and Allen
et al. (2000)].
The next substantial agency problem is the underinvestment problem. It is risky for
growth firms to have high debt levels. Managers, facing a high leverage ratio, appear
to limit flows of investment to minimise any uncertain risk. Hence it is possible that
managers would skip potentially positive NPV investment projects. A lot of potential
profits therefore are missed. Some papers then argue that an optimal payout decision
helps to balance the firm’s cash flows. For papers discussing under- and over-investment
see Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Berkovitch and Kim (1990), Morellec and Smith Jr
(2005) and Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2007).
2.2.3.4 Agency costs - life-cycle theory
DeAngelo et al. (2006) assert that dividend payments vary over the firm’s life cycle.
Firms have to keep cash flows for profitable investment opportunities in the early years
and thus there are lower cash payments. When the status of a firm becomes stable
and mature, firms receive profits and will increase dividends. The aim of the firm is to
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maximise its optimal dividend payments by adjusting its free cash flows for investment
opportunities in the long-run. By maximising a firm’s optimal dividend payment, there
are no any cash flows wasted and hence agency problems in terms of under- and over-
investment are solved. Denis and Osobov (2008) also find empirical evidence that
important determinants of the propensity to pay dividends are strongly related to firm
size, profitability, growth opportunities, the ratio of retained earnings to total equity.
2.2.4 Transaction costs & institutional constraints
The reason that investors prefer paying-dividend stocks may be because investors seek
steady incomes rather than dynamic capital gains. If investors plan to sell stocks, they
have to consider transaction costs. On the contrary, they do not need to worry about
this issue if they choose to receive dividends [Allen and Michaely (2002)]. Constan-
tinides (1990)’s habit formation theory indicate that investors want consumption go be
very smooth over time. In order to achieve this aim, investors would use their incomes
(wages and dividends) as a help to smooth consumption. Therefore, a stable income
apart from salaries is important to them.
Some circumstances, however, do not support this explanation for why investors
prefer dividends. For instance, in an environment with low transaction costs, dividends
are then not attractive to investors anymore. From this point, investors may wish to
have share repurchases, which makes the firm to take investors’ preferences into consid-
eration when they make dividend decisions. Dividend payments are hence substituted
by share repurchases, which may be more tax efficient.
Even if the transaction costs theory has been questioned, Dong et al. (2005) provide
supportive evidence showing that investors prefer to receive dividends. Their survey
investigates Dutch individual investors and shows that investors still think cashing in
dividends is less costly than selling stocks.
From the corporation’s point of view, a firm may choose to use dividends rather than
share repurchases because of institutional constraints. In some countries, it is forbidden
for firms to purchase their shares back. This kind of institutional constraint limits the
company’s potential to eliminate a heavy tax burden. Based on these legal restrictions,
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managers need to find an optimal way for paying dividends to their investors. For this
reason, dividend policy is relevant to the firm’s earnings.
2.2.5 Theoretical behavioural models
In the life-cycle theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984), it is believed that investors
have more self-control when they view their incomes from a long-term perspective.
As mentioned before, investors plan to have a stable consumption pattern over time
and cash dividends may be better than stock dividends to help them to achieve this
aim. Shefrin and Statman (1984) find that this is more clearly true for retired people.
This is because they do not have labour income and thus prefer to cash in dividends.
Fuller and Goldstein (2005) also find that investors tend to prefer receiving dividends in
bear markets. This can be explained by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Investors respond heavily to losses rather than to gains. In a recession, the
probability of getting losses is higher than having gains. Shareholders worry about their
income because of uncertainty. From this point of view, investors prefer dividends than
capital gains. However, it can be counter-argued that it is not better to have cash
dividends in a bad economy as the firm may not be able to pay out promised dividends.
If the firm has to pay dividends and then goes bankrupt, the insolvency process does
not provide any better solution. Therefore, prospect theory cannot fully explain why
investors prefer receiving cash dividends.
2.2.6 Managerial surveys
Lintner (1956) asserts that corporate dividends actually move in a smooth manner over
time. He surveyed corporate CEOs and CFOs for the study of corporate dividend policy
and found out that corporations prefer smoothing dividend payments to minimise neg-
ative information delivered to investors. He emphasises that major factors influencing
managers’ payout policy decision are the level of current retained earnings and expected
future earnings of a firm. For similar survey studies see Baker et al. (1985), Farrelly
et al. (1986), Pruitt and Gitman (1991), Baker and Powell (2000), and Baker et al.
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(2001).
A number of empirical investigations provide evidence to support Lintner’s (1956)
findings [Fama and Babiak (1968), DeAngelo et al. (1992), Benartzi et al. (1997),
Baker et al. (2001)]. Farrelly et al. (1986) emphasise that an optimal dividend policy
exists and the value of the firm is influenced by its payout policy [Lease (2000) also
shows that dividends have impacts on the value of the firm]. Kumar (1988) point out
that managers notice that dividend changes can be a signal of the firm’s prospect, and
therefore believe that a steady dividend policy is the best choice. Baker et al. (2001)
carry out a survey of NASDAQ-listed firms to study the managerial point of view on
dividend policy. Their results support Lintner’s (1956) findings and show that dividend
policy is influenced by the industry type.
2.2.7 Residual dividend policy
In signalling theory, scholars assume that dividends lead earnings. By contrast, some
researchers claim that earnings lead dividends from the viewpoint of a residual dividend
policy. Lang Robert and Larry (1989) show that the market reacts greater to dividend
changes because of a signal of a low Tobin’s q ratio6. Dividends will decrease if the firm
has unstable earnings. This implies earnings lead dividends, which is different to the
claim in signalling theory. Alli et al. (1993) support the residual dividend theory that
firms pay dividends after making their investment decisions. Baker and Smith (2006)
examine the characteristics of firms taking residual dividend policy and provide results
that firms with residual dividend policy (a) have low levels of free cash flow, (b) have
a low leverage ratio, (c) are in a large firm scale, and (d) are more profitable.
6q = market value of installed capital/Replacement cost of capital
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2.2.8 The relationship between net cash flows and aggregate
dividends
In this thesis, aggregate dividends are defined as net cash flows to equity investors,
which can be defined as
Net cash flows = (Gross) Dividends + Stock repurchases - Equity issues
Some theoretical models assume there are no stock repurchases and equity issues
in the economy. In this case, net cash flows are equal to aggregate dividends. In some
other cases, there are no equity issues but stock repurchases. Therefore the net cash
flows are the sum of dividends and stock repurchases [Grullon and Michaely (2002)].
In order to analyse the cyclicality of net cash flows and gross dividends individually,
data for gross dividends, stock repurchases and equity issues are collected, so is data
for Gross National Product (GNP). Annual data for the nominal total dollar amount of
dividends declared on the common stock and nominal equity repurchases are borrowed
from Grullon and Michaely (2002). Nominal equity issues are taken from Baker and
Wurgler (2000). Total nominal net cash flows (NCF) are the sum of nominal gross
dividends (GDiv), nominal equity repurchases and nominal equity issues. Data for
GNP is the seasonally adjusted annual rate and obtained from the US Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. All the nominal data is detrended into real
data by the customer price index (CPI) used in Shiller (1992)7.
NCF take into account not only GDiv but also stock repurchases and issues. One can
also consider NCF as total payouts. Table 2.2.1 contains results of (a) the correlations
between NCF and GNP and (b) the correlations between GDiv and GNP for several
sample periods. For the whole period 1973 - 2000, NCF and GDiv are procyclical but
NCF is less strongly correlated with the movement of GNP, i.e. Corr(NCF,GNP ) =
0.26 and Corr(GDiv,GNP ) = 0.40. The results from breaking down the whole
period into two sub-periods show that the correlation between NCF and GNP is stronger
7Professor Robert J. Shiller provides stock market data, used in his book Irrational Exuberance,
Broadway Books 2005, 2nd ed., on the website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
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during the second non-overlapping period 1987 - 2000 (Corr(NCF,GNP ) = 0.49),
compared to the first period 1973 - 1986 (Corr(NCF,GNP ) = 0.25). The third
set of sub-periods covers three non-overlapping periods (1973 - 1982, 1983 - 1992,
1993 - 2000). The results show that total net cash flows and dividends have a positive
relationship with GNP during the three sub-periods, despite a weak correlation between
NCF and GNP in early years is obtained. GDiv is however less strongly connected to
GNP during 1983 - 1993. In brief, the empirical data displays that both NCF (i.e. the
total payouts) and GDiv (gross dividends) are procyclical during 1973 - 2000 to some
extent. Moreover, NCF has a weak positive relationship with GNP in the early years,
e.g. the years between 1973 - 1982.
The co-movement between GNP and either NCF or GDiv is plotted and displayed
in Figure 2.2.1. This figure presents time-series data of log on real NCF, real GDiv
and real GNP from 1973 to 2000. The secondary axis is provided for the time-series
data of GNP. NCF are much more volatile and do not always have a similar movement
trend with GNP, which means that sometimes it occurs that NCF decreases during
booms and vice versa. Compared to NCF, the movement trend of GDiv is much more
consistent with that of GNP.
Overall, it is found that the empirical data shows (a) both total payouts and divi-
dends are procyclical, and (b) total payouts are occasionally less strongly correlated to
GNP even though they are procyclical. The difference between these two sets of results
(Corr(NCF,GNP ) and Corr(GDiv,GNP )) is because NCF concern not only gross
dividends but also equity repurchases and equity issues.
In the situation in which a residual dividend policy is considered in the model, cash
flows after the investment and financing decisions are left for payout decisions. If there
are no events of buying back equity and issuing more equity, one can therefore consider
NCF to be GDiv. The empirical data shows that both NCF and GDiv are positively cor-
related to GNP. In this thesis, ignoring stock repurchases and issues, net cash flows are
considered as total dividends and paid out as cash dividends to investors. However, in
theoretical studies, it is not always the case that theoretical models simulate procyclical
dividends. Some prior studies obtain procyclical dividends and several theoretical stud-
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Table 2.2.1: The relationships between real total net cash flows to real Gross
National Product and between real gross dividends and real Gross National Product
This table presents two sets of correlations during three different periods. The first set includes
correlations between real net cash flows (NCF) and real Gross National Product (GNP). The second
set includes correlations between real gross dividends (GDiv) and GNP. Figures are calculated based on
three periods: (i) the whole period from 1973 to 2000, (ii) two non-overlapping sub-periods between
1973 and 2000, (iii) three non-overlapping sub-periods between 1973 and 2000. Net cash flows are
the sum of gross dividends, equity repurchases and equity issues which are obtained from Grullon and
Michaely (2002) and Baker and Wurgler (2000). Data for Gross National Product is collected from
the US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. All the data is detrended into real
data by Shiller (1992)’s customer price index (CPI).
Sub-periods (not overlapping) Corr(NCF, GNP) Corr(GDiv, GNP)
The whole period 1973-2000 0.26 0.40
Two sub-periods 1973-1986 0.25 0.47
1987-2000 0.49 0.45
Three sub-periods 1973-1982 0.22 0.45
1983-1992 0.49 0.25
1993-2000 0.60 0.60
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Figure 2.2.1: Log on real total net cash flows, real aggregate dividends and real
Gross National Product between 1973 and 2000
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ies simulate countercyclical dividends. For example, a recent paper by Amdur (2010)
presents that equity payouts are positively correlated with output. Alessandrini (2003)’s
model, however, simulates countercyclical theoretical aggregate dividends in dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium.
In subsequent chapters, I show both situations in which some theoretical models
simulate countercyclical dividends and some obtain procyclical dividends. Relevant
details are discussed later.
2.3 Business cycles and economic growth theory
2.3.1 Business cycles and stylised facts
The business cycle8 refers to fluctuations in production over an extended period of time.
These fluctuations are derived from economic activities but do not go along with any
automatic predictable prototype. A cycle consists of expansion, recession, contraction
and revival then converges to the next cycle. Any section of this cycle is formed by a
number of economic activities which occur nearly at the same time. The major financial
fluctuations are random, seasonal, trend and business cycle. A widespread method, the
Hodrick-Prescott filter9, can assist us in distinguishing which general trend of growth
follows after the cyclical movement and how smoothly it will develop. It will also help
us to classify non-steady fluctuations.
Empirical research based on market data has found three primary regularities over
the business cycle (called “stylised facts”):
1. Persistence
Fluctuations in the economy are volatile over time and are predictable in the
short run. It is challenging, however, to try to foresee movements in the long
8Burns and Mitchell (1946) is the earliest paper, to the best of my knowledge, to define business
cycle.
9The Hodrick-Prescott filter was suggested in the field of the economics by Conrad Emanuel Victor
Leser (an econometrician) and become popular at the point of time that Hodrick, R.J. and Prescott,
E.C launched it into their model. It is used broadly for non-linear models in time-series for analysing
long-term fluctuations. It applies a multiplier for the adjustment of the sensitivity of the trend to
short-term fluctuations between the extent. This filter then has been used frequently in real business
cycle theory.
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run. Lucas (1975) provides evidence that variable capital stock has a vital impact
on persistence.
2. Cyclical variability
An estimated standard deviation of each real variable involved in the economy
helps to study the relative scale of fluctuation of each variable in business cycles.
Some variables have a much more unstable variation over time than others.
3. Co-movement of output with other macroeconomic variables
It is interesting to observe that different cyclical types of variables have diverse
correlations with output. Normally, procyclical variables (e.g. labour, consump-
tion and investment) have positive correlations with the economic fluctuations
and vice versa. That is, the quantities of procyclical variables will increase when
the economy is booming, such as Gross Domestic Product. Unemployment is,
however, countercyclical. The lower quantity of unemployment can boost the
business growth during booms. If the measure of the correlation between output
and another variable is nearly zero, then there is no strong co-movement rela-
tionship with the business cycle. In this case, it is called “acyclical”. Empirical
data shows that capital stock seems to be acyclical.
2.3.2 The long-term path - the economic growth
Economic growth theory centres on the long-run dynamic movements of the economy
while business cycle theory focuses on short-term economic stabilisation. Technological
progress plays a vital and necessary role in determining growth.
Rebelo (2005) has pointed out that Kydland and Prescott (1982) indicate that
general equilibrium models can interpret business cycles. Kydland and Prescott (1982)
demonstrate that it is possible to merge studies of business cycle theory and growth
theory into one model if the business cycle model is calibrated to what empirical research
has found about long-term growth. The major finding is that real variables have grown
steadily over cycles. The empirical data of the United States from 1954 - 1985 shows
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that per capita values of the main indices (e.g. real GDP, capital and consumption)
are growing steadily over time (see Plosser (1989)).
A paper by Solow (1957) points out that technological progress is a major factor for
determining economic growth. Economic growth theory, in contrast, works on the trend
of business activities in the long-run, while business cycles theory studies fluctuations
of variables in the short-run. Hence, technological progress plays a vital and necessary
role in determining growth.
An influential paper by King et al. (1988) shows the necessary restrictions on ad-
ditively and multiplicative separable momentary utility forms on production and prefer-
ences if the model is intended to obtain balanced growth. They discuss restrictions on
preferences under with three key points:
1. The model requires holding the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) in
consumption constant in order to have a constant steady state of the marginal
product of capital (MPK, i.e. the firm’s capital stock divided by its total output).
The economy, therefore, is in a state of balanced-growth equilibrium. Based
on this limitation, the kind of utility function for consumption in an additively
separable RBC model can be power and log utility, but not exponential utility.
The objection function of exponential utility for consumption and any type utility
for leisure could not reach a balanced growth.
2. Balanced growth theory emphasises that the condition of a constant steady-
state labour supply needs to hold in income and substitution effects of consumer
theory. The income effect is related to the changes of consumption resulting
from changes in real wage income, while the substitution effect is the effect of
one variable resulting from changes in price of another relative variable. Based on
this condition, in order to get a constant steady-state labour supply, it is required
that utility for consumption has to be a log form if it is an additively separable
utility function is assumed in the model.
3. Leisure per capita appear to be stable between centuries while real wage have
grown steadily. This implies that the elasticity of substitution between consump-
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tion and leisure is near to unity. It implies that both intertemporal and intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution of parameters in the model ought to be constant.
This is significant for defining utility over consumption and leisure across periods.
If the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to one,
the representative household’s utility function must be in an additive form con-
sisting of a log utility for consumption. Otherwise, when the value of the elasticity
of substitution is not equal to one, the investor’s utility function for consumption
and leisure is in a nonadditive form. That is, if the elasticity of substitution is
equal to one, the utility function is a log-log or log- “linear derived” formula for
consumption and leisure respectively. This momentary utility form is the so-called
additively separable model.
2.3.3 Dynamic macroeconomic models
The basic neoclassical model captures two types of dynamic macroeconomic models,
the growth models and business-cycle models (or called Keynesian macroeconomic
models). The growth models include three components of economic activity: capital
formation, population and productivity growth while Keynesian macroeconomic models
study the mutual influence of consumption and investment. Solow (1956) initially
modifies a growth model over the real business cycle (RBC hereafter) which is called
the neoclassical dynamic growth model. Contemporary researchers also contribute to
this dynamic model [see Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965)]. Afterwards, Brock and
Mirman (1972) introduce shocks to technology into the standard neoclassical growth
model. This model shows that the economy not only dynamically evolves over time but
also stochastically moves with the aggregate technology shocks.
In RBC, macroeconomic models are constructed by introducing real shocks rather
than nominal shocks (e.g., a shock to nominal interest rates). These models are used
to examine business cycle fluctuations in a large long-term growth trend rather than
short-term movements. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE here-
after) are transitional models derived from the basic neoclassical model. DSGE models
investigate the development of the economy over time through random shocks (e.g.
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macroeconomic variables, such as technological changes) based on the general equilib-
rium theory10. DSGE modelling aims to explore aggregate economic fluctuations over
the business cycle in a long term prospect. The literature of DSGE models will be
discussed comprehensively in Section 3.2.
Kydland and Prescott (1982) propose the application of DSGE modelling and took
the results into account for the implications of stylised facts. That is, they developed
an equilibrium model with growth theory and business cycle theory and used the model
to explain the autocovariances of output and the covariances of output with other
variables. The substantial work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) evaluates a preference-
technology-information structure of the model with non-time-separable utility11. Their
model shows that the variability of investment is high and that of consumption and
capital stock are relatively low. In addition, consumption, investment, labour hours and
productivity have high correlations with output. Moreover, they test the same model
with generated parameters and empirical U.S. economic data in the post-war period
for comparing the similarities and deviations. A part of their findings, labour hours for
instance, shows that the variability of labour is larger than that of productivity in the
model. This is of greater magnitude than is observed in the empirical data.
The technology shock that Kydland and Prescott (1982) employ in their model is
the sum of a permanent component and a transitory component with the permanent
shock and transitory shock individually subject to stochastic processes. Unlike Kydland
and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983) assume that the technology shock is
independent and identically distributed12 in a time-homogeneous Markov process13.
That is, there is no technological change and hence the cyclical regularities cannot be
explained by the model directly. Long and Plosser (1983) attempt to understand the
10General equilibrium theory discusses an equilibrium across the whole market (the supply, demand
and prices)
11Lucas (1975) finds that a non-time-separable utility function is essential to account for the fluctu-
ations in business cycle in employment and consumption. Based on the theory of household production
theory and cross-sectional evidence, non-time-separable utility provides greater intertemporal substitu-
tion of leisure which helps to account for the aggregate movements in the perspective of employment
in equilibrium models.
12Independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) expresses that each variable has an equal probability
distribution and is mutually independent.
13The time-homogeneous Markov process gives the uncertainty of production with respect to that
the conditional distribution of the future technology shock relies on the time interval and the value of
the present technology shock.
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magnitude of consumption-production plans in competitive general equilibrium models.
Although these two papers have different assumptions of concerning technology shocks,
both of them highlighted that technology shocks are essentially significant for explaining
the fluctuations of business cycles.
RBC models have also been studied by Rebelo (2005) and McGrattan (2006). Re-
belo (2005) puts the emphasis on four points: (a) the performance of stock prices; (b)
what factors drove the Great Depression; (c) what are the sources of fluctuation over
business cycle; and (d) the importance of role of technology shocks. McGrattan (2006)
then concentrates on introducing the Kydland-Prescott modelling process and offers a
brief review on extensions of RBC-based models. King and Rebelo (2000) and Rebelo
(2005) have constructed extensions of neoclassical growth RBC models.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter has briefly reviewed a literature relating to dividend policy, business cy-
cle and economic growth theory. It has examined how Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s
Dividend Irrelevance Theorem and Black (1976) Dividend Puzzle Theory have inspired
both theoretical and empirical approaches to study of the role of dividend policy to
corporation and investors, the determinant of dividend payout decisions and conse-
quences related to the stock market. In addition, it has identified the relationship
between corporate net cash flows and net equity payouts. It has also explored the gen-
eral macroeconomic environment and the evolution of the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium modelling. Compared to the standard literature corporate finance approach
to study dividend policy from a micro-based perspective, this thesis focuses on the sen-
sitivity of aggregate dividend policy to corporate and investor’s activities, particularly
investment decisions, production processes and consumer behaviour.
In subsequent chapters, I model the economy in which corporate dividend policy is
endogenous in an aggregated market, together with various frictions, and examine the
simultaneous interaction between aggregate payouts and market activities.
CHAPTER 3
THE IMPLICATION OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
FOR DSGE MODELS
34
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I calibrate three general equilibrium models. The first model is a
stochastic growth model in business cycle theory: the Hansen (1985) model. I then
extend it by incorporating dividend policy, which was not considered by Hansen (1985).
For my third model, I extend the second model to take external financing schemes
into account and to examine optimal aggregate dividends in dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) when an optimal dynamic capital structure is obtained. The results
I obtain for the first and second calibrations are similar to those reported by Hansen
(1985) and Alessandrini (2003), but, for all three models, I use a mix of software
techniques (MATLAB and DYNARE) which was not employed by Alessandrini (2003).
This leads to some differences in the results reported for the third calibration.
Initially I replicate the Hansen model and examine business cycle statistics in a
stochastic state because of random technology shocks. The Hansen model incorporates
the feature that employees are hired to work full time or they are unemployed, thus,
restricting the ability of employees to choose working hours in each period. In order to
capture this feature, a probability of working is introduced in the labour variable and a
representative household’s optimisation problem is solved for labour and consumption.
This model, however, is based only on the representative household’s problem and
thus it lacks information on optimal corporate behaviour. Following literature number
of previous studies [Jermann (1998), Lettau and Uhlig (2000), Alessandrini (2003),
Santoro and Wei (2009), Gourio and Miao (2010), etc], my second study in this chapter
calibrates a DSGE model with corporate dividend policy in a competitive equilibrium
environment. My results, very similar to Alessandrini (2003)’s results, show that optimal
aggregate dividends are (a) very volatile, which is higher than the observed data and
(b) highly correlated to output but countercyclical. In addition, other real variable such
as investment, labour and output are slightly variable in the with-dividend-policy DSGE
model compared to the basic stochastic model.
My third calibration in this chapter is to extend the second model to additional issues
including external financing, bankruptcy and taxation. The motivation comes from that
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the effect of a tax advantage on debt (also called the tax shield effect) encourages each
individual firm to seek for an optimal capital structure. While individual firms maximise
their tax savings from issuing debt, they also need to take care of their leverage levels
in case they go bankrupt. As a consequence, a dynamic optimal capital structure is
obtained in equilibrium. In between this situation, investment cash flows are influenced
by the financing decisions of firms and thus dividends as a residual cash flow are more
volatile.
In this chapter, a detailed table is provided including information of steady state,
variability, correlation and cyclicality for aggregate dividend payouts and other major
economic statistics (consumption, investment, output, labour, etc). My results are simi-
lar to those reported in previous studies but are more robust because the solution method
for stochastic simulations uses a mixture of software; MATLAB and DYNARE. Previous
papers Juillard (1996), Collard and Juillard (2001b), Collard and Juillard (2001a) and
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) use DYNARE in addition to MATLAB for computing
stochastic simulations and obtain more robust simulated results through a faster route.
This is because this software is designed to use a Taylor approximation which is equal
to third order expansion of the expectation functions, as opposed to the second order
used more commonly.
In conclusion, the third investigation of this chapter, in contrast to the first and
second calibrations, is more delicate and paves the way for further studies reported
in subsequent chapters of this thesis. These seek for the optimal level of aggregate
payouts in the presence of market frictions.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides an extensive liter-
ature review on real business cycle (RBC) based DSGE models. Section 3.3 describes
the three models that are being investigated in this chapter. Section 3.4 shows the
model implementation. Section 3.5 calibrates each model. Solving methods are pro-
vided in section 3.6. Section 3.7 presents results and discussion. Section 3.8 concludes.
Appendices for this chapter are in section 3.9.
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW: VARIANTS OF REAL-BUSINESS-CYCLE (RBC)
BASED DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (DSGE) MODELS 37
3.2 Literature review: variants of real-business-
cycle (RBC) based dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models
The purpose of this section is to briefly recap the similarities and differences among
four major specifications of DSGE models. A review of several papers that touch upon
the implication of investment and financing decisions for DSGE models is also done.
Table 3.2.1 sums up a set of comparisons across four types of DSGE model. The
major development of the specifications of DSGE models is:
1. Kydland and Prescott (1982) vs. Hansen (1985) (cell A2 in Table 3.2.1)
The standard RBC model was originally derived by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
This paper holds a central and fundamental position in stochastic growth mod-
elling over the business cycle, not only in the stream of descriptive research
on studying the implications of business fluctuations but also in the stream of
methodological model building. Their model assumes an environment in which
individuals are always working; i.e the event of unemployment was not considered
in their model setting.
Their model fails to account for the phenomena of the enormous volatility in
working hours and comparatively small movements in productivity. One of their
findings showed that the elasticity of labour supply to the changes in wages is
high, which is not compatible with the results of the empirical data. These
conflicting findings triggered a main strand of extensions of RBC models which
then tried to identify the cause of the problem and to improve it by studying
the labour (supply) market [Hansen (1985), Rosen (1986), Cho and Rogerson
(1988), Rogerson and Wright (1988) and Cho and Cooley (1994)].
Hansen (1985) starts to bring in the issue of an indivisible labour supply market
into the model calibration. The key assumption is that he argues that the number
of continuously employed hours is the major cause for these phenomena. He
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observes that the number of hours worked should be determined along with the
probability of unemployment, i.e. individuals may not work at all. This modified
variable of aggregate employment hours dominates and makes the individual’s
preference of utility function non-convex. The individual’s marginal productivity
from working is monotonic increasing but concave due to the existence of the
elasticity of substitution between leisure and working.
2. Hansen (1985) vs. DSGE Model with Endogenised Investment and Optimal
Capital Structure (OCS) decisions (cell B3 in Table 3.2.1)
Most of the revised DSGE models follow the calibrating process of Hansen (1985).
This is because Hansen (1985) makes a sensible assumption that the labour
market should be determined over time. The major difference between his paper
and the followers’ models is that the latter also consider endogenising financing
decisions. Their dynamic equilibrium stochastic models allow external financing.
The firm has options to loan money from the bank or issue equity. Due to the
conflicts between debtholders and equityholders, the firm needs to solve an OCS
to meet the needs of both sides.
Some papers study the interaction between capital structure and the industry dy-
namics by incorporating the theory of stationary equilibrium [Hopenhayn (1992),
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Hackbarth et al.
(2006), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007)]. Hopenhayn (1992)’s model examines
financial-market frictions and account for the size dependence of firm dynam-
ics. In Cooley and Quadrini (2001), they factor in the persistent shocks into a
model of industry dynamics. They generate dimensions of heterogeneity for both
size and age of the firm and discover that by using the combination of persistent
shocks and financial frictions, the model is able to justify the firm dynamics simul-
taneously on size of equity and age of the firm which is not done by Hopenhayn
(1992). Hopenhayn (1992) and Miao (2005) both incorporate competitive equi-
librium models under idiosyncratic shocks. The difference between their works
is that Miao (2005) use contingent claims analysis for providing advanced infor-
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mation about the relationship between the firm’s leverage (the capital structure)
and firm turnover. Hackbarth et al. (2006) construct a dynamic capital structure
model with macroeconomic conditions. They argue that the benefit and cost of
debt from the trade-off theorem should depend on macroeconomic conditions.
Moreover, expected bankruptcy costs should depend on the current state of the
economy condition as well. Hence, the optimal leverage should be affected by
macroeconomic conditions. Their model predicts that the market leverage should
be countercyclical. Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) calibrate a dynamic model and
suggest that firms should adjust their debt ratios for the optimal target without
delay if the costs stemming from financial distress are greater than those from
conflicts between the interests of shareholders and debtholders. In their model,
the market value of the firm is endogenously resolved by its earnings. Meanwhile,
the investment choices, the capital structure, the earnings and the target debt
ratio are endogenously settled on the firm’s product price.
3. DSGE Model with Endogenised Investment and OCS decisions vs. Its Variant
(cell C4 in Table 3.2.1)
Both of these two types of models endogenise the investment and financing
decisions simultaneously. The latter type of model incorporates real issues (e.g.
taxation and default possibilities) or market frictions (e.g. additional technology
shocks, capital adjustment costs), or investor’s utility (the most cases are to
consider habit formation in consumption).
Alessandrini (2003) and Amdur (2008) have a similar theoretical foundation for
their model calibrations, which is, their objective is to study the implication of
capital structure in the production economy through DSGE models. Both of
them use the same computational technique proposed by Uhlig (1995) to solve
their models.
Amdur (2008) introduces financial frictions into the general equilibrium model by
incorporating two elements: the monitoring costs and the adjustment costs. Mon-
itoring costs occur when the firm tries to delay the time of going into bankruptcy.
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Adjustment costs are the costs when the firm plans to change the payout to its
shareholders. Normally firms would not often execute this option. Therefore,
this causes the dividend payments to change smoothly over time. This indicator,
the adjustment cost, is not only used by Amdur (2008) but also by Jermann
and Quadrini (2006). The difference between these two papers is that Amdur
(2008) calculates the deviation of today’s equity payout from yesterday’s as the
adjustment factor instead of that of the deviation of today’s equity payout from
its long-term target taken by Jermann and Quadrini (2006). Amdur (2008)’s
results show that firms appear to have higher leverage ratios during booms to
finance their investment plans and also to pay high level of dividends to their
shareholders.
Levy and Hennessy (2007) construct a computable general equilibrium model
of optimal financing and investment over the business cycle by incorporating the
condition that firms can seek the source of external finance, issuing debt or equity.
The financing constraints in the model are endogenously determined. There is
a constraint on the ratio of external equity to managerial equity. Their model
incorporated managerial agency problems. The first agency problem is related to
shareholders, that managers may appropriate corporate earnings into their own
pockets by producing distorted annual reports. Another agency problem relates
to bondholders, that managers may appropriate corporate properties for private
use. In their calibration, the model shows that there is a countercyclical variation
in leverage ratios for firms with less financing constraints.
I further review papers that consider habit formation in their DSGE models in the
literature review section in chapter 4. A detailed review on papers considering the
friction of capital adjustment costs in DSGE models can be found in chapter 5.
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3.3 The models - Replications I, II and III
In this section, a standard Hansen (1985) model is replicated first. Then I extend the
replication by incorporating the issue of dividend policy. Third, the issue of external
financing decision is considered. The objectives of the three replications are:
Replication I: to show that the methodology of solving a social planner problem. The
replication work includes the theory of indivisible labour from Hansen (1985).
Replication II: to show that the methodology of solving problems in a competitive
equilibrium. It adds up a residual dividend policy to the typical Hansen (1985)
RBC model. The objective of this replication is to solve problems of a repre-
sentative agent and a representative firm in a competitive equilibrium. Three
market conditions (capital, labour and goods markets) are defined and equilib-
rium conditions are specified. The dividend policy is determined by the firm’s
investment decision. Problems of two representatives (agent and firm) are solved
simultaneously.
Replication III: to extend the Replication II by allowing the firm to have an external
financing decision.
The three replicating models are based on the RBC-based economic environment and
solved in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium economy. The traditional Hansen (1985)
model does not include the issue of paying dividends. The second model integrates a
residual dividend policy into the basic Hansen (1985) model. The third model is more
complex than the previous two as four issues are taken into account: (a) a residual
dividend policy; (b) taxation: company’s earnings are now taxed by a certain rate from
the government; (c) external financing decision: it allows the company to borrow money
from the bank for positive NPV investment projects although issuing corporate debts is
not discussed in the model; and (d) a probability of default is made possible through a
bankruptcy process. Table 3.3.1 summarises the specification of each replication. Next,
the required environment for Replication I, II and III is specified (information about the
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Table 3.3.1: The specification of Replication I, II and III
Replication I aims to solve the social planner’s problem while Replication II and III work on solving both
the representative firm’s and the household’s optimisation problems. The model assumption on the
market specification is the main difference between these three replications. Replication I calibrates
the standard Hansen (1985) model in which employees either work full time or are unemployed in
each period. To extend Replication I, capital structure is considered in Replication II. Endogenised
optimal investment and financing decisions are decided simultaneously. Replication III is built based
on Replication II and additionally employs tax and default issues. All assumptions for the main evolved
DSGE models refer to Table 3.2.1.
Replication I Replication II Replication III
Objective of study Social planner’s problem Competitive equilibrium
Definition One objective function is
specified and solved.
Multi-markets in the economy. Equilibrium
is satisfied when the objective function for
each sector (firms, investors) is solved.
Equilibrium
condition(s)
First-order conditions
(FOC) from solving the
household’s optimisation
problem.
FOCs from solving the firm’s and the
household’s optimisation problem. Market
clearing conditions for an equilibrium of
multi-markets.
Assumptions
(refer to Table 3.2.1)
B2 C3 D4
essential environment that a standard DSGE model should have is provided in Appendix
3.9.1).
3.3.1 Replication I: the Hansen (1985) model
The first replication model is a one-sector stochastic growth model with indivisible
labour1 (refer to Hansen (1985)). The social planner aims to solve the representative
agent’s problem by maximising the expected discounted utility over the agent’s lifetime.
The optimisation process aims to solve the household’s problem.
The representative household’s preferences are captured by a time-separable utility
function that includes consumption and leisure:
∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, 1− Lst+h) (3.3.1)
1Hansen (1985) claims that employees shall be employed either full or not be unemployed at all at
each period. It is not possible for employees to choose and change their working hours all the time
once they are hired (i.e. indivisible labour). He then introduces an endogenous probability of working
hours into the stochastic growth model to capture that there are a proportion of people employed at
each period in the aggregated labour demand market. The representative household solves his/her
optimisation problem by maximising the utility with respect to consumption and labour following a
given condition of indivisible labour in the agent’s utility function.
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where β is the subjective discount factor, U(·) is the period utility function for con-
sumption and leisure, Ct+h is the level of consumption at time t+ h, Ls is the number
of hours worked in the labour supply market and the total number of hours available
is normalised to one. This results in 1− Lst+h being available for leisure at time t+ h.
The household looks to maximise its expected lifetime utility. At time t it can choose
the current level of consumption and the amount of labour. The representative agent’s
optimisation problem at time t therefore becomes:
max
Ct,Lst ,Kt
Et
[ ∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, 1− Lst+h)
]
(3.3.2)
subject to
Ct + It = Yt
Yt = ZtK
α
t−1L
1−α
t (3.3.3)
where the output, Yt of the representative firm at time t is given by a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function. Kt, Lt and Zt denote the capital employed by
the firm, the labour supplied to the firm and a stochastic technology shock respectively,
while α is the output elasticity of capital. The technology shock is assumed to follow
a first order autoregressive process in logs:
logZt = (1− ψ)logZ¯ + ψ logZt−1 + εt (3.3.4)
where ψ is the parameter of technology shock persistence and t is an independently
and identically normally distributed random variable; t ∼ N(0, σ2 ). The capital base
of the firm evolves according to:
Kt = It + (1− η)Kt−1, 0 < η < 1 (3.3.5)
where It represents net investment by the firm at time t and η denotes the fixed capital
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depreciation rate. Equation 3.3.5 represents the capital accumulation process. Capital
stocks evolve over time, capital in the next period is the current depreciated capital
plus investment.
3.3.2 Replication II: the Hansen (1985) model with dividend
policy
The second replicating study considers the issue of an optimal dividend policy [Alessan-
drini (2003)]. The major purpose of replicating this modified model is to show that
the economy is in a competitive equilibrium where dividend payouts are decided after
the firm’s investment decision, which is sensitive to the investor’s need to maximise
his/her utility. The model economy is populated by a continuum of identical firms and
households. Two optimisation problems from firms and households are solved simulta-
neously.
1. The household’s problem
The representative household’s specification in the competitive equilibrium is bor-
rowed from Uhlig (1995). I also consider an optimal endogenous labour in equi-
librium. The optimisation problem of the representative agent is given as:
max
Ct,Lst ,Kt
Et
[ ∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, 1− Lst+h)
]
subject to the budget constraint
Ct +Kt = WtLt +Rt−1Kt−1
whereWt is the wage rate for labour, and Rt−1 represents the gross rate of return
on capital supplied for the period [t−1, t] and is determined endogenously in this
model.
2. The firm’s problem
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max
Lt,Kt
Dt + Et[
∞∑
h=1
Mt,hDt+h] (3.3.6)
where
Dt = Yt −WtLt − It (3.3.7)
pit = Yt −WtLt (3.3.8)
It = Kt − (1− η)Kt−1 (3.3.9)
Mt,h is the stochastic discount factor and is determined by the representative
household’s optimisation process. The operating profits (pi) of each firm is de-
termined. The firm’s profits are used for investment and then the remaining part
(i.e. the retained earnings) is distributed to investors as the payment of dividends.
3.3.3 Replication III: a DSGE model with capital structure
theory
This part shows how to develop an extended DSGE model (called Replication III) of
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985) when there is an indivisible labour
market. In this framework, the assumption is made that there is one representative firm,
one representative household and one representative bank that all potentially survive
forever in the absence of bankruptcy. Equilibrium is reached when each is simultaneously
able to maximise its individual objective function subject to budget and market clearing
constraints.
Within this proposed model, there are a continuum of identical firms and households
in the model economy. A representative firm has a constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function incorporating stochastic technical shocks to capital and
the demand on labour. Optimal levels of consumption of the single consumption good,
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labour and capital will be determined simultaneously by the firm and the household.
1. Specification of the household’s problem
The representative household’s preferences are captured by a time-separable utility
function that includes consumption and leisure:
∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, 1− Lst+h)
There are capital markets that allow the household to adjust its consumption
profile across time. In particular, it can purchase Nt shares in the representative
firm and will hold BHt in risk-free securities over the interval [t, t + 1]. The
representative agent’s optimisation problem at time t therefore becomes:
max
Ct,Lst ,Nt,B
H
t
Et
[ ∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, 1− Lst+h)
]
subject to the budget constraint
Ct +QtNt+1 +B
H
t ≤ WtLst + (Qt +Dt)Nt +Rf,t−1BHt−1
where Qt is the share price of the representative firm at time t, N denotes the
quantity of shares, Dt denotes the dividends paid by the firm and Rf,t−1 represents
the gross risk-free rate for the period [t − 1, t] and is determined endogenously
(details in the Appendix 3.9.2).
2. The firm’s problem
The output is defined the same as in Replication I and II. However, as it is
in a competitive equilibrium, the labour in the production function is denoted
specifically to show that it is from the labour demand market:
Yt = ZtK
α
t−1(L
d
t )
1−α
where Ldt denote the labour demanded by the firm. In addition, Replication III
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assumes that the firm can augment its capital base by borrowing an amount Bt−1
for the interval [t − 1, t] at a gross corporate interest rate Rt−1 ≥ Rf,t−1. It is
assumed that the firm pays corporation tax at a fixed rate τ and that the interests
payment at time t, (Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1, is tax-deductible. Therefore, the free cash
flow of the firm before accounting for investments is given by:
pit = (1− τ)(Yt −WtLdt − (Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1) (3.3.10)
Net investment in the firm, It, is generated from this “profit”, pit, the net cash
flow from paying off last period’s debt and re-borrowing this period, Bt − Bt−1,
minus any dividend paid, Dt. In this framework, the dividend level is a residual
variable whose optimal value emerges naturally from the chosen investment and
capital structure choices. This defines It as
It = (1− τ)(Yt −WtLdt − (Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1) +Bt −Bt−1 −Dt
=⇒ Dt = (1− τ)(Yt −WtLdt −Rt−1Bt−1)− τBt−1 +Bt − It
= (1− τ) [ZtKαt−1(Ldt )1−α −WtLdt −Rt−1Bt−1]
−τBt−1 +Bt −Kt + (1− η)Kt−1
(3.3.11)
The objective of the firm’s managers is to maximise the current share price, or
equivalently, the present value of future dividend payments. They have three
control variables to enable them to do this; labour, capital employed and how
much borrowing is raised; Ldt , Kt, Bt:
max
Ldt ,Kt,Bt
Dt + Et
[ ∞∑
h=1
Mt,hDt+h
]
subject to the production function, intertemporal capital stock function, technol-
ogy shock process (refer to equations 3.3.5, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4) and the definition
of dividends given in equation 3.3.11.
3. The banking sector
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In our economy, the representative household has access to a risk-free asset for
saving at an interest rate of Rf,t and the firm can help fund its investment oppor-
tunities by borrowing at a corporate rate Rt. It is therefore assumed that there
exists a representative bank that is risk-neutral and, in expectation, non-profit
making; it is prepared to lend to the firm at a rate that gives an expected rate
of return equal to Rf,t. However, because of the risk of default, in general, the
quoted interest rate to the firm is greater than the risk-free rate. The relationship
between these two variables is described in this section. Before introducing the
construction of these two variables, the theory and the fundamental environment
for employing a banking sector in a RBC-based model presented in a key paper
is summarised below.
Inspiration
Introducing the banking sector is motivated by Alessandrini (2003) which employs
a bankruptcy process in the economy. Alessandrini (2003) argues that issues
related to financial markets have rarely been discussed by prior standard RBC-
based literature. His paper focuses on variations of debt over the business cycle
when it comes to how to balance the tax shield from debt and the cost of potential
financial distress. This thesis is in line with the paper to study corporate finance
issues but puts the emphasis on the impact of either the firm’s or the household’s
specification on fluctuations of dividend policy.
Environment
Alessandrini (2003) investigates determinants of capital structure in a production
economy. He assumes the firm seeks funds for investment from both internal
(retained earnings) and external (raise a loan from the bank) sources. By linking
the relationship between financing and investment decisions, an optimal capital
structure (OCS) is obtained in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Specifi-
cally, the representative firm maximises its present value of future cash flows by
solving the variables labour, capital and debt while the representative household
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maximises his/her discounted utility on consuming goods and leisure by solving
consumption, labour, the quantity of equities and the amount of risk-free bonds.
The equilibrium economy can be obtained once (a) a relationship between the
risky interest rate on the firm’s debt and the risk-free rate on the household’s
bonds is defined, and (b) each first order condition of the firm and the household
and market clearing conditions are satisfied simultaneously.
A firm considers several issues at the same time, including (a) a leverage level,
(b) a financial distress point in terms of default risk, and (c) the tax benefit
from the committed debt, and then the model provides an OCS implying a best
benchmark that balances the maximum level of the tax shield on debt and the
cost of financial distress. Finally, one can analyse the impact of the level of
debt and its relevant tax issues on fluctuations of debt and investment over the
business cycle when the external financing decision is constructed in the model.
The interest rate on debt is vital to the firm when it estimates its OCS as this
factor is decided by the bank, not by the firm.
The effect of external financing
Standard RBC-based models have not yet considered external financing for firm’s
investment sources. By incorporating external financing, Alessandrini (2003)
shows that the variance of debt is relatively higher than that of dividends. Divi-
dends are smooth over the cycle. From his model, debt varies together with the
level of investment once the firm considers external funds. These results point to
the implication that the firm takes an action of increasing the amount of debt to
finance its investment plans instead of cutting flows for dividend payouts. Div-
idends, as a result, fluctuate less in the with-external-financing models than in
the standard RBC model. Moreover, he tests a relatively higher leverage ratio
in the same model. The calibrated results show that the variance of debt is less
than in the model with a relatively lower leverage ratio. This is because the cost
of potential financial distress goes up when the leverage ratio becomes greater.
The short-term fluctuation of investment after the technology shock is therefore
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also smaller in the high-leverage-ratio model than that in the low-leverage-ratio
model. The firm with a high leverage ratio limits its investment plans. This is con-
sistent with empirical studies reporting a negative relationship between leverage
and investment[Fama (2002)]. This extended RBC model clearly shows changes
in variations of debt, investment and dividends when the firm’s optimal capital
structure is considered.
Specification
The banking sector in Alessandrini’s theoretical model plays an important role for
determining the level of two interest rates according to the debtholder’s (i.e. the
firm in this case) probability of default. The two interest rates are the rates the
bank is willing to offer to the lender (the household) and the borrower (the firm).
It is, therefore, providing a simultaneous environment to determine the involved
variables: a risk-free interest rate (Rf ) and a risky interest rate (R) when the
default point and the recovery rate are considered. The results of Alessandrini’s
model show that debt is significantly related to output and investment. When
the firm’s leverage is higher, the variance of debt, investment and dividends is
smaller. This implies that the firm has relatively sticky investment and payout
decisions if an OCS exists. The firm is more sensitive to high default stress in
the case of high leverage, even though the tax benefit increases by more debt.
The assumption of the specification of the bankruptcy process is used commonly
in the area of monetary policy (Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al.
(1999)). The bankruptcy process helps to define an estimated break point, named
the threshold point, which also leads to the issue of the probability of default. In
Alessandrini (2003), it is understood that the probability of default is endogenous.
The method to solve the default condition and the relationship between risk-free
rate and the quoted interest rate is not specified. I provide an alternative method
to estimate the threshold value and the probability of default. The default process
is still based on his assumption that there is a specific shock affecting the gross
return on capital, that is, the specific shock is uniformly distributed on an interval
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determined by a given measure. A detailed layout capturing the impact of the
banking sector and related issues on the firm and the investor’s activities is given
in the following.
The relationship of Rf and R
Define the earnings before interest and tax as EBITt = Yt −WtLdt . At time t,
this then gives the firm a total capital base of EBITt+1 + (1 − η)Kt, which is
subject to a multiplicative specific shock, δt+1, which is i.i.d.. This specific shock
hits the firm and the firm may default, a condition captures this scenario:
BtRt > δt+1[EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt]
Another variable Xt+1 is defined as the ratio of total debt payment divided by
the firm value:
Xt+1 =
BtRt
EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt (3.3.12)
When δt+1 = Xt+1, the firm is on the verge of bankruptcy as, in this case,
δt+1 [EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt] = BtRt; there is just enough capital in the firm
to repay the debt with interest. The relationship between Rt and Rf,t is then
given by:
BtRt
∫ ∞
Xt+1
f(δt+1) +
∫ Xt+1
−∞
θδt+1(EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt)f(δt+1) = BtRf,t
(3.3.13)
where θ is defined as the recovery ratio of the firm’s value when bankruptcy
occurs and f(·) is a probability density function. The first term of the left-hand
side of equation 3.3.13 captures the fact that the bank fully receives the principle
and interest at time t+1 if there is no default. The second term on the left-hand
side captures the fact that the bank receives all the remaining capital from the
firm in the event of bankruptcy, but this is less than the promised amount. By
integrating over f(δt+1), the left hand side is the expected payoff to the bank.
As the bank is risk-neutral and non profit making in expectation, this expected
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payoff should be equal to BtRf,t, as given on the right-hand side of equation
3.3.13.
To operationalise this set-up, I assume that δt+1 is drawn from a rectangular
distribution:
f(δt+1) =

0 , δt+1 < l and δt+1 > u
1
u−l , δt+1 ∈ [l, u]
for some upper and lower bound u, l. By substituting this probability distribu-
tion function into equation 3.3.13, the bank can set the corporate interest rate,
conditional on knowing the level of debt and the risk-free interest rate, through
the relationship:
Rt =
{
BtRf,t − θ
2(u− l) [EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt][X
2
t+1 − l2]
}
u− l
Bt(u−Xt+1)
(3.3.14)
Appendix 3.9.3 displays a detailed process for deriving the above equation.
3.4 Models implementation
3.4.1 General procedures for solving nonlinear DSGE models
This section summarises a typical solving process for nonlinear DSGE models. Major
papers discussing the methodology and toolkits are Campbell (1994) and Uhlig (1995).
Both have provided explicit information for solving stochastic growth models, espe-
cially the method of undetermined coefficients. Campbell (1994) introduces an explicit
explanation of the stochastic growth models and the analytical solution. The paper
provides the approach of log-linearising the equations. In order to demonstrate the log-
linearisation, Uhlig (1995) has simplified Campbell (1994)’s approach while also showing
how to solve the neoclassical growth model by hand. It is not efficient, however, to
log-linearise first order conditions (FOCs) by hand when the model is sophisticated.
In that case, DYNARE2 software can help to deal with complicated tasks. A general
2DYNARE is a pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB for solving nonlinear models. It is the
research work done at the Centre Pour La Recherche Economique Et Ses Applications (CEPREMAP;
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process of solving nonlinear DSGE models is summarised below.
1. First order conditions (FOCs)
The first step is to find the necessary equations by solving the Lagrangian max-
imisation formula of representatives with constraints. The maximised variables
are generally consumption, capital and labour.
2. Steady state
To observe the steady state of each variable is to understand its property under a
condition of behaviour that lasts (or continues) into the future until all variables
reach to a state in which each variable is in an optimal level under those given
first order conditions. To solve the steady state, what we need to do is to rewrite
the first-order conditions by dropping the time indices.
3. Log-linearise the first-order conditions and constraints
Log-linearlisation is a vital technique for nonlinear dynamic stochastic models.
It ensures that the first-order equations and the log-deviations from the steady
state have an approximately linear relationship.
Campbell (1994), Uhlig (1995) and King et al. (2002) have proposed the solu-
tion of log-linearisation. The practical approach by hand is to form a logarithmic
deviation of each variable from its steady state value, and use the Taylor approx-
imation to estimate the logarithmic deviation. The result will be a roughly linear
equation for the variable, its steady state and its log-deviation.
A technology shock process is a nonlinear equation. To characterise its equilibrium
in the system, a method called log-linearisation3 aims to obtain an equation
approximately linear in the log-deviations from the steady state.
The procedures of log-linearising the technology shock are
Center for economic research and its applications). Related papers are Boucekkine (1995), Juillard
(1996) and Collard and Juillard (2001a)(2001b).
3It follows an approximate computation by solving the logarithm deviation of the targeted variable
from its steady state. Refer to Uhlig (1995) for more details.
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(a) To define the difference between the logarithmic deviation of Zt and its
steady state value Z¯ as
Zt = Z¯e
zt ≈ Z¯(1 + zt)
where, approximately, zt is the deviation betweenZt and Z¯.
(b) To define the stochastic technology shock:
logZ = (1− ψ)logZ¯ + ψ logZt−1 + εt
(c) To log-linearise the above equation, we substitute equation (a) into equation
(b). After rearranging, an approximately log-linearised constraint for the
technology shock is obtained:
logZ = (1− ψ)logZ¯ + ψ logZt−1 + εt
log(Z¯ezt) = (1− ψ)logZ¯ + ψlog(Z¯ezt−1) + εt
Z¯ + zt = logZ¯ − ψlogZ¯ + ψlogZ¯ + ψzt−1 + εt
zt = ψzt−1 + εt
4. Solving for the dynamics
Uhlig (1995) provides explicit instructions for solving the dynamic stochastic
neoclassical models via the method of undetermined coefficients by hand. The
method he presents is to postulate a linear recursive law of motion first and then
solve for the yet to be determined coefficients. This part can also be done by
some software packages e.g. MATLAB.
5. Analysing the results
After running the simulation for the models, results of the steady state of each
variable, theoretical moments of each variable, coefficients of autocorrelation
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between one and another, relative standard deviations (RSD)4 (i.e. 100*the
standard deviation/the mean) can be analysed. Additionally, it is also useful to
study the movement of each variable to the technology shock via the impulse-
response analysis.
3.4.2 First order conditions (FOCs)
The momentary utility function for the representative household is:
U(Ct, 1− Lt) = logCt + A(1− Lt)
where A is the parameter of disutility of labour. This monetary utility function con-
siders indivisible labour, which is introduced in Hansen (1985). The above objective
function has utility for consumption and leisure. The household has log utility for con-
sumption and linear derived utility for leisure. The former utility is the special case of
the time-separable power utility function where the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is equal to one; the latter one is a specification of power utility for leisure where the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution for leisure is infinite. This function shows that
the household’s preferences are separable in consumption and work.
To demonstrate how the proposed Replication I, II and III models are solved, each
process of solving the optimisation is individually displayed:
3.4.2.1 FOCs for Replication I
The Lagrangian (L) in Replication I shows
L = max
Ct,Lt,Kt
Et
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt[(logCt − ALt)− λt(Ct +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 − Yt)]
]
To solve the optimisation, I take the first order conditions (FOC) of consumption
4The values of relative standard deviations (RSD) shown in this chapter are in per cent. RSD
is calculated as each variable’s standard deviations divided by its mean value. It is the value of the
coefficient of variation. RSD considers not only the variable’s standard deviation but also its mean.
As each variable has its mean value. RSD can utilise risks of real variables.
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(Ct), labour (Lt) and capital (Kt):
∂L
∂Ct
: 1
Ct
− λt = 0
∂L
∂Lt
: −A+ λt(1− α)ZtKαt−1L−αt = 0
∂L
∂Kt
: −λt + λt+1β(1− δ) + λt+1βαZt+1Kα−1t L1−αt+1 = 0
Rearranging the results, I obtain:
ACt = (1− α)ZtKαt−1L−αt ⇒ ACt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
(3.4.1)
1 = βEt[(
Ct
Ct + 1
)(αZt+1K
α−1
t L
1−α
t + 1− δ)] (3.4.2)
Rt = α
Yt+1
Kt
+ 1− δ (3.4.3)
The second term on the right-hand side of the second equation is the total returns
which are equal to the sum of the capital share and one minus depreciation. The third
equation is the Euler equation for gross returns (Rt) for period [t, t+1], the net returns
(rt) is then obtained as α YtKt−1 − δ.
Equilibrium can finally be solved when first-order conditions are satisfied with the
given constrains and the log-linearised technology shock equation zt = ψzt−1 + εt.
3.4.2.2 FOCs for Replication II
In Replication II, it is assumed that the quantity of labour supply is equal to that of
labour demand, and the economy is in an equilibrium status. The same assumption
is applied to the capital market. In order to obtain an equilibrium state, both the
firm’s and the household’s optimisation problems are solved by taking the approach of
Lagrange.
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The partial derivatives of labour and capital for maximising the firm’s problem are
obtained:
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt−1L−αt
1 = Et[Mt,1(αZt+1K
α−1
t L
1−α
t+1 + 1− η)]
The partial derivatives of Lagrangian multiplier, consumption, labour and capital
for maximising the household’s problem are obtained:
λt =
1
Ct
ACt = (1− α)ZtKαt−1L−αt
λt = βEt[λt+1Rt]⇒ 1 = βEt[ Ct
Ct+1
Rt]
The necessary equations are obtained and summarised as follows:
ACt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
1 = βEt[
Ct
Ct+1
Rt]
Mt,1 =
Ct
Ct+1
Rt = αZt+1K
α−1
t L
1−α
t+1 + 1− η
Dt = αYt − It (3.4.4)
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Yt = ZtK
α
t−1L
1−α
t
Kt = It + (1− η)Kt−1
Ct = Yt + It
zt = ψzt−1 + εt
Results of steady state values and fluctuations of the theoretical optimal real variables
(Kt, Lt, Ct, Yt It, Rt, Dt, Zt) can be acquired simultaneously while these necessary
conditions are satisfied by solving them with the method of simulation with the HP-
filter.
Equation 3.4.4 shows that dividend payouts are determined after investment deci-
sions. This replicating study presents how dividend payments stochastically interact
with other variables and investor’s consumption in a general equilibrium model.
3.4.2.3 FOCs for Replication III
I solve the firm and the household’s optimisation problems of Replication III (details in
Appendix 3.9.2) and summarise the obtained equilibrium conditions:
ACt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(3.4.5)
1 = Et [Mt,1Rf,t] (3.4.6)
Rf,t = Et[(1− τ)αZt+1Kα−1t Lt+11−α + 1− η] (3.4.7)
Rt =
(
1
1− τ
)
[Rf,t − τ ] (3.4.8)
Qt = Et[Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (3.4.9)
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where Mt,1 = β CtCt+1 is identified from the representative household’s optimisation
(equation 3.9.12 in Appendix 3.9.2).
The next step is to obtain market clearing conditions. This economy begins with a
capital stock Kt > 0 and an initial level of the technology shock Zt > 0. In equilibrium,
consumption, capital and labour need to be determined simultaneously. For the market
to clear, a number of conditions must hold. First, aggregate borrowing must equal
aggregate lending:
BHt = Bt (3.4.10)
Second, the equity market must clear so that the total equity of the firm, which is
normalised to one, is owned by the representative household.
Nt = 1 (3.4.11)
Third, the labour market must clear so that the hours provided by the representative
household matches the labour used by the representative firm.
Ldt = L
s
t = Lt (3.4.12)
The final market condition is derived from the goods market. Since the economy
consists of identical individual firms, each individual firm is under stochastic process and
hit by the credit shock, even though aggregate firms have no difference by the credit
shock, the aggregate amount of output (Y at ) is determined from that each individual
firm does not go bankrupt and survives in the model economy. The aggregate output
is defined as follows
Y at = Yt − (1− θ)
∫ Xt
0
(Yt −WtLt)f(δt) (3.4.13)
where the aggregate output is the net amount after allowing for bankruptcy. After a
default, some proportion of the total output seized by the bank cannot be recovered,
i.e. θ
∫ Xt
0
(Yt −WtLt)f(δt). The recovered portion of the seized output by the bank
will be sold on the goods market and therefore it is considered in aggregate output.
From the demand side, the total aggregate demand includes aggregate investment (Iat )
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and consumption. As with aggregate output, aggregate investment is considered while
the firm is still running its business (i.e. no default). Aggregate investment is denoted
as follows
Iat =
∫ ∞
Xt
Itf(δt) (3.4.14)
Substituting the equations of aggregate output and investment into the goods market
clearing condition (Y = C + I) gives
Y at = I
a
t + Ct
⇒ Yt − (1−θ)u−l (Yt −WtLt)(Xt − l) =
1
u− l It(u−Xt) + Ct (3.4.15)
A detailed computation is given in Appendix 3.9.4. The value of aggregate dividends
are with respect to a condition of the firm’s non-default state as the household can only
get dividends when the firm runs the business and gives dividend payouts. Aggregate
dividends is defined as
Dat =
∫ ∞
Xt
[(1− τ)(Yt −WtLdt −Rt−1Bt−1)− τBt−1]f(δt) (3.4.16)
=
(u−Xt)
u− l [(1− τ)(Yt −WtL
d
t −Rt−1Bt−1)− τBt−1]
Finally, the general equilibrium can be solved once these conditions (3.4.5, 3.4.6,
3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.4.9, 3.3.12 and 3.3.14) are satisfied with respect to the market clearing
conditions (equations 3.4.10, 3.4.11, 3.4.12, 3.4.15 and 3.4.16).
3.5 Calibration
For Replication I, all values used for the parameters are standard and borrowed from
Hansen (1985). For technology parameters, the constant capital share in a Cobb-
Douglas production function, α, is set to 0.36. The quarterly capital depreciation rate,
η, is 0.025. The persistence of the idiosyncratic technology shock ψ is 0.95. The
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is assumed to be 0.00712. The parameter
A in the utility function denotes the disutility of labour (or utility of leisure) and is set
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Table 3.5.1: Parameter values
This table lists the parameter values used to solve and simulate the three replications. All the param-
eters are categorised into three groups. The first group, Technology, includes parameters in the firm’s
production function. The second group, Financial Credit Default, includes parameters in the bank’s
default process and the firm’s operating profits after tax. The final group of parameters is calibrated
for the investor’s utility function. The parameters of Replication I are taken from Hansen (1985) and
those of Replication II and III from Alessandrini (2003).
Replications
I II III
Basic
Hansen
(1985)
model
Hansen
(1985) model
with dividend
policy
Advanced
DSGE model
with investing
and financing
decisions
Technology
Capital share to output α 0.36 0.35 0.35
Depreciation ratio η 0.025 0.019 0.019
Persistence of the technology shock ψ 0.95 0.95 0.95
Standard deviation of the technology
shock
σ 0.00712 0.00712 0.00712
Disutility of labour A 2.85 2.85 2.85
Financial Credit Default
Recovery rate θ - - 0.92
Tax rate τ - - 0.06
Upper bound u - - 1.225
Lower bound l - - 0.475
Preferences
Subjective time discount factor β 0.99 0.99 0.99
equal to 2.85. The quarterly intertemporal subjective time discount factor β is set to
0.99.
For Replication II and III, most values for parameters are borrowed from Alessandrini
(2003) because the replicating results are to be compared with the results in his paper.
Therefore, most values for the parameters in Replication II and III remain the same as
used for Replication I except the capital share and the depreciation ratio, which are,
0.35 and 0.019 respectively.
Replication III considers more factors than I and II. The recovery rate, θ, and tax
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rate, τ , are assigned values of 0.92 and 6% respectively. The specific shock is distributed
in an interval of 0.75 suggested by Alessandrini (2003). The value of (u− l) determines
the interval which the specific shock is distributed in. Accordingly, the range between
parameters of the upper bound (u) and the lower bound (l) is assumed to be fixed
given the value of 0.75, that is to say, if the value of the upper bound is given to 1.00
and the value of the lower bound is then adjusted to be 0.25. By calibrating Replication
III for various cases, values of 1.125 and 0.375 (150% of 0.75 is set to be the upper
bound and 50% of 0.75 is for the lower bound) for example, the model shows results
which are close to the second calibration of Alessandrini (2003) when the values of the
upper/lower bounds are 1.225 and 0.475. Therefore I use the values of 1.225 and 0.475
for u and l respectively for keeping the interval as a value of 0.75. Table 3.5.1 gives a
summary of parameter values.
The results and discussion sections summary the US economy statistics are also
provided. The US data for capital, consumption, labour and investment are taken
from Hansen (1985). They are quarterly data from 1955.3-1984.1 detrended with a
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The US quarterly data for dividends and debt are taken from
Alessandrini (2003). Alessandrini (2003) gets the quarterly data from 1955-2001 from
US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) statistics for dividends and from the
US Flow of Funds statistics for debt. The multiplier of the HP filter aims to adjust the
sensitivity of short-term fluctuations. I take the suggestion from Hodrick and Prescott
and set the multiplier at 1600 for quarterly data. All data are detrended by the Hodrick
and Prescott filter (HP filter) and are quoted in percent.
3.6 Solving methods
The optimisation problems of the representative firm and investor are solved simultane-
ously and to reach an equilibrium state. Carrying out the simulation through MATLAB
and DYNARE for DSGE models requires the four first order conditions (FOCs) of the
optimisation problems. DYNARE codes for the three replications are provided in Ap-
pendices 3.9.5, 3.9.6 and 3.9.7.
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I summarise two solving methods for DSGE models, the first method is a standard
method using technique MATLAB alone while the second method considers MATLAB
with DYNARE.
1. Method one: technique MATLAB only (refer to the toolkit of Uhlig (1995))
Step 1: Solve first-order conditions by hand.
Step 2: Obtain steady state by hand.
Step 3: Log-linearise constraints by hand.
Step 4: Create the matrices by hand.
Step 5: Solve for recursive equilibrium law of motion by hands (method of unde-
termined coefficients) or via MATLAB.
Step 6: Get the results.
2. Method two: multi-techniques MATLAB and DYNARE
Step 1: Solve for first-order conditions by hand
Step 2: Write codes for DYNARE which has been installed in MATLAB and
simulate it in MATLAB
Step 3: Get the results
From the above comparison, one can see that method two can effectively solve time-
consuming problems. An additional advantage is that it avoids errors in doing the
mathematics for the matrix of first-order conditions. Overall, taking method two for
nonlinear models is more efficient and comparatively accurate than using method one.
3.7 Results and discussion
The focus of this study is on the properties of aggregate dividends. By taking dividend
policy into account in DSGE models, the results show that the theoretical variability
of optimal dividends is much greater than in empirical findings. Additional issues and
frictions can be incorporated into theoretical DSGE models, such as the investor’s habit
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formation and the firm facing costly adjusting capital inputs costs. More advanced
research in these areas is contained in the next two chapters.
Using multi-techniques helps not only to calibrate results precisely for the stan-
dard Hansen (1985) model, but also to successfully solve the extended model used in
Alessandrini (2003). The next more complex advanced DSGE model, in which the firm
has both a residual policy and an external financing decision, shows that outcomes are
close to Alessandrini (2003).5
Results of business statistics of real variables are reported in table 3.7.1. This
table has two sections. Section I has four sets of columns consisting of (a) empirical
US data; (b) the basic Hansen model taken from the original paper Hansen (1985);
(c) the extended Hansen model with a dividend policy [Alessandrini (2003)]; and (d)
an advanced DSGE model incorporating a dividend policy and an external financing
decision [Alessandrini (2003)]. Section II contains three sets of columns which show the
simulated results for my three replications, named Replication I, II and III, respectively.
3.7.1 Business cycle statistics
3.7.1.1 Aggregate dividends
In Table 3.7.1, Replication I simulated a standard stochastic growth economy in which
a dividend policy is not involved. My simulated results are very close, nearly the same,
to the original paper. This model captures that real investment is the most volatile vari-
able in the production economy; its variability is approximately three times aggregate
output volatility. All the real variables in this model are procyclical, particularly con-
sumption, labour, investment and return on capital are strongly correlated to output.
I calculate that the steady-state consumption output ratio is 0.74 which is consistent
with Campbell (1994)’s analytical result.6
5The reason of obtaining different but close outcomes between this research and Alessandrini
(2003)’s paper lies in the methods used to solve. The solving methods used here enable me the
generation of matrices for first order conditions, that has not been used by Alessandrini (2003). He
takes a log-linear approximation method of undetermined coefficients.
6Steady-state values show that each variable reaches to a stable and unchanged state and each
variable’s relatively size in the economy once all equilibrium conditions are solved simultaneously at
each period. In this case, the steady-state consumption output ratio of 0.74 represents that, when an
equilibrium exists in the economy, the value of consumption is relatively 74 percent of the value of
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Replication II and III display the moments of aggregate payouts and show that
the figures for the theoretical relative standard deviation (RSD) of aggregate payouts
are 7.57% and 6.93% respectively.7 The first number is close to 7.62% as reported in
Alessandrini (2003) but significantly greater than the observed US data.8 The empirical
US data shows that the RSD of aggregate dividends for the period 1955-2001 was
3.73%.9 In Alessandrini (2003)’s DSGE model with investing and financing decisions,
optimal aggregate dividends are, 2.06%, still lower than the empirical observation.10
Both the theoretical models fail accurately capture the variability of corporate pay-
outs for the aggregated market. The reason is that there are many unknown factors
that influence, directly and indirectly, the movement of dividend policy. That is the
purpose of this thesis: to examine the variance of aggregate dividends by incorporating
different factors or frictions. Chapters 4 and 5 will have further explicit studies on this
issue.
From the simulated results of Replication II and III, one can see that optimal div-
idends are countercyclical to the business cycle. This phenomenon has also been ob-
served in Alessandrini (2003). In the observed US economy, gross dividends are posi-
tively correlated with the output but the strength of the correlation is much weaker, the
value of corr(D, Y ) is 0.34.11 In Section 2.2.8 of Chapter 2, the empirical data shows
that net cash flows and gross dividends are procyclical. My simulated results however
are not in line with this.
3.7.1.2 Business statistics for other main variables
Replication I simulates similar results to the basic Hansen (1985) model and further
generates steady-state values for major real variables. Steady state values help us
to study the relative optimal state-relationship between variables. For instance, in a
numerical way, the goods condition states that the sum of consumption and investment
is equal to output. That is, consumption of 0.83 and investment of 0.29 are summed
output.
7Table 3.7.1, Section II, “Replication III”, Column (a) for D.
8Table 3.7.1, Section I, “Hansen model with dividends”, Column (a) for D.
9Table 3.7.1, Section I, “US data”, Column (a) for D.
10Table 3.7.1, Section I, “DSGE model with investing and financing decisions”, Column (a) for D.
11Table 3.7.1, Section I, “US data”, Column (c) for D.
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to be equal to output, 1.12.12
The RSD of consumption in the three replications of my research are around 27
percent that of output.13 This figure is less than that of the observed US economy, 73
percent.14 The three replications presented so far in this thesis estimate the correlation
between consumption and output at roughly 87 percent, which is close to that of the
empirical US data, 85 percent. Moreover, the simulated moments of consumption,
investment, labour and return on equity are procyclical.
From the simulated results of Replication II and III, I find that, not only optimal
aggregate dividends are very volatile, optimal aggregate investment is also volatile. Its
variability is nearly, as high as aggregate payouts, three and half times of the output
volatility.
One may notice that Replication I provides strong support for the Hansen (1985)
model except the correlation between capital and output (i.e. 0.05 reported by Hansen
(1985) vs. 0.35 in Replication I). In this thesis, I use Kt−1 instead of Kt as the point at
which the capital input is actually chosen, which is suggested by Uhlig (1995). Hansen
(1985) uses Kt to denote that capital input is chosen at the beginning of time t.
Prescott (1986, 1998) shows the cyclical behaviour of (a) the Kydland and Prescott
economy (i.e. the simulated production economy by Kydland and Prescott (1982)) on
the current period and one period before and after the current period (see Table 3.7.2),
and (b) the US economy during 1954 - 1982 (see Table 3.7.3). By comparing their
simulated results with their empirical data, the theoretical correlation between capital
stock in the previous period (Kt−1) and current output, corr(Kt−1, Outputt), is -0.05
while the empirical statistic of the correlation between current nonresidential structure
and output, corr(Kt, Outputt), is -0.03. From this comparison, the notation difference
from capital stocks matters when it comes to the correlation with output. In order to
be consistent with the empirical data, it is suggested to define the chosen capital input
in time, when it is actually chosen. Prior studies such as Uhlig (1995) and Alessandrini
(2003) are in line with this assumption of defining the initial capital at time t− 1.
12Table 3.7.1, Section II, “Replication I”, Column (d) for C, I and Y .
13Table 3.7.1, Section II, “Replication I”, “Replication II” and “Replication III”, Column (b) for C.
14Table 3.7.1, Section I, “US data”, Column (b) for C.
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Table 3.7.2: Cyclical behaviour of the Kydland-Prescott economy
This table is taken from Prescott (1986) (page 9) and shows the statistics of the main real macroe-
conomic variables for the Kydland-Prescott economy, including standard deviation in percent and the
cross correlation of Gross National Product (GNP) with each variable for the three time periods (-1
to +1, 0 is the base period).
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Table 3.7.3: Cyclical behaviour of the US economy, 1954.1 to 1982.4
This table, taken from Prescott (1986) (page 4), reports statistics of standard deviation in percent
and correlation between the variable and Gross National Product (GNP) for the US economy during
1954.1 to 1982.4. The estimated results for cross correlation of GNP with each variable are across
three periods (-1 to +1, 0 is the base period).
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In Table 3.7.1, the result of the correlation of output with debt for “DSGE model
with investing and financing decisions from Alessandrini (2003)” is also dissimilar to
Replication III, i.e. 0.94 and 0.20 respectively. The difference comes from the definition
of the firm’s profit (see equation 3.3.10). The after-tax profit a firm has is obtained
after the interest payments on debt, i.e. the net interest rate R − 1. Alessandrini
(2003), however, estimates the after-tax profit after the interest payments and the
total amount of debt. With the tax issue, the interest payments are tax deductable
but not the amount of debt. In this thesis, I amend this profit equation from his paper
and the model therefore shows a different result for the correlation between debt and
output.
3.7.2 Impulse responses to a technology shock
Figures of impulse responses present information about how macroeconomic variables
deviate from their own steady state values after an exogenous technology shock.
Figures 3.7.1, 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 plot the impulse responses of the main real variables
to a technology shock for Replication I, II and III respectively.
The results show that the impulse response of dividends is greater when the economy
has less friction. The graph for dividends in Replication II shows that aggregate payouts
immediately decline approximately −7x10−3 from their steady state value. This is more
than the value in Replication III, which is about −4x10−3.
In Replication III, corporations have external financing decisions. It means invest-
ment funding can be partly from debt issuance. Free cash flows, as a result, are less
volatile and improve relatively quickly after the shock when compared to Replication II.
Other production variables including output, capital and investment are significantly
influenced by the dynamic technology shock, which can be viewed from these figures.
Replication III displays deviations of capital and debt from their steady state values after
the shock. The capital structure (the debt over the capital ratio) is volatile immediately
after the shock. It takes almost twenty years to return to steady-state levels.
The response of consumption to the shock is about 0.1% in the first ten years after
the shock and then smoothly returns towards the steady state value. The differences
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between the three replications are, however, not obvious to see.
Investment and labour are as volatile as dividends, in the early years after the shock.
The technology shock has a direct impact on investing and labour demanding activities
from the production process. The impulse responses of investment and labour are
dramatically variable. It takes them nearly twenty years onward to start to improve and
reach stable conditions.
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Figure 3.7.1: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Replication I
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Figure 3.7.2: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Replication II
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Figure 3.7.3: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Replication III
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3.8 Summary
This chapter showed that a DSGE model is capable of capturing corporate and in-
vestor activities such as investment and financial decisions and presenting simultane-
ously aggregated-level movements of real variables. I calibrated three equilibrium mod-
els and found that (a) the volatility of theoretical optimal aggregate payouts is high,
(b) the volatility of theoretical optimal aggregate consumption is small, (c) aggregate
dividends are countercyclical, (d) productivity variables, investment, labour and return
on equity, are strongly correlated with real output in the economy.
The standard stochastic growth model does not consider dividends and external fi-
nancing, I then incorporated them into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. The variability of optimal aggregate dividends and real investment are approxi-
mately three to four times of the variability of optimal real output. On the contrary, the
variability of theoretical optimal consumption is smaller than the empirical observation.
The theoretical model captures simultaneous interaction in the economy that optimal
aggregate output volatility increases while optimal aggregate investment volatility in-
creases and optimal payouts are volatile. The countercyclicality of aggregate dividends
is consistent with the hypothesis that companies appear to retain their free cash flows
for future profitable NPV projects if the economy during booms.
In order to examine the high variability of aggregate dividends in terms of the
sensitivity of optimal payouts to corporate production process and consumer behaviour
in a deep depth, the subsequent chapters investigate the impact of specific issues and
frictions on the fluctuation of optimal aggregate dividends.
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3.9 Appendices
3.9.1 The essential environment for DSGE models
For the RBC-based stochastic neoclassical growth model, the economic environment is
inhabited by the representative households who maximise their expected utility. A rep-
resentative firm possesses a typical Cobb-Douglas production function with stochastic
shocks to technology. A state of consumption, labour and capital will be determined
simultaneously in order to reach the equilibrium of the economy. The economic envi-
ronment is populated by three fundamental criteria (note: all the subscript notations t
and t− 1 are at the point in time when the input is actually chosen). The information
is revised based on Uhlig (1995):
1. Preference: A representative household’s preference is determined by a utility
function. A utility function can quantify the level of satisfaction of the household
from consumption and working (or leisure). The household maximises the lifetime
expected discounted utility according to the equation
max
Ct,Lt
Et[
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, 1− Lt)], 0 < β < 1
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on time-t information, β is
the subjective discount factor, U(C, 1−L) is the utility function of consumption
and leisure, C is consumption, L is labour, and 1−Lt is the level of leisure at time
t. There are various forms of utility functions. The utility function that Kydland
and Prescott (1982) use in their model is a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility
function. The representative household is endowed with a constraint that the
sum of the time for working and for leisure equals the total amount of time in
each time period which is set to be one.
2. Technology: A firm has an expected process for new capital. Capital evolves over
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time by this process
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1, 0 < δ < 1
where K is capital, δ is a depreciation rate, and It is investment. The firm’s
output depends on the amounts of capital and labour along with a production
function which follows
Yt = f(Zt, Kt−1, Lt)
where Y is output and f() denotes a production function. Production functions
can be various types. Kydland and Prescott (1982) use a constant-returns-to-
scale production function. Many studies have decided to use a non-constant-
returns-to-scale production function instead. The most popular choice is the
Cobb-Douglas production function. Z is the aggregate technology shock and
exogenously evolving over time. Zt conforms to the law of motion
logZt = (1− ψ)logZ¯ + ψ logZt−1 + εt (3.9.1)
where ψ is the parameter of persistence, Z¯ is the steady state of the technology
shock. The error term, εt, is an independent and identically distributed random
variable (i.i.d.) along with the normal distribution εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε). The aggregate
technology shock assumes to follow a first order autoregressive process (AR(1))
in logs.
3. Information: In this economy, it begins with a capital stock Kt > 0 and an initial
level of the technology shock Zt > 0. The technology shock is dependent on
a stochastic process. In equilibrium, three inputs “consumption”, “capital” and
“labour” need to be determined simultaneously up to time t by the technology
parameter (the shock).
To sum up, Kydland and Prescott (1982) holds a central and fundamental position in
stochastic growth models capturing business cycles, not only in the stream of descriptive
research on studying the implications of business fluctuations but also in the stream of
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methodological model building.
3.9.2 Solving the firm’s and the household’s optimisation
problem of Replication III
Step 1: Solving the firm’s optimisation problem
The representative firm’s optimisation problem:
max
Ldt ,Kt,Bt
Dt + Et
[ ∞∑
h=1
Mt,hDt+h
]
subject to
Dt = (1−τ)
[
ZtK
α
t−1(L
d
t )
1−α −WtLdt −Rt−1Bt−1
]−τBt−1+Bt−Kt+(1−η)Kt−1
Setting the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to L = 0,
K = 0, B = 0 reveals the following three constraints for the firm:
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt−1L−αt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
(3.9.2)
1 = Et{Mt,1{[(1− τ)αZt+1Kα−1t Lt+11−α] + 1− η} } (3.9.3)
1 = Et
{
Mt,1[(1− τ)Rt + τ ]
}
(3.9.4)
the above equations 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.9.4 are the firm’s optimal conditions.
Step 2: Solving the household’s optimisation problem
To solve the household’s problem, I form the Lagrangian of the household’s op-
timisation problem (on page 47):
L = Et
{ ∞∑
h=0
βh[logCt+h + A(1− Lt+h)− λt+h(Ct+h +Qt+hNt+h+1(3.9.5)
+BHt+h −Wt+hLst+h −Qt+hNt+h −Dt+hNt+h −Rf,t+h−1Bht+h−1)]
}
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where λt+h is a Lagrangian multiplier. I solve the optimisation problem by com-
puting partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to each of the control
variables and setting each equal to zero. The following equations are yielded
according to ∂L/∂Ct = 0, ∂L/∂Lst = 0, ∂L/∂Nt = 0 and ∂L/∂BHt = 0
respectively:
λt =
1
Ct
(3.9.6)
− A+ λtWt = 0 (3.9.7)
Qt = βEt
[(
λt+1
λt
)
(Qt+1 +Dt+1)
]
(3.9.8)
λt = βEt[λt+1Rf,t] (3.9.9)
The above four equations can be summarised into three major closed forms for
the household’s optimisation. First, by substituting λt from equation 3.9.6 to
equation 3.9.7:
Wt = ACt (3.9.10)
Second , the standard Euler equation follows directly from equation 3.9.9:
1 = βEt
[(
λt+1
λt
)
Rf,t
]
(3.9.11)
This defines the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with respect
to consumption
Mt,1 = β
λt+1
λt
= β
Ct
Ct+1
(3.9.12)
To rewrite equation 3.9.8, I obtain:
Qt = Et [Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (3.9.13)
Equations 3.9.10, 3.9.11, 3.9.12 and 3.9.13 are the household’s optimal condi-
tions.
Step 3: Equilibrium conditions from firm and household
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To merge the firm and the household’s optimal conditions for a general equilib-
rium, we can obtain five equilibrium conditions:
ACt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
1 = Et [Mt,1Rf,t]
Rf,t = Et[(1− τ)αZt+1Kα−1t Lt+11−α + 1− η]
Rt =
(
1
1− τ
)
[Rf,t − τ ]
Qt = Et[Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)]
3.9.3 The relationship of Rt and Rf,t
Presuming that the probability density function (pdf) of the specific shock (f(δt+1)) is
f(δt+1) =

0 , δt+1 < l and δt+1 > u
1
u−l , δt+1 ∈ [l, u]
Applying this to equation 3.3.13 gives
BtRt
∫∞
Xt+1
f(δt+1) +
∫ Xt+1
−∞ θδt+1(EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt)f(δt+1) = BtRf,t
=⇒ BtRt
∫ u
Xt+1
1
u−ldδt+1 +
∫ Xt+1
l
θ
u−lδt+1(EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt)dδt+1 = BtRf,t
=⇒ BtRt
u−l (u−Xt+1) + θ2(u−l) [EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt][X2t+1 − l2] = BtRf,t
this can be re-written as
Rt = {BtRf,t − θ
2(u− l) [EBITt+1 + (1− η)Kt][X
2
t+1 − l2] }
u− l
Bt(u−Xt+1)
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the above result shows the relationship of Rt and Rf,t. The gross interest rate is
determined in the credit market. It is set by the bank after having the information
about debt and the risk-free interest rate.
3.9.4 Clearing goods market condition
In an aggregate equilibrium, the clearing condition for the goods market (equation
3.4.15) is given as
Y at = I
a
t + Ct
=⇒ Yt − (1− θ)
∫ Xt
0
(Yt −WtLt)f(δt) =
∫ ∞
Xt
Itf(δt) + Ct
=⇒ Yt − (1− θ)
∫ Xt
l
1
(u−l)(Yt −WtLt)dδt =
∫ u
Xt
1
(u− l)Itdδt + Ct
=⇒ Yt − (1−θ)(u−l) (Yt −WtLt)(Xt − l) =
1
(u− l)It(u−Xt) + Ct
where (Yt −WtLt) can be substituted to (αYt) as WtLt represents (1− αYt) knowing
from equation 3.9.2.
3.9.5 DYNARE code for Replication I
% file name: test0904_basichansen
% save in ResearchWorkinSchool\Mystuff\RBCexamples
\20090904_similarwith20090810_parameterAdiffer
% similar to Model0_hansen from \mystuff\20090810 but A=2.85 here
%————————————————————————————
% Purpose: Hansens RBC model (1985) 7 variables
% with indivisible labor
%————————————————————————————
% Points : (1) Parameters: same as in Hansen (1985)
% (2) Replicate Hansend basic RBC model with dividends in Alessandrini (2003)
% (3) no dividends, no debt , no default, no tax
% (4) 7 variables: c, i, k, l, y, z, r
%————————————————————————————
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
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%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
%periods 20100; var k, c, y, l, i, r, z;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
A = 2.85;
alpha = 0.36; % capital share
beta = 0.99;
delta = 0.025; % depreciation share
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
A*c = (1-alpha)*exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(-alpha));
1 = beta*((c/c(+1))*r(+1));
r = alpha* (k(-1)^(alpha-1))*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha)) + 1 - delta;
y = (k(-1)^alpha)*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha));
i = k - (1-delta)*k(-1);
i = (k(-1)^alpha)*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha)) - c;
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks; var e = sigma^2; end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:7,1:7)))./oo_.mean(1:7);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:7,:),statistic1,10,7,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:7,1:7)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:7,:),statistic2,7,8,4);
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3.9.6 DYNARE code for Replication II
% file name: test0904_hansendiv
% save in ResearchWorkinSchool\Mystuff\RBCexamples
\20090904_similarwith20090810_parameterAdiffer
% similar to Model1_hansendiv from \mystuff\20090810 but A=2.85 here
% Hansen with dividends only (compare to Alessandrini , same!)
%————————————————————————————
% Purpose: Hansens RBC model (1985) 8 variables
% with indivisible labor
%————————————————————————————
% Points : (1) Parameters: same as in Hansen (1985)
% (2) Replicate Hansend basic RBC model with dividends in Alessandrini (2003)
% (3) no debt , no default, no tax
% (4) dividends are dicided after investment and financial decisions
% (5) 8 variables: var c, d, i, k, l, y, z, r, q;
%————————————————————————————
var k, c, y, l, i, d, r, z, q;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology , q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma;
A = 2.85;
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99;
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
model;
A*c = (1-alpha)*exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(-alpha));
1 = beta*(c/c(+1))*r(+1);
r = alpha* (k(-1)^(alpha-1))*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha)) + 1 - delta;
y = (k(-1)^alpha)*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha));
i = k - (1-delta)*k(-1);
i = (k(-1)^alpha)*exp(z)*(l^(1-alpha)) - c;
d = alpha*exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha)) - i;
q = beta*((c/c(+1))*(q(+1)+d(+1))); z = psi*z(-1) + e;
end;
initval;
k = 2;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks; var e = sigma^2; end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
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%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:9,1:9)))./oo_.mean(1:9);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:9,:),statistic1,10,9,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:7,1:7)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:9,:),statistic2,9,8,4);
3.9.7 DYNARE code for Replication III
% file name: test0904_testnew6
% save in ResearchWorkinSchool\Mystuff\RBCexamples
\20090904_similarwith20090810_parameterAdiffer
% similar to testnew6 from \mystuff\20090810 but A=2.85 here
% testnew6 : similar to testnew3. now trying to put aggregate equilibrium for d and
(c=y-i)
% (not partial b and k of r, put the equation in, then can run.)
% file name: testnew5.mod
% \mystuff\20090810_startingfromDynareSummerSchool
%————————————————————————————
% Purpose: Extended RBC model: 13 variables
% with indivisible labor, dividends, debt, risk-free rate,
% interest rate and default probability estimate.
% %—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
var k, c, y, l, i, z, d, b, rf, r, q, x, fau; %fau
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology, q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma, tau, theta, U, L, epi;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
A = 2.85; % 2.85 self-estimated by Hansen (1985)’s parameter results
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99; % subjective time discount factor
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
tau = 0.06; % tax rate
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theta = 0.92; % recovery rate
U = 1 + 0.3*epi;
L = 1 - 0.7*epi;
epi = 0.75; % specific shock
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( (c/c(+1))*rf);
rf = (1-tau)*(alpha*exp(z(+1))*(k^(alpha-1))*(l(+1)^(1-alpha))) + 1 - delta;
A*c = (1-alpha)*exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(-alpha));
y = exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-1+0.7*epi)/epi))*y - ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*i;
y = exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-1+0.7*epi)/epi))*y - ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*i;
r = (1/(1-tau))*(rf-tau);
r = (b*rf - ((theta/(2*epi))*(alpha*y(+1)+(1-delta)*k)*(x(+1)^2 -
(1-0.7*epi)^2)))*(epi/(b*(1+0.3*epi-x(+1))));
q = beta*( (c/c(+1)) * (q(+1)+ d(+1)) );
x = b(-1)*r(-1) / (alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
d = ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*((1-tau)*(alpha* y - r(-1)*b(-1)) -tau*b(-1) - i + b);
z = psi*z(-1) + e; fau = x/(alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1)); end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
b = 0.6;
x = 0.3;
fau = 0.03;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks; var e = sigma^2; end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:13,1:13)))./oo_.mean(1:13);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:13,:),statistic1,13,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:13,1:13)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:13,:),statistic2,13,8,4);
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I show the simultaneous interaction between aggregate dividends and
aggregate consumption in the particular case that investors have habit formation. The
purpose of this investigation is to examine that investors, who prefer having smooth
consumption, utilise cash dividends as an important source of countercyclical cash flows.
My results are consistent with the hypothesis that aggregate dividend policy plays an
important role in helping investors to smooth consumption.
Previous papers, which take habit formation into account in their DSGE models
[Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Uhlig (2007), Lettau and Uhlig (2000), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2008) and Gershun (2010)], have not focused on optimal aggregate
dividend behaviour. Some existing papers [Santoro and Wei (2009) and Gourio and
Miao (2010)] have considered dividend policy in their DSGE models but (a) their focus
is on dividend taxation and (b) they do not include habit formation. To fill this gap,
my contribution in this chapter is to demonstrate that the role of aggregate corporate
dividend policy is related to consumption smoothing and to examine the changes in the
variability of aggregate dividends over a range of habit motives.
This chapter starts with an extensive review of the literature of DSGE models
with habit formation. The main feature of utility functions used in this chapter is
that it includes consumption and leisure, which means the investor’s lifetime utility
is determined by both market and nonmarket activities. Internal habit formation is
introduced in Constantinides (1990) and defined in a way such that each individual
investor’s current utility of consumption is influenced by his/her own past consumption.
This is useful here because it is well known that the stronger the habit motive, the
greater the desire of investors to smooth consumption. Dividends are highlighted as an
important source to offset investors’ procyclical labour incomes.
There are three habit formation utility functions incorporated into previous DSGE
models. The first is a multiplicative utility function with an additive habit formation
[Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)]. The second utility function, introduced by Nutahara
(2010), is a logarithm form for consumption and a power utility form for leisure, together
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with an additive habit formation. The third function is a power utility for consumption
and a power utility for leisure, incorporating a different habit formation type: a ratio
of current and past consumption [Lettau and Uhlig (2000)]. My objective here is
to examine the variability of optimal aggregate dividends in different type of habit
formation utility functions. I compare the simulated results obtained from the three
models in addition to a benchmark which involves no habit formation. My results show
that the three model’s results of variability of optimal aggregate dividends and other
economic variables differ slightly one from the other. In addition, optimal aggregate
dividends are countercyclical cash flows in each model.
My next contribution is to investigate the relationship between optimal aggregate
dividend volatility and consumption volatility for different strengths of habit motive.
This work is based on a DSGE model including a multiplicative utility function with
an addition habit formation. By changing the habit motive, the relationship between
optimal dividend policy and consumption smoothing in equilibrium can be examined. I
find that the greater the habit motive, the smoother optimal aggregate consumption
while the greater optimal aggregate dividend volatility. It implies that the corporate
dividend policy is an important mechanism to help investors to smooth consumption.
I also examine the sensitivity of optimal aggregate dividend payouts in a range of
habit motives to a different change in the coefficient of risk aversion. Previous work has
not investigated whether there are changes in optimal aggregate dividend movements
when both the investor’s habit motive and risk aversion are altered. Interestingly, my
results show that, for all levels of habit motive, the variability of optimal aggregate
payouts increases as investors’ risk aversion decreases.
Overall, my calibrated results show that corporations are sensitive to the habit
motive of investors at an aggregate level. When investors’ utility of current consumption
depends more on past consumption, the volatility of the optimal aggregate payout policy
increases to balance out changes in other sources of income, such as wages. There is
also greater associated volatility in real investments. Aggregate corporate activities are
thus influenced by investors’ consumption smoothing motives because investors need
dividends to attain and maintain a balance between savings and spending across time.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review
on habit formation in DSGE models. Section 4.3 introduces the specification of the
model with habit formation. Section 4.4 presents the model implementation. Section
4.5 provides a brief solving method following the detailed description in the previous
chapter. Section 4.6 and 4.7 show the first calibration and discusses the impact of
different utility functions on aggregate dividends. Section 4.8 calibrates (a) the dynamic
movements of optimal aggregate dividends and consumption when the habit motive is
adjusted to different levels and (b) the sensitivity of optimal dividends to various levels of
risk aversion for different strengths of habit formation. Section 4.9 presents the results
and discussions for section 4.8. Section 4.10 summarises this chapter. Appendices are
provided in section 4.11.
4.2 Literature review
This section starts with a brief summary of the specification of the momentary consumption-
leisure utility function and habit formation. Then it moves to the specific topic of
consumption-leisure momentary utility and habit persistence. Previous scholars have
touched upon this specific topic in three different domains: asset pricing and business
cycles; momentary and fiscal policy analysis; and estimated DSGE models for analysing
aggregate variables.
4.2.1 The momentary consumption-leisure utility function
The first and standard type of momentary utility function is a multiplicative form. It is
a power utility form capturing the agent’s preferences of consumption and leisure1:
U(Ct, 1− Lt) = [C
ρ
t (1− Lt)1−ρ]1−γ − 1
1− γ (4.2.1)
where Ct, Lt and 1− Lt are the variables consumption, labour and leisure in period t,
respectively. The endowment of time for leisure and hours worked (labour) is normalised
to be one [Hansen (1985) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)]. Parameter γ > 0 is
1Campbell (1994) and Jacobs (2007) use this specification of period utility function for their studies.
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 89
defined as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Parameter 0 < ρ < 1 determines the
time devoted to market activities [Campbell (1994) and Cooley and Prescott (1995)].
In addition to the above nonseparable utility function, another type of momentary
utility function is an additively separable utility function. It is the case in which the
representative household has log utility for consumption and power utility for leisure:
U(Ct, 1− Lt) = log(Ct) + A(1− Lt)
1−γl
1− γl (4.2.2)
where a parameter A stands for the dis-utilising effect caused by the labour input,
with A > 0. The parameter γl stands for the coefficient of relative risk aversion on
leisure, with γl > 0. The utility for consumption is restricted as a log utility form when
it comes to additively separable utility function in consumption and leisure [see King
et al. (1988)]. The reason for that is to obtain a constant steady-state path of the
model (more details were discussed in chapter 2.3.2 on page 28.).
Jacobs (2007) estimates nonlinear Euler equations for preferences by using panel
data for the period 1974-1987 and indicates that the risk aversion parameter, γ, is
far from the value of one. This implies the elasticity of substitution, 1/γ, will not be
one. Thus, from his investigation, it can be concluded that a logarithmic preference
specification used in existing theoretical studies is far from adequate for explaining
observed phenomenon.
4.2.2 What is habit formation?
So far, the utility for consumption is in a time separable function. The standard RBC
model is built up with a time-separable momentary utility function. The representative
household’s preferences are independently determined by consumption and leisure in
each period. The representative’s utility for current consumption is independent from
past consumption behaviour. Several researchers have extended the momentary utility
function from being time independent to time dependent by incorporating habit forma-
tion. The utility function with habit formation is known as time-inseparable utility2.
2Several studies focus on the impact of habit formation on the dynamics of consumption over time.
Dynan (2000) investigates consumption habit in households’ preferences by using data from the Panel
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It considers that a representative household’s level of satisfaction from consumption is
determined not only by current consumption but also by past consumption.
Habits are considered either internal or external. An internal habit can ensure the
individual’s utility in consumption is derived by his/her own level of past consumption
rather than by others’ consumption [Constantinides (1990)]. External habit formation
assumes the individual’s consumption is determined by other people’s past consumption
[Campbell and Cochrane (1999)]. Pennacchi (2007) presents a detailed context for
time-inseparable utility and also points out the specification for internal and external
habits respectively.
The focus of this chapter is to incorporate internal habit formation into the house-
hold’s utility function. A brief understanding of Constantinides (1990)’s internal habit
formation is presented here.
Constantinides (1990) derives an improved utility function taking both current and
past consumption into account. What the paper does is to break the condition of
the time inseparability in Mehra and Prescott (1985) by considering a time-separable
utility function. Constantinides (1990) relaxes the assumption of time separability and
rebuilds a utility function with habit formation. He assumes that the utility function is
of the constant relative risk aversion type but is extended to incorporate the agent’s past
consumption as well. The modified utility function of Constantinides (1990) consists
of the discounted present value of the agent’s current and past consumption, and can
be defined as:
U(C) = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(Ct+s − ξCt+s−1)1−γ
1− γ , ξ > 0 (4.2.3)
where
β is the subjective time discount factor
ξ indicates the effect of past per capita consumption on current utility
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). His paper finds there is no significant evidence of habit formation
at annual frequency. In contrast, Gruber (2004) and Ravina (2005) indicate the importance of the
evolution of consumption with habit formation for preferences.
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This function is extended in this thesis by incorporating labour into the DSGE model,
the details of which are provided in Section 4.4.2.
4.2.3 Habit formation in DSGE models
In a DSGE model, habit formation can be defined as either habits in consumption
or habits in leisure. The majority of research studies habit formation in consumption
[Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Uhlig (2007) and Gershun (2010)] and although
a few papers discuss habits in both consumption and leisure [Lettau and Uhlig (2000)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)].
Habit formation has been discussed earlier in the area of consumption-based capital
asset pricing models (CCAPM). Asset pricing models are in an endowment economy in
which the consumption is pinned down and makes the asset’s rate of return endogenous.
Habit formation not only contributes to solving the equity premium and the risk-free
rate puzzles3 in asset pricing, but also to studies of business cycles. In a production
economy, the stochastic growth model makes consumption and output endogenous,
while the asset’s rate of return distribution is determined exogenously, which is an
opposite assumption compared to asset pricing models. Thus, a refined RBC model with
consumption habit formation will have effects on economic fluctuations endogenously.
Generally, the study of the momentary utility function with habit formation in DSGE
models is about the intertemporal and intratemporal substitution with respect to con-
sumption and between consumption and leisure. Two arguments that have been mainly
discussed are related to: (a) the fluctuations caused by habit formation, especially the
observed procyclical phenomenon of the aggregate labour input, and (b) the interactive
behaviours between consumption and labour in multiplicative and additive-separable
preferences, respectively. A very early paper that employs habit formation in a growth
model is Ryder Jr and Heal (1973). The objective of their paper is to study the
behaviour of the capital input in independent and dependent utility functions. They
3Supposing the agent makes decisions with a past consumption habit, his/her utility will display
extreme aversion to consumption risk. So in a market economy, the investor is willing to buy bonds
rather than equities, hence the risk-free rate will decrease. That explains the risk-free rate puzzle.
This method, however, still cannot resolve the equity premium unless the coefficient of risk aversion
becomes unusually big [Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989)].
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discuss how the intertemporal preference affects the movement of the capital input
in an optimal path. Their model is a fixed labour model where labour is unity and
in which the representative household’s preferences are based on consumption across
periods only.
The literature review hereafter will mainly be concerned with general equilibrium
models associated with (i) internal habit formation [Constantinides (1990)] and (ii)
external habit formation [Campbell and Cochrane (1999)]. The review is categorised
into four topics: (1) the impact of a momentary utility function with habit formation
on the inter(intra)temporal marginal rate of substitution [Subsubsection 4.2.3.1]; (2)
the implication for asset pricing and fluctuations over business cycles [Subsubsection
4.2.3.2]; (3) policy analysis [Subsubsection 4.2.3.3]; and (4) aggregate variables in
estimated DSGE models [Subsubsection 4.2.3.4]. Table 4.2.1 summarises previous
papers working on stochastic general equilibrium models with habit formation.
4.2.3.1 The impact of the momentary utility function with habit formation
on the substitution effect
Researchers find that consumption and leisure move in opposite directions when a
DSGE model incorporates a multiplicative momentary utility function. For studies on
the procyclical movement of labour input and the covariance of consumption and leisure
in a multiplicative utility function refer to Kydland and Prescott (1982), Eichenbaum
et al. (1988), Lucas (1995) and Seckin (2001). Seckin (2001) uses a multiplicative
specification of momentary utility form to study how habit formation alters the range
of intertemporal substitution between current and future leisure and the intratemporal
substitution between current consumption and leisure. His paper concludes that the
intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in a mul-
tiplicative utility function with habit formation is higher than in the case without habit
formation, as well as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between current
and future leisure. These results imply that the household is less willing to substitute
between consumption and leisure, as well as unwilling to change the substitution of
current and future leisure. The household takes more leisure today than in the future.
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Table 4.2.1: DSGE models with habit formation
This table reports a summary of previous dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with
specific utility functions and habit formation. There are two types of utility function, multiplicative and
additively separable, and two types of habit formation, internal and external. Multiplicative form means
the household’s utility on consumption and leisure is constructed in a power utility function. Additively
separable form is the special case when the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the multiplicative
form is equal to one. Internal habit assumes that the individual consumer’s consumption is affected
by his/her past consumption while external habit assumes that the individual consumer’s consumption
is determined by other people’s past consumption. The form of current and past consumption in the
internal habit is found to have two types, non-separable and separable. Models with fixed labour are
under an assumption that the labour variable is exogenous. Models with variable labour make the
labour endogenous and are simulated simultaneously with other variables (e.g. consumption, output,
etc.).
Multiplicative Utility
Function
Additively Separable Utility Function
Internal
habit
Non-separable
Preferences in
Consumption
Seckin (2001)
Separable
Preferences in
Consumption
Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2008)
(i) models with fixed labour:
Boldrin et al. (1995), Jermann (1998)
(ii) models with variable labour:
Christiano and Fisher (1995), Boldrin
et al. (2001), Nason and Kano (2004),
Christiano et al. (2005), Kano and
Nason (2009)
External
habit
Smets and Wouters
(2005, 2007), Uhlig
(2007)
Lettau and Uhlig (2000), Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007)
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Moreover, the household prefers having more leisure and less consumption. Lettau
and Uhlig (2000) employ an additively separable momentary utility function which is
a power utility function for both consumption and leisure. They emphasise that using
the additively separable utility function rather than multiplicative utility function is be-
cause the latter would cause a lower conditional volatility of the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution (IMRS) in consumption compared to the former4. It is therefore
not plausible to calibrate a multiplicative utility function for a study explaining the
observed equity premium, as a lower conditional volatility will make the asset pricing
implications counter-factual. The authors also employ habit motives to consumption
and leisure individually. As before, log utility in consumption is required in an additively
separable utility function [King et al. (1988)]. Lettau and Uhlig (2000), however, do
not follow this restriction. They suggest two solutions to allow a power utility form for
consumption in an additively separable consumption-leisure utility function. One solu-
tion is, relatively simple, to change the form of current and past consumption. They
suggest the use of a ratio style instead of an additive style, i.e. current consumption
function(past consumption)
instead of current consumption − function(past consumption). Thus, they could
still look for a steady-state path in the model without restricting the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion to be one. Uhlig (2007) builds a multiplicative utility function with
external habits and wage rigidities in a DSGE model to explain asset prices. Following
Lettau and Uhlig (2000), which points out the lack of ability to explain asset pricing
anomalies when using a multiplicative utility function, Uhlig (2007) emphasises that the
multiplicative utility function works well when it is restricted to real wage stickiness or
sufficient curvature on preferences. In his paper, the sufficient curvature on preferences
is with habits in both consumption and leisure.
4The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) for the multiplicative utility function
includes not only consumption but also leisure. With the assumption that consumption and leisure are
negatively correlated and the coefficient of risk aversion is greater than one, the volatility for IMRS
is smaller than in the case of additively separable utility function. This is because the IMRS for the
additively separable utility function only contains consumption.
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4.2.3.2 Studies of asset pricing and business cycles
Habit formation helps to account for the equity premium puzzle by calibrating not only
CCAPM but also DSGE models. It creates a smooth consumption process which implies
low elasticity of substitution (EIS) between current and future consumption [Lettau and
Uhlig (2000), Seckin (2001) and Otrok et al. (2002)]. The studies in this field can be
summarised into two streams: (a) with fixed labour supply and (b) with variable labour
supply.
(a) Models with fixed labour supply
Fixed labour in the model means that the labour is constrained to equal one (equiv-
alently, leisure is zero) and the production function is determined by capital (and the
technology shock) only. The objective function of the representative household studied
in Jermann (1998) includes consumption but no labour input, which means it maximises
the expected lifetime utility of consumption only. The author tries to explain the his-
torical equity premium by modelling a real business cycle model with an internal habit
formation. Boldrin et al. (1995) also adopt internal habit formation into a basic RBC
model. But the major difference is that Boldrin et al. (1995) introduce multi-sector
technologies in order to account for the behaviour of asset prices, especially the equity
premium and risk-free rate. The household’s preferences are based on a form of power
utility with additive intertemporal consumption and fixed labour supply. Their model
shows a higher correlation of consumption and asset returns, compared to empirical
statistics. Moreover, they indicate that the model works well for interpreting the equity
premium puzzle and business fluctuations.
(b) Models with variable labour supply
Models with variable labour supply consider that labour is endogenous and determined
by both the firm’s and the household’s objectives simultaneously. Christiano and Fisher
(1995) incorporate an additively separable momentary utility function with internal
habits to interpret the fact that Tobin’s q is different from one and analyse the observed
asset returns and the implications for business cycles. The momentary utility function in
their model is in the form of a log utility for consumption and a linear utility for leisure,
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 96
which is borrowed from Hansen (1985) (see chapter 3). Boldrin et al. (2001) employ
the same momentary utility function as Christiano and Fisher (1995) but introduce
a two-sector RBC model with habit persistence. They extend their previous paper
(Boldrin et al. (1995)) to also take endogenous labour into account. Their results
show that habit formation in a modified RBC model, with low elasticity of capital
supply, can generate a large equity premium. Elasticity of capital is low due to costly
reallocation of capital and labour across sectors. Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al.
(2001) examine the effect of habit formation on business cycles mainly for the study of
asset pricing, while Lettau and Uhlig (2000) put the focus on business cycles. The latter
is a rich paper in which the impact of habit formation on RBC models is studied in four
scenarios: (i) no habit; (ii) habit in consumption; (iii) habit in leisure; and (iv) habit in
both consumption and leisure. Furthermore, existing work finds that habit formation
gives a smoother consumption process from actual U.S. data [Lettau and Uhlig (2000),
Otrok et al. (2002) and Nason and Kano (2004)]. Otrok et al. (2002) consider habit
formation in consumption asset pricing models and discuss the potential to resolve the
equity premium puzzle. Nason and Kano (2004) doubt the implication of models with
habit formation for business cycles for two reasons. Firstly, models with habit formation
show lower frequency fluctuations in output growth compared to empirical U.S. data.
Secondly, there are no clear consequences of output to permanent shocks through the
impulse response functions.
4.2.3.3 Studies of monetary and fiscal policy analysis
RBC models also have been used by researchers who sought to study the impact of
habit formation on optimal fiscal and monetary policy. Most importantly, the RBC-
based monetary models are with nominal frictions where prices and wages are sticky.
Christiano et al. (2005) present a general equilibrium model with habit formation and
nominal rigidities to account for the observed behaviour of economic inflation and
fluctuations. The utility function of the household’s preferences is an additive form
employing a function of consumption with internal habit, a function of hours worked
and a function of real cash balances. Kano and Nason (2009) study the implications of
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propagation and monetary transmission in New Keynesian DSGE models with internal
habit in consumption where the model is borrowed from Christiano et al. (2005). In
their model, the household’s momentary utility function overall is an additively separable
form including log utility for consumption with internal habit, power utility for disutility
of labour and a log form for real balances that is a ratio of the household’s stock of
cash divided by the aggregate price level.
4.2.3.4 Studies of estimating parameters of DSGE models
A strand of research studies the parameters that should be used in stochastic growth
RBC models. Smets and Wouters (2003) employ a DSGE model with a RBC frame-
work to study the business cycle characteristic of the actual data in E.U. economies.
The household’s preferences in this estimated model are an additively separable utility
function of power forms for consumption and labour supply individually. Smets and
Wouters (2003) put emphasis on business fluctuations in the short-run. Smets and
Wouters (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) present an estimated linearised DSGE
model which proffers a steady-state growth path through a multiplicative (equivalently,
non-separable) utility function with external formation. Smets and Wouters (2007) es-
timate a DSGE model for the U.S. economy by taking a Bayesian likelihood approach.
The environment of this estimated structural DSGE model is with an exogenous technol-
ogy shock and a multiplicative utility function of consumption and leisure with external
habit formation in consumption. Their estimated model shows the capability to fit
the U.S. macro data by incorporating frictions and shocks. In addition, their paper
discusses the effect of a productivity shock on hours worked. They indicate that the
technology shock has a weighty, but not dominant, role. With various frictions (nom-
inal price rigidities, habit formation and capital adjustment costs) in DSGE models,
labour is influenced greatly by the effect of a productivity shock and drops immediately
from its steady state. This phenomenon is counterfactual as empirical studies show
that there is a strong correlation between output and labour input. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2008) is another paper working on estimating structural Bayesian models.
They display an estimated RBC-based model with capital adjustment costs, variable
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capacity utilisation, consumption habit formation and leisure habit formation. More-
over, they employ three shocks (permanent and stationary neutral productivity shocks,
permanent investment-specific shocks, and government spending shocks) to explain
predicted aggregate fluctuations over business cycles in the post-war United States.
Their estimation works well, predicting over two thirds of observed aggregate fluctua-
tions. The household’s momentary utility function in their paper is assumed to be a
multiplicative function with habits in both consumption and leisure.
In conclusion, with habit formation, the household’s consumption volatility is not only
determined by current consumption but also by past consumption. The resulting
consumption is expected to be smooth over time. Table 4.2.1 clearly shows that
the majority studying habit formation in macroeconomics take an additively separa-
ble utility function of consumption and leisure into account (at the same time, it
is assumed that there is a separable form of current and past consumption). That
is, the momentary utility function is assumed to have a log utility for consumption,
for example, U(Ct, Ct−1, Lt) = log(Ct − ξCt−1) + A(1 − Lt) or U(Ct, Ct−1, Lt) =
log(Ct − ξCt−1) + A log(1 − Lt). This, however, serves the purpose of simplicity in
calibration. This thesis will use a multiplicative utility function rather than an additively
separable function. It provides the flexibility for studies in both log and power utility
forms. Furthermore, the investor’s overall utility is determined by a mixed effect of
leisure, consumption and its habit formation.
4.3 The model with effective labour and habit for-
mation
This section shows how I develop the extended DSGE models. The standard framework
of DSGE models can be traced back to the pioneers Kydland and Prescott (1982) and
Hansen (1985). In the proposed framework, it is assumed that there is one representa-
tive firm, one representative household and one representative bank that all potentially
survive forever in the absence of bankruptcy. Equilibrium is reached when each is si-
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multaneously able to maximise its individual objective function subject to budget and
market clearing constraints.
The modified RBC-based DSGE models demonstrated here are the extension of my
previous work: Replication III (page 46). The main difference between Replication III
and the model here is that there are modifications on two elements:
1. Effective labour: In the real world, the labour supply market would enhance its
technology. This technology growing in a positive increasing rate can influence
output. The labour unit, therefore, is “effective labour”. In order to improve the
efficiency of labour, a factor reflecting stochastic technical change in labour is
incorporated into the production function.
The output, Yt of the representative firm at time t is given by a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K
α
t−1(ZtL
d
t )
1−α (4.3.1)
2. The momentary consumption-leisure utility function with consumption habit for-
mation: The representative household’s preferences are captured by a time-
inseparable utility function (U(.)) that includes consumption and leisure:
Ut ≡ U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst) (4.3.2)
that the utility function for time t is determined by not only current consumption
and leisure but also past consumption.
(a) The first model is to incorporate consumption habit formation into the
multiplicative momentary utility function.
(b) The second model is to incorporate consumption habit formation into the
additively separable utility function.
(c) The third model is a DSGE model with non-additive habit formation (i.e.
the habit formation is in the form of a ratio).
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The specifications of the representative agent’s and corporate optimisation problems
and the bank remain the same as in the Replication III, introduced in previous chapter
(pages 46 - 53). Optimal levels of consumption of the single consumption good, labour
and capital will then be determined simultaneously by the firm and the household.
4.4 Model implementation
4.4.1 First order conditions and market clearing conditions
To solve the corporate and investor’s optimisation problem, five FOCs and four market
clearing conditions are obtained as:
(1− α)Yt
Lt
= −
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Lst
∂U(Ct, Ct−11− Lst)
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lst+1)
∂Ct
(4.4.1)
1 = Et [Mt,1Rf,t] (4.4.2)
Rf,t = Et[(1− τ)αKα−1t (Zt+1Lt+1)1−α + 1− η] (4.4.3)
Rt =
(
1
1− τ
)
[Rf,t − τ ] (4.4.4)
Qt = Et[Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (4.4.5)
BHt = Bt
Nt = 1
Ldt = L
s
t = Lt
Yt − (1− θ)
u− l (Yt −WtLt)(Xt − l) =
1
u− l It(u−Xt) + Ct
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where Yt is subject to equation 4.3.1. The definition of Xt has been assumed as the
ratio of total debt payment divided by the firm value (the detailed definition please
refer to chapter 3 (page 52). This chapter will use three types of utility functions. Mt,1
is identified from the representative household’s optimisation (see Appendix 4.11.1 for
an example). Aggregate dividends is subject to
Dt =
(u−Xt)
u− l [(1− τ)(Yt −WtL
s
t −Rt−1Bt−1)− τBt−1]
The relationship between the risk-free interest rate on bond and gross interest rate on
debt is given in equation 3.3.14 in Chapter 3 (page 53).
Finally, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium can be obtained with respect to
the technology shock Z which is assumed to follow a AR(1) process.
4.4.2 Utility function implementation (with internal habit)
To solve models with the above conditions, this section demonstrates how to calibrate
the marginal rate of substitution (∂Ut/Ct, ∂Ut+1/Ct, ∂Ut+1/Ct+1, ∂Ut/Lt), the La-
grangian multipliers (λt and λt+1), and the form of the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (IMRS) (which is denoted as Mt,h).
The study of Campbell (1994) demonstrates both multiplicative and additively sep-
arable utility functions but it does not consider habit persistence. So far, there are
two types of utility functions (multiplicative and additively separable) and two types
of internal habit formation (additive and of ratio). The next step is to extend these
momentary utility functions by applying internal habit formation to three cases5. The
purpose of demonstrating three models is to compare the effects of habit persistence
on aggregate dividends among different functions of utility.
A nonseparable model (Model 1)
In model 1, the representative household’s utility is determined by the multiplied effect
5The ratio formation of habits is applied to a special case that an additively separable utility
function is with power utility for consumption [Lettau and Uhlig (2000)]. In a multiplicative form, it is
possible to use an additive form of habit formation. Thus, I skip the fourth combination: multiplicative
utility function with the ratio of habit formation.
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of consumption and leisure:
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = [(Ct − ξCt−1)
ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]1−γ − 1
1− γ (4.4.6)
where parameter ρ determines the time allocated to market activities by the represen-
tative agent. γ is the coefficient of risk aversion. The household’s utility is determined
by the multiplied effect of consumption and leisure. The consumption process partly
considers its past values. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) also use this utility function
with internal habit. Another similar case can be found in Uhlig (2007).
With the given momentary utility function for Model 1, I calculate ∂Ut/Ct, ∂Ut+1/Ct,
∂Ut+1/Ct+1, ∂Ut/Lt, λt, λt+1:
∂Ut
∂Ct
= [(Ct − ξct−1)ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]−γ[ρ(Ct − ξCt−1)ρ−1(1− Lt)1−ρ] (4.4.7)
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
= [(Ct+1−ξCt)ρ(1−Lt+1)1−ρ]−γ[(−ξ) ρ (Ct+1−ξCt)ρ−1(1−Lt+1)1−ρ] (4.4.8)
∂Ut
∂Lt
= [(Ct − ξCt−1)ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]−γ[(−1)(1− ρ)(Ct − ξCt−1)ρ(1− Lt)−ρ] (4.4.9)
λt =
∂Ut
∂Ct
+ β
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
(4.4.10)
λt+1 =
∂Ut+1
∂Ct+1
+ β
∂Ut+2
∂Ct+1
(4.4.11)
Take these formulae to summarise the form of IMRS
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Mt,1 = β
λt+1
λt
= β (
1− [ξβ(Ct+2−ξCt+1
Ct+1−ξCt )
−γρ+ρ−1(1−Lt+2
1−Lt+1 )
−γ(1−ρ)+1−ρ]
[(Ct−ξCt−1
Ct+1−ξCt )
−γρ+ρ−1( 1−Lt
1−Lt+1 )
−γ(1−ρ)+1−ρ]− ξβ ) (4.4.12)
An additively separable model with additive habit formation
(Model 2)
The momentary utility function for Model 2 is:
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = log(Ct − ξCt−1) + A(1− Lt)
1−γL
1− γL (4.4.13)
This type of form6 is an extension of Hansen (1985) by considering an internal con-
sumption habit and giving a power form for leisure. For an additively separable utility
function, Kydland and Prescott (1982) have shown that a presumption of γc = 1
is necessary for balanced growth. The utility form for consumption, therefore, is a
logarithmic form. Campbell (1994) also uses this specification of utility function but
without considering habit formation. I intend to extend his model with internal habit
in consumption.
Regarding the utility form for leisure, it is assumed to be a power form. The
specification of a power function for capturing the utility on leisure (or labour) provides
various possibilities. For example, when γL is one (and ξ = 0), the form of the utility
for leisure is the case of Hansen (1985)’s divisible labour. When γL is equal to zero
(and ξ = 0), it then changes to the case of a model with indivisible labour supply.
The necessary equations for equilibrium are calculated as below:
∂Ut
∂Ct
=
1
(Ct − ξCt−1) (4.4.14)
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
=
−ξ
(Ct+1 − ξCt) (4.4.15)
6Nutahara (2010) uses the same utility function with internal habit. For similar specifications see
Christiano and Fisher (1995), Boldrin et al. (2001) and Kano and Nason (2009).
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∂Ut
∂Lt
= (−1) A (1− Lt)−γL (4.4.16)
λt =
∂Ut
∂Ct
+ β
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
(4.4.17)
λt+1 =
∂Ut+1
∂Ct+1
+ β
∂Ut+2
∂Ct+1
(4.4.18)
Mt,1 = β
λt+1
λt
= β (
1− ξβ( Ct+1−ξCt
Ct+2−ξCt+1 )
(Ct+1−ξCt
Ct−ξCt−1 )− ξβ
) (4.4.19)
An additively separable model with a ratio of habit formation
(Model 3)
The momentary utility function used so far is an additive form, which means Ct−ξCt−1.
Some papers (see Seckin (2001) and Lettau and Uhlig (2000)) take non-additive habit
formation, that is, a ratio of current and past consumption: Ct
ξCt−1
. In this section, an
additional DSGE model is introduced with a one-period non-additive habit formation.
Bouakez et al. (2005) also use the ratio of habit formation for their study of the
persistence of monetary shocks.
The model (called Model 3 hereafter) uses a separable utility function of consump-
tion and leisure, that is, a power form for consumption and a power form for leisure.
King et al. (1988) suggests that this kind of additive utility function needs to have a log
form for measuring utility in consumption otherwise there is lack of necessary condition
for obtaining a balanced growth path. From Lettau and Uhlig (2000)’s suggestion, it is
possible to build a model under non-log utility function for consumption with habit, and
the model can still reach to a balanced growth path over business cycles. The advice is
to assume a ratio of a consumption process instead of an additive form. Therefore, it is
assumed that there is a consumption process with internal habit given by Ct
ξCt−1
instead
of the standard one-period internal habit formation Ct− ξCt−1. The momentary utility
function is displayed as:
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U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) =
( Ct
ξCt−1
)1−γC
1− γC + A
(1− Lt)1−γL
1− γL (4.4.20)
This momentary utility function shows that consumption and leisure determining utility
are in an additive form. Both variables are in a power utility function. The idea
of this specification is adopted from Lettau and Uhlig (2000). They use an additive
utility function in consumption and leisure. They also consider external habits for both
variables. King et al. (1988) have asserted that it is necessary to use a log form for
consumption in an additively separable period utility function. Lettau and Uhlig (2000)
have suggested approaches avoiding the restriction given by King et al. (1988). One of
their suggestions is to replace the additive form of consumption and its habit persistence
with a ratio form. As a result, the momentary utility function would still be consistent
with a balanced path when γc is generated across time. Their suggestion is duly taken
into consideration for the purposes of this research and therefore it is assumed that
there is a ratio for the consumption process in Model 3. The utility in leisure is a power
form in which the γL is not restricted particularly.
The calculations of ∂Ut/Ct, ∂Ut+1/Ct, ∂Ut+1/Ct+1, ∂Ut/Lt, λt, λt+1 and Mt,1 are
shown below respectively:
∂Ut
∂Ct
= (
Ct
ξCt−1
)−γC (
1
ξCt−1
) (4.4.21)
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
= (−1)(Ct+1
ξCt
)−γC (
Ct+1
(ξCt)2
) (4.4.22)
∂Ut
∂Lt
= (−1) A (1− Lt)−γL (4.4.23)
λt =
∂Ut
∂Ct
+ β
∂Ut+1
∂Ct
(4.4.24)
λt+1 =
∂Ut+1
∂Ct+1
+ β
∂Ut+2
∂Ct+1
(4.4.25)
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Mt,1 = β
λt+1
λt
= β ((
Ct+1/Ct
Ct/Ct−1
)−γC (
1
Ct/Ct−1
)(
1− β(Ct+2/Ct+1
Ct+1/Ct
)1−γC
1− β(Ct+1/Ct
Ct/Ct−1
)1−γC
)) (4.4.26)
in conclusion, this section has succeeded in calibrating the household’s preferences
for three types of momentary utility functions. We can afterwards substitute these
formulae for the previous obtained FOCs. Followed by giving parameter values, we
then can obtain results for the moments of aggregate dividends, consumption, output
and the other main real variables for each model.
4.5 Solving methods
To solve the three models, I use the software packages DYNARE that is compatible
with MATLAB. DYNARE codes are provided in Appendices 4.11.5, 4.11.6 and 4.11.7.
4.6 Calibration (I)
Table 4.6.1 presents a summary of parameter values. Most of the values for the param-
eters are standard and borrowed from Alessandrini (2003). For technology parameters,
the constant capital share in a Cobb-Douglas production function, α, is set to 0.35.
The quarterly capital depreciation rate, η, is 0.019. The persistence of the idiosyn-
cratic technology shock ψ is 0.95. The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock
is assumed to be 0.00712. The recovery rate, θ, and tax rate, τ , are assigned values
of 92% and 6% respectively. The values for U and L are given equal 1.225 and 0.475;
details are given in Chapter 3.
The quarterly intertemporal subjective time discount factor β is set to 0.99. The
coefficients of relative risk aversion of consumption in Model 1 and Model 3, denoted
γ and γC respectively, are set to 2. The coefficient of relative risk aversion of labour,
γL, is set to 5 for both Model 2 and Model 3.
In the momentary utility function, the habit persistence level is set to 0.8 as used in
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Constantinides (1990)7. I take 0.36 as the parameter value of ρ, which is taken from
Campbell (1994)8.
A benchmark has been demonstrated in this research that is a model without habit
formation. The utility function is log utility for consumption and linear utility form for
leisure, as used by Hansen (1985):
U(Ct, 1− Lt) = log Ct + A(1− Lt) (4.6.1)
The reason to choose this specification for a benchmark utility function is because
that log utility function of consumption is a simple form which has been used often in
studies of business cycles [such as Jermann (1998) and Campbell (1994)] and that the
linear-derived utility for leisure implies an infinite elasticity of substitution in leisure in
different periods [Hansen (1985)9]. Even though the utility function of the benchmark is
the same as the previous chapter Replication III, simulated results with this benchmark
are different than reported there. This is because that the production process in the
equilibrium economy in this chapter is improved by applying an effective labour scheme.
DYNARE codes for the benchmark are provided in Appendix 4.11.4.
4.7 Results and discussion (I)
The discussion in this section is much more technical than before as the objective
here is to compare the impact of different specifications of momentary utility functions
with habit formation on economic statistics by calibrating the three models and one
7The value for the habit persistence varies. In Jermann (1998), it is 0.82. In Cochrane and Hansen
(1992), they use two values - 0.5 and 0.6.
8The preference parameters ρ and 1 − ρ are the consumption and leisure share parameter. Ghez
and Becker (1975) [cited by Prescott (1998) and Kydland and Prescott (1982)] emphasise that the
ratio of the household’s productive time to nonmarket and market activities is approximately two to
one. Nearly two thirds of the time is devoted to nonmarket activities while one third of the time is
allocated to market activities. Campbell (1994) calculates an implied value of 0.36 for parameter ρ
with a given labour input (L = 0.33). A value for the leisure share parameter, therefore, is close
to two thirds. These values are taken as the principle of the allocation of time for consumption and
leisure choice for the Model 1. An expected optimal endogenous steady state value of labour input,
approximately 0.33, is obtained.
9The idea of the linearity in leisure is derived from Hansen (1985). He emphasises that labour
should be indivisible, which means employees either work fully or not at all. It is much more reasonable
than divisible labour that hours worked are chosen by individuals.
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Table 4.6.1: Parameter values
This table lists the parameter values used to solve and simulate the three with-habit dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. All the parameters are categorised into three groups.
The first group, Technology, includes parameters in the firm’s production function. The sec-
ond group, Financial Credit Default, includes parameters in the bank’s default process and the
firm’s operating profits after tax. The upper and lower bound are used to solve a default prob-
ability density function given that the credit shock follows a rectangular distribution, f(δt+1) ={
0 , δt+1 < l and δt+1 > u
1
u−l , δt+1 ∈ [l, u]
. The final group of parameters is calibrated for the investor’s
utility function. Model 1 is a nonseparable consumption-leisure model and its utility function is
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1 − Lt) = [(Ct−ξCt−1)
ρ(1−Lt)1−ρ]1−γ−1
1−γ . Both model 2 and 3 are additively separa-
ble consumption-leisure models but the front is calibrated with an additive habit formation and
the latter is constructed using a ratio of habit formation. The utility function of model 2 is
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1 − Lt) = log(Ct − ξCt−1) + A (1−Lt)
1−γL
1−γL and the utility function of model 3 is
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1 − Lt) =
(
Ct
ξCt−1 )
1−γC
1−γC + A
(1−Lt)1−γL
1−γL . The parameter value for the habit persistence
level is taken from Constantinides (1990). For determining the time allocated to market activities
(consumption), the parameter value used here is suggested by Campbell (1994).
Technology
Capital share to output α 0.35
Depreciation ratio η 0.019
Persistence of the technology shock ψ 0.95
Standard deviation of the technology shock σ 0.00712
Disutility of labour (Model 2) A 2.85
Financial Credit Default
Recovery rate θ 0.92
Tax rate τ 0.06
Upper bound u 1.225
Lower bound l 0.475
Preferences
Discount factor β 0.99
Coefficient of relative risk aversion (Model 1) γ 2
Coefficient of relative risk aversion (Model 3) γC 2
Coefficient of relative risk aversion for labour (Model 2 and 3) γL 5
Habit persistence ξ 0.80
Parameter determining the time allocated to market activitities ρ 0.36
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benchmark.
The first main finding is that these modified DSGE models provide the same con-
stant steady growth path for the economy regardless of the specification of utility
function. The second contribution here is that models with separable habit formation
have similar results of moments of aggregate dividends and other main real variables.
All the models with habit formation have a smoother consumption growth than the
model that is without habit formation. In a model with a ratio of habit formation,
the variability of aggregate dividends is closer to that in a benchmark which is without
habit formation. It appears that the ratio of habit formation used in this research does
not provide a strong effect of habit formation on business cycles. It only affects the
variability of consumption.
In addition, I find that aggregate dividend policy is countercyclical to business cy-
cles. Although this finding is inconsistent with the empirical result that the correlation
between net cash flows and Gross National Product is positive during several periods
(see Section 2.2.8, Chapter 2), it implies that the structure of the firm’s production
process, investment and financing decisions is complex and results in a negative rela-
tionship with output. The outcome of countercyclical payouts is related to the theorem
that corporations prefer to keep free cash flows for potential positive investment plans
in a bull market rather than pay dividends. It does not affect investors because, on
one hand, the value of profitable investments will be reflected in share prices. On the
other hand, agents with habit formation prefer to have smooth consumption. If the
economy is growing, labour income increases while output profit increases. Meanwhile,
the agent would like to keep consumption smooth and balance out changes in labour
income and other income (i.e. dividends). My results show that the procyclicality of
labour and the countercyclicality of dividends are consistent with this hypothesis.
4.7.1 Steady state values
The steady-state values for the marginal product rates of capital and labour (denoted
MPK and MPL respectively) should be constant in a steady-state growth stochastic
model as highlighted by King et al. (1988), as well as the ratios of Y/K, C/Y and
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C/K. These results have confirmed these conditions and are displayed in Table 4.7.1.
With internal habits, steady-state values in Model 1 are slightly greater than in the
benchmark. Steady-state values in Model 2, have the opposite result and are about
half of the values in the benchmark. The value of the threshold bankruptcy point is
about 0.40 in the all models. This shows that the firm will have to close its business if
it is unable to pay back the loan with the key threshold value being forty per cent of
the firm’s earnings and its residual capital.
Model 1 and Model 2 are with additive habit formation and Model 3 is with non-
additive habit formation. The steady state values of real variables in Model 3 are
considerably lower than in others. This is because the consumption process in Model 3 is
computed in a ratio form. Despite this, Model 3 reaches a general equilibrium economy
and the steady state values of capital to output (Y/K = 0.0885), consumption to
output (C/Y = 0.7665) and consumption to capital (C/K) are the same as Model 1
and Model 2. It is a significant finding that steady-state growth on output, capital and
consumption will remain the same no matter what utility function is adopted.
The benchmark, Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 have obtained steady-state growth
paths over business cycles in which technology, output, capital and consumption all
grow at a constant rate around 0.002 (0.8% at an annual rate) (details in Appendix
4.11.2). In Campbell (1994)’s paper, the values of the log technology growth rate g and
the log real return on capital r are 0.005 (2% annualised) and 0.015(6% annualised)
respectively. The reason for these differences comes from different value settings of the
depreciation rate and, most importantly, the model here is calibrated in an aggregated
level with the presence of bankruptcy.
The steady-state leverage ratio, B/K, is endogenously determined by the proposed
models, the figure for each model is about 40%. This is consistent with the report from
Taggart Jr (1986) that the leverage ratio for the after war period is between 30% and
47% [quoted by Alessandrini (2003)].
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Table 4.7.1: Steady state values
This table summarises the steady state values of dividends (D), consumption (C), output (Y ), capital
(K), labour (L), investment (I), debt(B), the risk-free rate (Rf), the gross risky interest rate (R),
the share price (Q), the benchmark point of bankruptcy (X), the marginal product of capital (MPK),
the marginal product of labour (MPL), the output-capital ratio (Y/K), the consumption-output ratio
(C/Y ) and the consumption-capital ratio (C/K) for four models. The first model, Benchmark, is a
model in which its utility function is without habit formation. Model 1, 2 and 3 are models with internal
habit formation. Model 1 and Model 2 are with additive habit formation (i.e. Ct − ξCt−1, ξ is the
parameter for habit persistence) and Model 3 is with non-additive habit formation (i.e. Ct/(ξCt−1)).
D C Y K L I B
Benchmark 0.0827 0.8418 1.0983 12.4166 0.2976 0.2359 4.9715
Model 1 0.0922 0.9381 1.2239 13.8371 0.3316 0.2629 5.5403
Model 2 0.0398 0.4047 0.5279 5.9685 0.1430 0.1134 2.3897
Model 3 0.0007 0.0067 0.0087 0.0982 0.0024 0.0019 0.0393
Rf R Q X
Benchmark 1.0101 1.0108 8.1905 0.3999
Model 1 1.0101 1.0108 9.1275 0.3999
Model 2 1.0101 1.0108 3.9371 0.3999
Model 3 1.0101 1.0108 0.0648 0.3999
MPK MPL Y/K C/Y C/K
Benchmark 0.0310 2.3992 0.0885 0.7665 0.0678
Model 1 0.0310 2.3992 0.0885 0.7665 0.0678
Model 2 0.0310 2.3992 0.0885 0.7665 0.0678
Model 3 0.0310 2.3992 0.0885 0.7665 0.0678
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4.7.2 Cyclical variability
Table 4.7.2 displays moments of aggregate dividends, consumption and other main
variables. The results provide significant information that aggregate dividends move
in a less volatile manner with habit persistence than without habits, and so do other
real variables. In addition, the model generates relatively low variability in the labour
market through habit persistence in the utility of consumption.
Comparing three models which have different momentary utility functions with habit
persistence, I find that Model 1 and Model 2 have similar volatility of aggregate div-
idends even though the specification of the momentary utility function is different.
Model 3 generates results which are closer to the benchmark apart from much smoother
consumption.
The relative standard deviation of consumption is lower in with-habit models rather
than in the no-habit model because of the effect of habit persistence. This is confirmed
by the fact that the household prefers a smoother consumption path in response to a
shock.
There is a puzzle when I compare the results of volatilities of aggregate output and
consumption between the no-habit model (the benchmark) and the habit model, Model
3. In Model 3, the variability of aggregate output is as great as that in the no-habit
model but the variability of aggregate consumption in Model 3 is much lower than that
in the no-habit mode. In the no-habit model, aggregate dividends fluctuate greatly
while the volatility of consumption is high. This does not provide consistent results
with the other models. One possible reason to explain the above results is the use of
a ratio form for habit formation. Thus I question the effectiveness of modelling habit
through the ratio of past and current consumption.
Labour is less volatile in with-habit models. The variability of the labour market
is smaller for habit consumers rather than for no-habit consumers. It tells us that
individuals having consumption habits prefer a stable state of the labour market. In
particular, much smoother labour is generated by a model with habit persistence in
utility of consumption and low risk aversion. That is, Model 2 with a log utility for
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Table 4.7.2: A summary of macroeconomics statistics of the benchmark and three
models
This table reports the cyclical statistics for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, a
benchmark model without habit formation and three models with internal habit. Model 1 and Model
2 are with additive habit formation (i.e. Ct − ξCt−1, ξ is the parameter for habit persistence) and
Model 3 is with non-additive habit formation (i.e. Ct/(ξCt−1)). The results are summarised into
two sections. Section I includes the relative standard deviation (RSD) of each variable (dividends
(D), consumption (C), output (Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), debt(B), the risk-free
rate (Rf), the gross risky interest rate (R), the share price (Q), the benchmark point of bankruptcy
(X), the marginal product of capital (MPK) and the marginal product of labour (MPL). Section
II reports the relative movement of each variable to output by computing the ratio of each variable’s
RSD to the RSD of output.
Section I: Relative standard deviations (RSD) in percent of economic variables
σD σC σY σK σL σI σB
Benchmark 4.50 0.31 1.24 0.29 0.99 4.41 0.29
Model 1 3.54 0.21 0.84 0.21 0.36 3.21 0.21
Model 2 3.56 0.18 0.81 0.21 0.31 3.19 0.21
Model 3 4.99 0.15 1.06 0.30 0.71 4.40 0.30
σRf σR σQ σX σMPK σMPL
Benchmark 0.03 0.03 0.30 0.04 1.26 0.31
Model 1 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.85 0.49
Model 2 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.82 0.50
Model 3 0.03 0.03 0.30 0.03 1.09 0.39
Section II: Relative standard deviations (RSD) of each economic variable to RSD of output
σD
σY
σC
σY
σY
σY
σK
σY
σL
σY
σI
σY
σB
σY
Benchmark 3.63 0.25 1.00 0.24 0.80 3.56 0.24
Model 1 4.22 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.43 3.83 0.25
Model 2 4.40 0.22 1.00 0.26 0.39 3.94 0.26
Model 3 4.71 0.14 1.00 0.28 0.67 4.15 0.28
Rf
σY
σR
σY
σQ
σY
σX
σY
σMPK
σY
σMPL
σY
Benchmark 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.03 1.02 0.25
Model 1 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.03 1.01 0.58
Model 2 0.03 0.03 0.26 0.03 1.01 0.62
Model 3 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 1.03 0.37
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consumption and habit in consumption develops a low standard deviation of labour.
My next findings are about the analysis of the relative strength of the volatility of
aggregate dividends and other main variables to the volatility of output. (Table 4.7.2,
Section II).
Aggregate dividends and investment have the highest relative volatility to output
volatility when individuals have habits in consumption in the economy. The volatility
of dividends is about three and half times that of output in the benchmark, while it is
nearly four times that of output in models with habit formation. The standard deviation
of investment is roughly four times that of output in cases with habit formation. That
investment fluctuates much more than output is more obvious in with-habit models.
The magnitude of fluctuations in hours worked to output is 79% in the benchmark.
In with-habit models, it becomes much lower. It shows the labour is much smoother
than the output in models with habit formation.
The standard deviation of debt is about a quarter of that of the output in the
benchmark. With habit formation, debt becomes slightly more volatile. This is because
initially debt would absorb the short-term fluctuations of investment and now, with
habit formation, the volatility of investment becomes greater which causes debt to be
more volatile rather than in the model without habit formation.
4.7.3 Co-movement
Table 4.7.3 lists each variable’s correlation with output (first section), dividends (second
section), consumption (third section) and debt (fourth section) respectively with and
without habit formation.
The results show that dividends are countercyclical. Aggregate dividend policy is
strongly and negatively correlated with output when habit persistence exists in each
model. Intuitively, we would think that the higher the output, the more cash available
for dividend payments. That is, aggregate dividend policy should be procyclical to
business cycles (see Section 2.2.8 of Chapter 2). This is not the case, however, as
corporations would prefer to hold more cash flows for potential investment projects
when the economy is booming. The higher the output, the lower the proportion of
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cash flows left for dividend payments. Therefore, the correlation between aggregate
dividend policy and output is negative.
The correlation of dividends and consumption, corr(D,C), becomes less negative
in models with habit formation. The correlation is -0.67 in no-habit model, while it is
-0.30 in model 1, -0.23 in Model 2 and a nearly zero correlation in Model 3 (-0.06). It is
expected that dividends and consumption have a less strong relationship. Models with
habit persistence generate smooth consumption while dividends still fluctuate greatly
over periods. As a result, the paths of dividends and consumption deviate greatly from
each other. The correlation between them is less strong. I also find that aggregate
labour has a strong negative correlation with aggregate dividends. Investors with habit
formation maximise consumption and labour and intend to have smooth consumption
over periods. The counter-correlation between dividend income and labour income can
help them to smooth consumption, as in the bull market the increase in labour income
increases and the decrease in dividend payouts can balance out any changes in the
agent’s cash flows.
Consumption is a strong procyclical variable in the case without habit formation,
that is, consumption has a positive and significant correlation with output. But, models
with habit formation show that consumption has a less systematic relationship to the
business cycle. This is consistent with the hypothesis that consumption moves smoothly
when consumer’s utility is partly determined by past consumption. Because of the effect
of habit formation, the strength of co-movement between consumption and output is
less strong.
So far, results tell us that habit persistence makes consumption smooth. Because of
that, consumption has a less strong relationship with other macroeconomic variables.
The price of equity and the amount of risk-free bonds, however, are exceptions. Models
with habit formation show that the price of equity is highly correlated with consumption
(corr(C,Q), around 97% to 99%), rather than in the model without habits (the figure
of corr(C,Q) is 80%). And the correlation between consumption and debt is 97% in
with-habit models and 67% in the no-habit model. I successfully present models which
can show that equity and bond markets are more sensitive to consumers’ habit motive.
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If there is no habit formation, the distribution of the household’s revenues is independent
from one period to another. Because of the effect of consumption habit, households
like to have smooth consumption rather than having volatile consuming behaviour.
In a booming economy, there is more cash going to equity and bond markets. In a
recession, there is less money for investing in equities and bonds. Therefore, the price
of equity and the amount of bonds are more sensitive and have greater correlation to
consumption when individuals have habit motives.
4.7.4 Impulse responses to a technology shock
Figures 4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.7.3 and 4.7.4 display results of impulse responses of macroe-
conomic variables to the stochastic technology shock for four models (one is without
habit formation (the benchmark) and three models are with habit formation) respec-
tively. These graphs show explicitly the differences of each real variable’s reaction
to a technology shock in DSGE models with multiplicative (Model 1) and additively
separable momentary utility functions (Model 2 and Model 3) individually.
Comparing figures of Model 1 and 2, they illustrate the reaction of both dividends
and consumptions to a positive technology shock. Model 1, with multiplicative utility
function, demonstrates a larger deviation of dividends from the steady state in the early
years after the shock than in Model 2. Consumption in Model 1 exhibits a big jump in
the first ten years after the shock.
The additively separable utility function (Model 2) reduces the reaction of real
variables, particularly productivity inputs, to a positive technology shock. Graphs of
output, capital, labour, investment, debt and equity price in Model 2 are comparatively
less volatile than in Model 1.
Another effect of non-additive habit formation in DSGE models is that consumption
and aggregate dividends tend to respond to the technology shock passively. Figure 4.7.4
displays the impulse response function of consumption, dividends, investment and debt
to the stochastic technology shock. In the early years, consumption deviates slightly
from the steady state; the figure is approximately 0.25x10−5. Aggregate dividends also
show small changes from the steady state (-2.5x10−5) in the following years when the
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Figure 4.7.1: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the benchmark
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Figure 4.7.2: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Model 1
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Figure 4.7.3: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Model 2
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Figure 4.7.4: Impulse responses to a technology shock for Model 3
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shock hits the market.
Overall, this section demonstrates DSGE models with habit formation in three cases:
multiplicative utility functions with separable consumption habit formation, additively
separable utility function with separable consumption habit formation, and additively
separable utility function with the ratio of habit formation.
The results emphasise that a multiplicative utility function provides a strong effect
on dividend policy in the general equilibrium process (see figures of Model 1, Figure
4.7.2). Aggregate dividends respond heavily to the technology shock in the first ten
years. In contrast, dividends, output, investment and consumption in the additively
separable utility function are less volatile. With this type of utility function, most real
variables have less ability to respond the stochastic technology shock. The reasons is
that the parameter of risk aversion is set equal to one, which means the household in
Model 2 is less risk averse than in Model 1 because the coefficient of risk aversion is
higher than one in Model 1 (implying a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption). Model 2, by contrast, has investors who are less risk averse. That
causes most real variables to respond less severely to the technology shock. Model 3,
a DSGE model with a ratio of habit formation, causes consumption to be less volatile
and dividends to fluctuate greatly.
The purpose of my next study intends to demonstrate that market-wide dividend policy
plays an important role in helping investors to smooth consumption. I take an aggre-
gated approach to corporate payouts, which contrasts with the more usual firm-level
analysis that is standard in the corporate finance literature. Using a macroeconomic
general equilibrium approach, the results show that dividend volatility increases, while
consumption volatility decreases, as the consumption smoothing motive of investors
gets stronger. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors use the cash pay-
outs from well diversified portfolios to help smooth consumption.
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4.8 Calibration (II)
Consistent with the hypothesis, the expectation is that the smoother the consumption,
the more volatile the aggregate dividends. All the models generate a low variability of
the consumption growth rate through habit persistence in the utility of consumption.
In particular, the non-additive habit formation brings much smoother consumption and
the volatility of aggregate dividends is lowest among three habit-models. I therefore
use the previous section’s Model 1 as this section’s model framework. The major and
only change is the value for habit persistence. In this section, the habit persistence
level is given from 0 to 0.9 with a range of 10%. Other parameter values remain the
same and are reported in Table 4.6.110.
The simulated results will be compared to the observed moments of the US economy.
Details of data description have been provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
4.9 Results and discussion (II)
The main finding of this calibration is that aggregate payout volatility increases while
consumption volatility declines as the consumption habit motive of investors increases.
Optimal aggregate payout policy is therefore shown to be sensitive to agents’ habit
persistence. Moreover, dividends keep a strong negative correlation with most real
variables (output, labour and investment) at each level of habit motive. Habit formation
is therefore an important link between consumption smoothing and optimal corporate
finance policy.
4.9.1 Variability of aggregate dividends and consumption smooth-
ing
Table 4.9.1 gives a summary of relative standard deviations (RSD) of each macroe-
conomic variable. ξ indicates investors’ habit motive; the greater ξ, the higher the
10Note that: ignore parameters of disutility of labour and the coefficient of relative risk aversion for
labour as they are not applicable in this section, they are parameters for Model 2
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Table 4.9.1: Relative standard deviation (RSD) in percent for the equilibrium model
and US data
This table reports relative standard deviations of aggregate dividends (D), consumption (C), labour
(L), output (Y ), capital (K), investment (I) and debt (B) of the extended equilibrium model. This
model is the Model 1 introduced in calibration I. The cyclical statistics are grouped into three by
giving different values of habit persistence in consumption (ξ), 0, 0.5 and 0.9 (the larger the value,
the stronger the habit persistence). The data source for capital, consumption, labour and investment is
from Hansen (1985). They are quarterly data from 1955.3-1984.1 detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter. The US quarterly data source for dividends and debt is Alessandrini (2003). Alessandrini
(2003) gets the quarterly data from 1955-2001 from US National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) statistics for dividends and from the US Flow of Funds statistics for debt. The multiplier of
the HP filter aims to adjust the sensitivity of short-term fluctuations. Hodrick and Prescott suggest
to set the value of the multiplier as 1600 for quarterly data. All data are detrended by the HP filter
and are quoted in percent.
Extended equilibrium model US data
ξ= 0 ξ=0.5 ξ= 0.9
σD 2.42 2.92 3.69 3.73
σC 0.30 0.27 0.14 1.29
σL 0.38 0.38 0.31 1.66
σY 0.85 0.85 0.80 1.76
σK 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.63
σI 2.66 2.90 3.26 8.60
σB 0.18 0.19 0.22 4.82
influence of past consumption on investors’ current utility.
My calibrated results show that the variability of aggregate payouts increases from
2.42% to 3.69% with growing habit persistence while the volatility of aggregate con-
sumption moves down from 0.30% to 0.14% (Table 4.9.1, Rows 1 and 2) as ξ moves
from 0 to 0.9. That consumption growth becomes smoother with increased habit mo-
tive is consistent with previous research; for example, Constantinides (1990). His study
emphasises that a high level of habit persistence, about 80 percent, generates a low
variability in consumption growth. Furthermore, a significant finding shows that the
lower the variability of consumption the greater the fluctuation of aggregate payouts.
My contribution here is to demonstrate that this is associated with an increase in
volatility of the optimal aggregate dividend payout. This is further illustrated by Figure
4.9.1, where the ratio σD/σC for values of ξ ∈ {0, ..., 0.9} is plotted.
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Figure 4.9.1: Sensitivity of aggregate dividends and consumption through habit
motive
This figure shows that, in aggregate, the relative standard deviation of dividends to
consumption rises dramatically as the habit motive becomes large.
To further understand why a decrease in consumption volatility with increased habit
formation is associated with a rise in aggregate dividend volatility, Table 4.9.2 reports
the correlations between each of the macroeconomic variables with consumption, divi-
dends and output.
From this, it is clear that, as the habit motive increases, the correlation between
consumption and output, corr(Yt, Ct), drops dramatically from 0.97 when ξ = 0 to
0.37 when ξ = 0.9. Again, this is intuitively consistent with an increased desire for
consumption smoothing. The question arises as to how investors manage to make their
consumption smoother and less dependent on output. In this model, consumption is
constructed from labour income, investing in the risk-free asset and dividends.
For all values of ξ, labour income and output have a very high correlation (Table
4.9.2) . As a consequence, for Ct to become less dependent on Yt as the habit motive
4.9. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION (II) 126
grows, so the cash flows that an investor generates from financial assets must become
increasingly countercyclical to offset the procyclicality of their salaries. In the case of
equity income, this is achieved by both the dividend and investment becoming more
volatile (Table 4.9.1) as ξ increases. In addition, dividends are strongly negatively
correlated to labour, investment and output (Table 4.9.2). Aggregate dividend policy
is thus important to investors as it helps agents keep a smoothness of consumption
through its countercyclicality.
It should be noted that the highly negative correlation between dividends and output
that is a feature of this model contrasts with the positive observed correlation reported
by Hansen (1985). However, it should also be noted that “dividends” here are the net
equity cash flows from the firm to the investor, which are more accurately interpreted
as net free cash flows after the retained earnings and investment. Amdur (2010)
calibrates a DSGE model in which the net equity payouts are not estimated under a
residual dividend policy. His model therefore predicts a procycalicality of equity payouts
and a countercyclicality of debt issues.
Figures 4.9.2 and 4.9.3 illustrate the impulse responses of the expected future path
of consumption, aggregate dividends, investment and debt in two cases, without habit
formation and with strong habit formation (ξ = 0.9). These response functions further
indicate that consumption growth is smoother when habit persistence is higher. That
is, consumption with high habit motive of ξ = 0.9 has lower deviations in the first ten
years after a shock (the range is [below 0.0005, 0.002]) than in the case of no-habit
motive of ξ = 0.0 ([0.002, 0.0025]). The figure further shows that aggregate dividends
fluctuate more in the habit formation case than in the no-habit formation case.
4.9.2 Variability of other macroeconomic variables
Aggregate investment, It has similar characteristics to Dt both with and without habit
in terms of its volatility and the absolute levels of its correlations with consumption and
income. In particular, the optimal investment path becomes more volatile as the habit
motive increases and investment volatility is close to aggregate payout volatility in each
of the different habit persistence cases (Table 4.9.1, Row 6). This is, again, what we
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Table 4.9.2: Cross-correlations of real variables
This table reports a summary of correlations between output (Y ) with capital (K), consumption
(C), labour (L), investment (I), dividends (D) and debt (B) by varying the habit persistence (ξ)
parameter value from 0.0 (without habit) to 0.9 (high level of habit persistence) for a DSGE model
with internal habit (Model 1 in the calibration I). The results are grouped into three sets. The first
group is the cross-correlation of consumption with other variables. The second group includes the
cross-correlation of dividends with other variables. The final group shows the observed cross-correlation
of gross national product (GNP) with other real variables and theoretical cross-correlation of output
with other variables. The data source for capital, consumption, labour and investment is from Hansen
(1985). They are quarterly data from 1955.3-1984.1 detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The
US quarterly data source for dividends and debt is Alessandrini (2003). Alessandrini (2003) gets the
quarterly data from 1955-2001 from US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) statistics for
dividends and from the US Flow of Funds statistics for debt. All data are detrended by the Hodrick
and Prescott filter (HP filter) and are quoted in percent.
Corr(., Ct) (Kt, Ct) (Ct, Ct) (Yt, Ct) (Lt, Ct) (It, Ct) (Dt, Ct) (Bt, Ct)
ξ = 0.0 0.52 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.94 -0.91 0.40
ξ = 0.1 0.55 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.93 -0.88 0.43
ξ = 0.2 0.59 1.00 0.94 0.89 0.90 -0.83 0.48
ξ = 0.3 0.64 1.00 0.92 0.87 0.86 -0.78 0.53
ξ = 0.4 0.69 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.81 -0.71 0.59
ξ = 0.5 0.75 1.00 0.84 0.78 0.75 -0.63 0.66
ξ = 0.6 0.81 1.00 0.78 0.70 0.66 -0.54 0.74
ξ = 0.7 0.89 1.00 0.70 0.60 0.56 -0.43 0.83
ξ = 0.8 0.96 1.00 0.57 0.45 0.42 -0.30 0.92
ξ = 0.9 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.21 0.25 -0.16 0.99
Corr(., D) (Kt, Dt) (Ct, Dt) (Yt, Dt) (Lt, Dt) (It, Dt) (Dt, Dt) (Bt, Dt)
ξ = 0.0 -0.11 -0.91 -0.98 -1.00 -0.99 1.00 0.03
ξ = 0.1 -0.10 -0.88 -0.98 -0.99 -0.99 1.00 0.04
ξ = 0.2 -0.09 -0.83 -0.97 -0.99 -0.99 1.00 0.04
ξ = 0.3 -0.09 -0.78 -0.96 -0.99 -0.99 1.00 0.05
ξ = 0.4 -0.08 -0.71 -0.96 -0.98 -0.99 1.00 0.05
ξ = 0.5 -0.08 -0.63 -0.95 -0.98 -0.99 1.00 0.05
ξ = 0.6 -0.07 -0.54 -0.95 -0.97 -0.99 1.00 0.05
ξ = 0.7 -0.08 -0.43 -0.95 -0.98 -0.99 1.00 0.05
ξ = 0.8 -0.09 -0.30 -0.95 -0.98 -0.99 1.00 0.03
ξ = 0.9 -0.12 -0.16 -0.98 -1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.01
Corr(., Y ) (Kt, Yt) (Ct, Yt) (Yt, Yt) (Lt, Yt) (It, Yt) (Dt, Yt) (Bt, Yt)
US data 0.04 0.85 1.00 0.76 0.92 0.34 0.29
ξ = 0.0 0.29 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 -0.98 0.16
ξ = 0.1 0.30 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 -0.98 0.17
ξ = 0.2 0.31 0.94 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.97 0.18
ξ = 0.3 0.32 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.96 0.19
ξ = 0.4 0.34 0.89 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.96 0.21
ξ = 0.5 0.35 0.84 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.95 0.23
ξ = 0.6 0.36 0.78 1.00 0.99 0.98 -0.95 0.24
ξ = 0.7 0.37 0.70 1.00 0.99 0.98 -0.95 0.26
ξ = 0.8 0.37 0.57 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.95 0.26
ξ = 0.9 0.33 0.37 1.00 0.99 0.99 -0.98 0.23
4.9. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION (II) 128
10 20 30 40
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
B
10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
8
x 10−3 I
Years after shock (for all x axes)
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e 
(fo
r a
ll y
 ax
es
)
10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3
x 10−3 C
10 20 30 40
−3
−2
−1
0
1
x 10−3 D
Figure 4.9.2: The figure plots the impulse responses of optimal consumption (C),
aggregate dividends (D), investment (I) and debt (B) in the case of without habit
persistence (ξ = 0)
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Figure 4.9.3: The figure plots the impulse responses of optimal consumption (C),
aggregate dividends (D), investment (I) and debt (B) in the case of with habit
persistence (ξ = 0.9).
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would expect. As investors’ habit motive gets stronger, the firm must adapt its own
investment plans to ensure that the firm helps maximise the expected utility of the
agent. This results in more volatile investment for the firm but smoother consumption
for the investor as ξ increases. The correlation between investment and consumption
also decreases as the latter is smoothed, which is consistent with the absolute rela-
tionship between dividends and consumption. Investment is nearly perfectly correlated
with output for all values of ξ because of the high persistence of technology change;
ψ = 0.95. High output this year signals high future profitability, giving firms a strong
incentive to increase investment levels. In addition, as with dividends, the volatility of
the amount of bonds Bt increases with ξ. This suggests that firm financing is also
affected by the utility function of investors.
Labour supply is almost perfectly correlated with output. The explanation for this
is the same as for investment (It); firm profitability is very highly persistent, so high
output makes the firm want to employ more labour. However, if the agent supplies
more hours when times are good, then the more procyclical their salary becomes. This
then creates difficulties for them to smooth consumption. To counteract this, the
volatility of labour, σL, decreases as the habit motive increases. Again, as expected,
the correlation between labour and consumption decreases as the habit motive gets
stronger.
In this general equilibrium setting, the habit motive of investors is shown to have
a significant influence not only on the investors’ labour and consumption decisions but
also on the investment, financing and payout policy of the firm. This suggests that
there is a significant interaction between corporate policy and investor utility.
4.9.3 Sensitivity to various levels of gamma and habit per-
sistence
This section studies the cross-sensitivity of the coefficient of risk aversion (γ) and habit
persistence (ξ) to the aggregate payout volatility and others. From this research, I find
a relationship between the aggregate dividend policy with investors’ risk aversion and
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habit motives.
Dividend policy, in an aggregated market, becomes more volatile when investors
are willing to take more risk on their revenues. This hypothesis has been supported by
my model (Table 4.9.3). At each level of habit persistence, the greater the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution for consumption, the higher the variability of aggregate
dividend policy. Moreover, until habit motive is equal to 0.8, the higher the habit
motives investors hold, the greater the volatility of aggregate payouts, no matter what
the level of risk aversion. Further result shows that aggregate dividends are less volatile
when habit motive is set close to one and γ = 0.5. Little existing work has discussed
this issue. Exploring this relationship is left for future research.
I have followed Lettau and Uhlig (2000) and find that a low variability of consump-
tion growth is generated through a stochastic general equilibrium model with a certain
high level of habit persistence (about 80 percent) and low risk aversion (Table 4.9.3,
Section σC).
As to movements of other real macroeconomic variables, the results demonstrate
that output, investment, capital and labour are less volatile when investors are more
risk averse at every level of habit persistence.
Overall, the sensitivity of business cycles to the coefficient of risk aversion implies
that habit persistence helps consumers smooth their consumption, and so does the
factor of risk aversion. The results show that both factors of habit persistence and
risk aversion can affect the variability of aggregate dividend policy. Under a value
of 0.8 of habit persistence, I find that an economy has the most volatile aggregate
payouts if investors are less risk averse and willing to use cash payouts to help smooth
consumption.
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Table 4.9.3: Sensitivity of real variables to various gamma and habit persistence
for Model 1
This table reports a summary of the relative standard deviations of dividends (D), consumption (C),
labour (L), output (Y ), capital (K), investment (I), and debt (B) for a range of habit persistence
in consumption (ξ) and four levels of coefficient of relative risk aversion. The results are obtained by
simulating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model (Model 1, introduced in calibration
I). This table shows the sensitivity of each variable’s movement in various habit persistence parameter
values from 0.0 (without habit) to 0.9 (high level of habit persistence) in four categories of 0.5, 1, 2
and 10 for the coefficient of risk aversion (γ). The greater the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the
stronger the individual’s risk aversion level.
ξ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
σD γ = 0.5 4.10 4.12 4.14 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.30 4.31 4.16
γ = 1 3.18 3.22 3.27 3.33 3.41 3.50 3.61 3.75 3.88 3.90
γ = 2 2.42 2.49 2.57 2.66 2.78 2.92 3.09 3.30 3.54 3.69
γ = 10 1.62 1.71 1.82 1.95 2.12 2.31 2.55 2.84 3.19 3.51
σC γ = 0.5 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.13
γ = 1 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.13
γ = 2 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.14
γ = 10 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.15
σL γ = 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.42
γ = 1 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.36
γ = 2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.31
γ = 10 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27
σY γ = 0.5 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.87
γ = 1 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.83
γ = 2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.80
γ = 10 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.78
σK γ = 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
γ = 1 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
γ = 2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
γ = 10 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21
σI γ = 0.5 3.77 3.78 3.78 3.79 3.80 3.81 3.82 3.83 3.80 3.64
γ = 1 3.16 3.18 3.20 3.23 3.27 3.31 3.36 3.42 3.48 3.43
γ = 2 2.66 2.69 2.72 2.77 2.83 2.90 2.98 3.09 3.21 3.26
γ = 10 2.12 2.16 2.22 2.28 2.36 2.46 2.59 2.75 2.94 3.12
σB γ = 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
γ = 1 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
γ = 2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
γ = 10 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.21
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4.10 Summary
In this chapter, I studied the relationship between aggregate dividend policy and investor
utility; an issue that previously has rarely been discussed in the standard corporate
finance and macroeconomics literature.
From the first calibration, I showed that separable habit formation in both multiplica-
tive and additively separable utility functions generates similar results for movements
of aggregate dividends. Another result from my models was that aggregate dividend
policy is countercyclical to business cycles. Corporations would prefer to leave earn-
ings for potential positive NPV investment plans rather than pay dividends, particularly
when the economy is booming. Thus, the correlation between aggregate dividends and
output is negative.
The second calibration exploited the fact that investors’ desire to smooth consump-
tion across time is directly linked to their internal habit motive. Therefore, by changing
the impact that previous consumption has on current utility, I examined the relationship
between optimal corporate finance activity and investor welfare.
As expected, the results showed that, as the habit motive becomes stronger, con-
sumption growth becomes smoother. My primary contribution was to demonstrate
that dividends play an important role in helping to isolate investors from the volatil-
ity of the business cycle. In particular, I showed that the optimal dividend payout
policy becomes more volatile and stays negatively correlated with output as the habit
motive increases. This volatile and counter-cyclical stream of financial income helps
counterbalance the highly procyclical nature of labour income in this economy.
I further found that the form of investors’ utility impacts upon a number of other
aspects of financial activity. In particular, I found that as the habit motive increases,
the volatility of real investment rises, as does the volatility of debt financing. Agents
will also change their labour availability as their consumption habits change.
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4.11 Appendices
4.11.1 Procedure for solving DSGE models with habit for-
mation
Step 1: Solving the firm’s optimisation problem
The optimisation function of the firm’s cash flow is:
max
Ldt ,Kt,Bt
Dt + Et
[ ∞∑
h=1
Mt,hDt+h
]
(4.11.1)
subject to
Dt = (1−τ)
[
Kαt−1(ZtL
d
t )
1−α −WtLdt −Rt−1Bt−1
]−τBt−1+Bt−Kt+(1−η)Kt−1
(4.11.2)
Setting the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to L = 0,
K = 0, B = 0 reveals the following three constraints for the firm:
Wt = (1− α)Kαt−1(Zt)1−αL−αt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
(4.11.3)
1 = Et{Mt,1{[(1− τ)αKα−1t (Zt+1Lt+1)1−α] + 1− η} } (4.11.4)
1 = Et
{
Mt,1[(1− τ)Rt + τ ]
}
(4.11.5)
the above equations 4.11.3, 4.11.4 and 4.11.5 are the firm’s optimal conditions.
Step 2: Solving the household’s optimisation problem
To solve the household’s problem, it starts form the Lagrangian of the household’s
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optimisation problem based on page 47:
L = Et
{ ∞∑
h=0
βh[U(Ct+h, Ct+h−1, 1− Lst+h)− λt+h(Ct+h +Qt+hNt+h+1
+BHt+h −Wt+hLst+h −Qt+hNt+h −Dt+hNt+h −Rft+h−1Bht+h−1)]
}
(4.11.6)
where λt+h is a Lagrangian multiplier. I solve the optimisation problem by com-
puting partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to each of the control
variables and setting each equal to zero. The following equations are yielded
according to ∂L/∂Ct = 0, ∂L/∂Lst = 0, ∂L/∂Nt = 0 and ∂L/∂BHt = 0
respectively:
λt =
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lst+1)
∂Ct
(4.11.7)
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Lst
+ λtWt = 0 (4.11.8)
Qt = βEt
[(
λt+1
λt
)
(Qt+1 +Dt+1)
]
(4.11.9)
λt = βEt[λt+1Rf,t] (4.11.10)
The above four equations can be summarised into three major closed forms for
the household’s optimisation. First, by substituting λt from equation 4.11.7 to
equation 4.11.8:
Wt = −
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Lst
∂U(Ct, Ct−11− Lst)
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lst+1)
∂Ct
(4.11.11)
Second , the standard Euler equation follows directly from equation 4.11.10:
1 = βEt
[(
λt+1
λt
)
Rf,t
]
(4.11.12)
This defines the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with respect
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to consumption
Mt,h = β
hλt+h
λt
= βh
∂U(Ct+h, Ct+h−1, 1− Lst+h)
∂Ct+h
+
∂U(Ct+h+1, Ct+h, 1− Lst+h+1)
∂Ct+h
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lst+1)
∂Ct
(4.11.13)
To rewrite equation 4.11.9
Qt = Et [Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (4.11.14)
Equations 4.11.11, 4.11.12, 4.11.13 and 4.11.14 are the household’s optimal
conditions.
Step 3: Equilibrium conditions from firm and household
To merge the firm and the household’s optimal conditions for a general equilib-
rium, we can obtain five equilibrium conditions:
(1− α)Yt
Lt
= −
∂U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lst)
∂Lst
∂U(Ct, Ct−11− Lst)
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lst+1)
∂Ct
(4.11.15)
1 = Et [Mt,1Rf,t] (4.11.16)
Rft = Et[(1− τ)αKα−1t (Zt+1Lt+1)1−α + 1− η] (4.11.17)
Rt =
(
1
1− τ
)
[Rf,t − τ ] (4.11.18)
Qt = Et[Mt,1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (4.11.19)
where Yt is determined by the Cobb-Douglas production function. U(.) is the
utility function. This chapter adopts three types of habit formation utility func-
tions. Mt,1 is identified from the representative household’s optimisation (equa-
tion 4.11.13).
Step 4: Market clearing conditions
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Refer to Chapter 3.
Finally, by calibrating equations 4.11.15, 4.11.16, 4.11.17, 4.11.18, 4.11.19 from step
3 with aforementioned (in chapter 3) two conditions in the banking sector (3.3.12 and
3.3.14) together with the market clearing conditions (equations 3.4.10, 3.4.11, 3.4.12,
3.4.15 and 3.4.16), an expected dynamic stochastic general equilibrium can be obtained
with respect to the technology shock Z which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
4.11.2 Steady-state growth
Table 4.7.1 shows that the steady state output-capital, consumption-output and consumption-
capital ratios are constant. The information implies that variables of technology, capital,
output and consumption are growing at a constant rate. For instance, the ratios of
Kt
Kt−1
, Zt+1
Zt
, Yt+1
Yt
, and Ct+1
Ct
are the same as the constant growth rate of G.
I examine the steady-state growth rate in which technology, capital, output and
consumption all grow at a constant rate (G) by an analytical approach. The capital
accumulation function is
Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + It
Kt
Kt−1
= 1− η + It
Kt−1
where I = Ia when it is valued in aggregate level and given that Ia = Y a − Ca. The
steady state condition of the above equation is given
G = 1− η + Y
a
K
− C
a
K
Next I substitute in the parameter value of η and the results shown in Table 4.7.1
, the growth rate is
G = 1− 0.019 + 0.0885− 0.0678 = 1.0017
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The growth rate can be computed in log form as
g = ln(G) = ln(
Kt
Kt−1
) + 0.002
where the value is a quarterly value, the annual rate is 0.8%. Details about the steady-
state growth can be referred from Campbell (1994).
4.11.3 The nature of multiplicative utility function with in-
ternal habits
This section follows the study of Seckin (2001) to investigate the nature of the multi-
plicative utility function with habits.
4.11.3.1 Intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
By using an algorithm, the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRSintra)
between current consumption and current leisure with internal habits can be defined.
The general momentary utility function includes three variables that control the
household’s optimal preferences, current leisure, current and past consumption. Pre-
viously, Model 1 showed that the representative household has a multiplicative utility
function with internal habits given a form of
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = [(Ct − ξCt−1)
ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]1−γ
1− γ (4.11.20)
where γ, ξ and ρ are parameters and between zero and one. γ is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, ξ determines habit persistence in consumption, and ρ measures
the proportion of time devoted to market activities.
Model 1 with habit formation displays a decrease in the intratemporal marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRSintra). To calculate MRSintra,
we first calculate the marginal utility of leisure (1− Lt) which is
MU(1−Lt) = (1− ρ)[(Ct− ξCt−1)ρ(1−Lt)1−ρ]−γ](Ct− ξCt−1)ρ(1−Lt)−ρ (4.11.21)
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and the net marginal utility of consumption:
MUCt = ρ[(Ct − ξCt−1)ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]−γ](Ct − ξCt−1)ρ−1(1− Lt)1−ρ
− ρξβ[(Ct+1 − ξCt)ρ(1− Lt+1)1−ρ]−γ](Ct+1 − ξCt)ρ−1(1− Lt+1)1−ρ
(4.11.22)
The MRSintra is obtained by
MRSintra|ξ>0 =
MU(1−Lt)
MUCt
=
[ (1−γ)(1−ρ)
1−Lt ]U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt)
(1−γ)ρ
Ct−ξCt−1U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt)−
ρξβ(1−γ)
Ct+1−ξCtEtU(Ct+1, Ct, 1− Lt+1)
= (
1− ρ
ρ
)
[
(
Ct
1− Lt )− (
ξCt−1
1− Lt )
][
1
1− ξβ(Ct−ξCt−1
Ct+1−ξCt )
EtU(Ct+1,Ct,1−Lt+1)
U(Ct,Ct−1,1−Lt)
]
=
[
MRSintra|ξ=0 − (
1− ρ
ρ
)(
ξCt−1
1− Lt )
]
∗
[
1
1− ξβ(Ct−ξCt−1
Ct+1−ξCt )
EtU(Ct+1,Ct,1−Lt+1)
U(Ct,Ct−1,1−Lt)
]
(4.11.23)
On the right-hand side of the equation, the first is positive and the second is assumed to
be greater than one. This equation implies that the individual investor with habits has
stronger marginal rate of substitution between current leisure and current consumption.
The elasticity of substitution is therefore smaller than the case without habits. The
investor is less willing to alter his/her preferences for leisure and consumption units at
the current time.
In a special case of the value of γ = 1, the utility function turns to be the one in
model 2 which is
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = log(Ct − ξCt−1) + A(1− Lt)
1−γL
1− γL
The MRSintra|ξ>0 is calculated as
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MRSintra|ξ>0 =
MU(1−Lt)
MUCt
= MRSintra|ξ=0 ∗ [
1
Ct(
1
Ct−ξCt−1 − ξβ 1Ct+1−ξCt )
] (4.11.24)
Suppose the habit persistence (ξ) is increasing, the higher the ξ, the greater the
second term of equation 4.11.24. It indicates thatMRSintra|ξ>0 is greater thanMRS
intra
|ξ=0 .
The message is that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure is low when the household has a strong habit motive. The household would
take more leisure and prefer to consume less consumption.
4.11.3.2 Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
To further study the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRSinter) between
current and future leisure, MRSinter can be analysed by using an algorithm approach:
MRSinter|ξ>0 =
MU(1−Lt)
MU(1−Lt+1)
=
(1− ρ)[(Ct − ξCt−1)ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]−γ](Ct − ξCt−1)ρ(1− Lt)−ρ
(1− ρ)[(Ct+1 − ξCt)ρ(1− Lt+1)1−ρ]−γ](Ct+1 − ξCt)ρ(1− Lt+1)−ρ
= [
Ct − ξCt−1
Ct+1 − ξCt ]
ρ(1−γ) ∗ [ 1− Lt
1− Lt+1 ]
(1−ρ)(−γ)−ρ
= [
(1− ξCt−1
Ct
)
(Ct+1
Ct
− ξ) ]
ρ(1−γ) ∗ [ 1− Lt
1− Lt+1 ]
(1−ρ)(−γ)−ρ
= MRSinter|ξ=0 ∗ [(
1− ξCt−1
Ct
Ct+1
Ct
− ξ )(
Ct+1
Ct
)]ρ(1−γ)
= MRSinter|ξ=0 ∗ [
Ct − ξCt−1
Ct+1 − ξCt )(
Ct+1
Ct
)]ρ(1−γ)
Suppose that the ratio of Ct+1
Ct
is positive and the ratio of Ct−ξCt−1
Ct+1−ξCt is smaller than
one but positive, we could then analyse the elasticity of current and future leisure.
1. If the household is risk averse, the value of γ > 1. Thus MRSinterξ>0 is greater
than MRSinterξ=0 when the habit motive is increasing. This provides an important
message that the elasticity between consuming leisure today and the future is
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smaller in the case of habit formation than in the case of without habits. When
the habit persistence gets stronger (ξ↑), the value of MRSinterξ>0 is bigger. The
household is less willing to take more leisure in the future, and prefers taking
more of leisure today. Note that, this finding is restricted on this multiplicative
utility function.
2. It is presumed that the household is not risk neutral. This is because the mul-
tiplicative utility function will transfer to an additively separable utility function
of consumption and leisure when γ is equal to one. Then the utility function is
the one used in model 2. Under an additively separable utility function, the con-
sumption habit persistence does not influence the utility of leisure. Therefore, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution between current and future leisure remains
the same in both cases of with and without habits.
4.11.4 DYNARE code for the Log-LD DSGE model with ef-
fective labour (benchmark)
% Economic growth: labor augmenting technical change (effective labor units)
% LOG-LD
% no habits
% similar to file name: testutility00_testnew6
% similar to test0904_testnew6 from \mystuff\20090904
% utility function: type 1 - log-power utility (gamma_l = 0) => log-ld
% similar to testnew6 from \mystuff\20090810 but A=2.85 here
% testnew6 : similar to testnew3. now trying to put aggregate equilibrium for d and
(c=y-i)
% (not partial b and k of r, put the equation in, then can run.)
% file name: testnew5.mod
% \mystuff\20090810_startingfromDynareSummerSchool
%————————————————————————————
% Purpose: Extended RBC model: 13 variables
% with indivisible labor, dividends, debt, risk-free rate,
% interest rate and default probability estimate.
%
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
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%—————————————————————-
%var d, c, y, k, l, i, b, r, rf, q, x, z, fau, mpk, mpl;
var k, c, y, l, i, d, b, r, q, rf, x, z, fau, mpk, mpl;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology, q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma, tau, theta, U, L, epi, gamma_l;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
A = 2.85;
% 2.85 self-estimated by Hansen (1985)’s parameter results
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99; % subjective time discount factor
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
tau = 0.06; % tax rate
theta = 0.92; % recovery rate
U = 1.225; % U = 1 + 0.3*epi
L = 0.475; % L = 1 - 0.7*epi
epi = 0.75; % specific shock
gamma_l = 0;
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( (c/c(+1))*rf );
rf = (1-tau)*(alpha*(exp(z(+1))^(1-alpha))*(k^(alpha-1))*(l(+1)^(1-alpha))) + 1 -
delta;
A*c = (1-l)^(gamma_l)*(1-alpha)*(exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(-alpha));
y = (exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-L)/epi))*y - ((U-x)/epi)*i;
r = (1/(1-tau))*(rf-tau);
r = (b*rf - ((theta/(2*epi))*(alpha*y(+1)+(1-delta)*k)*(x(+1)^2 - (L)^2)))*
(epi/(b*(U-x(+1))));
q = beta*( (c/c(+1)) * (q(+1)+ d(+1)) );
x = b(-1)*r(-1) / (alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
d = ((U-x)/epi)*((1-tau)*(alpha* y - r(-1)*b(-1)) -tau*b(-1) - i + b);
z = psi*z(-1) + e; fau = x/(alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
mpk = alpha*y/k(-1);
mpl = (1-alpha)*y/l;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
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c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
b = 0.6;
x = 0.3;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks; var e = sigma^2; end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)))./oo_.mean(1:15);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic1,15,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic2,15,8,4);
4.11.5 DYNARE code for the DSGE model with habit for-
mation and effective labour (Model 1)
% file: Paper1001com0 (under Mystuff\RBCexamples\20100210_paper1)
%file: Atestutility22
% file: Paper1001xi0gamma1 (under Mystuff\RBCexamples\20100210) for running
different gammas
% technical change in labor
% non-separable model with habit formation
% similar to file name: testutility22
% utility function: non-additively separable utility in consumption and leisure (rho =
0.36, gamma=2, xi=0.80)
% with habit formation
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
var k, c, y, l, i, d, b, r, q, rf, x, z, fau,mpk,mpl; %fau
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology, q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma, tau, theta, U, L, epi, rho, gamma, xi;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
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%—————————————————————-
%A = 2.85; % 2.85 self-estimated by Hansen (1985)’s parameter results (not use here)
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99; % subjective time discount factor
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
tau = 0.06; % tax rate
theta = 0.92; % recovery rate
U = 1 + 0.3*epi;
L = 1 - 0.7*epi;
epi = 0.75; % specific shock
rho = 0.36;
gamma = 2;
xi = 0.80; % habit persistence
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-
l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/ ( ((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^
(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta) *rf );
rf = (1-tau)*(alpha*(exp(z(+1))^(1-alpha))*(k^(alpha-1))*(l(+1)^(1-alpha))) + 1 -
delta;
c = xi*c(-1)+((rho/(1-rho))*(1-alpha)*(exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*
(l^(1-alpha))*(1-l)/l* ( 1 - xi*beta*((1-l(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(1+rho*(gamma-1))*
((1-l)/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(rho*(1-gamma)-1)*((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^gamma));
y = (exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-1+0.7*epi)/epi))*y - ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*i;
r = (1/(1-tau))*(rf-tau);
r = (b*rf - ((theta/(2*epi))*(alpha*y(+1)+(1-delta)*k)*(x(+1)^2 -
(1-0.7*epi)^2)))*(epi/(b*(1+0.3*epi-x(+1))));
q = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-
l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/ ( ((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(rho-
gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta)
*(q(+1)+ d(+1)) );
x = b(-1)*r(-1) / (alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
d = ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*((1-tau)*(alpha* y - r(-1)*b(-1)) -tau*b(-1) - i + b);
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
fau = x/(alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
mpk = alpha*y/k(-1);
mpl = (1-alpha)*y/l;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
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c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
b = 0.6;
x = 0.3;
fau = 0.03;
z = 0;
e= 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1, irf=40);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)))./oo_.mean(1:15);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic1,15,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic2,15,8,4);
4.11.6 DYNARE code for the DSGE model with habit for-
mation and effective labour (Model 2)
% file: Atestutility37
% technical change in labor
% additively separable model with separable habit formation
% (gamma_c=1, gamma_l=5 xi=0.80) => log-power (with separable habit)
% file name: testutility30
% utility function: additively separable utility in consumption and leisure
% — habit formation —
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
var k, c, y, l, i, z, d, b, rf, r, q, x, fau,mpk,mpl; %fau
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology, q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma, tau, theta, U, L, epi, xi, gamma_c,
gamma_l;
%—————————————————————-
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% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
A = 2.85; % 2.85 self-estimated by Hansen (1985)’s parameter results
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99; % subjective time discount factor
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
tau = 0.06; % tax rate
theta = 0.92; % recovery rate
U = 1 + 0.3*epi;
L = 1 - 0.7*epi;
epi = 0.75; % specific shock
xi = 0.80; % habit persistence
gamma_c = 1;
gamma_l = 5;
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( ((1-xi*beta*(((c(+1)-xi*c)/(c(+2)-xi*c(+1)))^(gamma_c))) /
( (((c(+1)-xi*c)/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(gamma_c))-xi*beta )) *rf);
rf = (1-tau)*(alpha*(exp(z(+1))^(1-alpha))*(k^(alpha-1))*(l(+1)^(1-alpha))) + 1 -
delta;
A* (((1/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(gamma_c))-xi*beta*((1/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(gamma_c)))^(-1) =
(1-alpha)*((1-l)^(gamma_l))*(exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(-alpha));
y = (exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-1+0.7*epi)/epi))*y - ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*i;
r = (1/(1-tau))*(rf-tau);
r = (b*rf - ((theta/(2*epi))*(alpha*y(+1)+(1-delta)*k)*(x(+1)^2 -
(1-0.7*epi)^2)))*(epi/(b*(1+0.3*epi-x(+1))));
q = beta*( ((1-xi*beta*(((c(+1)-xi*c)/(c(+2)-xi*c(+1)))^(gamma_c))) /
( (((c(+1)-xi*c)/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(gamma_c))-xi*beta )) * (q(+1)+ d(+1)) );
x = b(-1)*r(-1) / (alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
d = ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*((1-tau)*(alpha* y - r(-1)*b(-1)) -tau*b(-1) - i + b);
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
fau = x/(alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
mpk = alpha*y/k(-1);
mpl = (1-alpha)*y/l;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
b = 0.6;
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x = 0.3;
fau = 0.03;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)))./oo_.mean(1:15);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic1,15,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic2,15,8,4);
4.11.7 DYNARE code for the DSGE model with nonsepa-
rable habit formation and effective labour (Model 3)
% file: Atestutility35
% technical change in labor
% additively separable model with nonseparable habit formation (gamma_c=2, gamma_l=5
xi=0.80)
% similar file name: testutility35
% utility function: additively separable utility in consumption and leisure
% — habit formation — ratio way – (c_t/xi*c_t-1)
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
var k, c, y, l, i, z, d, b, rf, r, q, x, fau,mpk,mpl; %fau
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology, q: the price
of the equity
varexo e;
parameters A, alpha, beta, delta, psi, sigma, tau, theta, U, L, epi, xi, gamma_c,
gamma_l;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
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A = 2.85; % 2.85 self-estimated by Hansen (1985)’s parameter results
alpha = 0.35; % capital share / Uhlig & Hansen: 0.36, Alessandrini: 0.35
beta = 0.99; % subjective time discount factor
delta = 0.019; % depreciation share /Uhlig & Hansen: 0.025, Alessandrini: 0.019
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
tau = 0.06; % tax rate
theta = 0.92; % recovery rate
U = 1 + 0.3*epi;
L = 1 - 0.7*epi;
epi = 0.75; % specific shock
xi = 0.80; % habit persistence
gamma_c = 2;
gamma_l = 5;
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( ( ( (c(+1)/c)/(c/c(-1)))^(-gamma_c)*(1/(c/c(-1)))* ((1-beta*((c(+2)/
c(+1))/(c(+1)/c))^(1-gamma_c))/(1-beta*((c(+1)/c)/(c/c(-1)))^(1-gamma_c))))
*rf);
rf = (1-tau)*(alpha*(exp(z(+1))^(1-alpha))*(k^(alpha-1))*(l(+1)^(1-alpha)))
+ 1 - delta;
A = (1/(c^gamma_c))*(1-alpha)*(exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*
(l^(-alpha))*(1-l)^(gamma_l)*(1/(xi*c(-1)))^(1-gamma_c)* (1- beta*
((c(+1)/c)/(c/c(-1)))^(1-gamma_c));
y = (exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)*(l^(1-alpha));
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1);
c = (1 - (alpha*(1-theta)*(x-1+0.7*epi)/epi))*y - ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*i;
r = (1/(1-tau))*(rf-tau);
r = (b*rf - ((theta/(2*epi))*(alpha*y(+1)+(1-delta)*k)*(x(+1)^2
- (1-0.7*epi)^2)))*(epi/(b*(1+0.3*epi-x(+1))));
q = beta*( ( ( (c(+1)/c)/(c/c(-1)))^(-gamma_c)*(1/(c/c(-1)))*(( 1-beta*
((c(+2)/c(+1))/(c(+1)/c))^(1-gamma_c)) /( 1-beta*((c(+1)/c)/(c/c(-1)))^
(1-gamma_c)))) * (q(+1)+ d(+1)) );
x = b(-1)*r(-1) / (alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
d = ((1+0.3*epi-x)/epi)*((1-tau)*(alpha* y - r(-1)*b(-1)) -tau*b(-1) - i + b);
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
fau = x/(alpha*y + (1-delta)*k(-1));
mpk = alpha*y/k(-1);
mpl = (1-alpha)*y/l;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 2;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
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b = 0.6;
x = 0.3;
fau = 0.03;
z = 0;
e= 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)))./oo_.mean(1:15);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic1,15,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:15,1:15)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:15,:),statistic2,15,8,4);
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the impact of frictions in the production process on aggregate
dividends. In particular, capital adjustment costs as well as habit formation are included
within the DSGE models. External financing and default, however, are not considered
in this chapter for reasons of analytical tractability.
Several papers have previously taken both capital adjustment costs and habit forma-
tion into account in DSGE models [Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), and Gershun
(2010)]. Their focus, however, is to address asset pricing issues by using the DSGE
methodology but they have not discussed optimal aggregate dividend behaviour.
This objective of this chapter is to examine the variability of optimal aggregate
dividends when there are frictions generated from the corporate production system.
The topic of dividend smoothing has been investigated over many years [Lintner (1956),
Kumar (1988), Allen and Michaely (2002) and Fuller and Goldstein (2005)]. There are,
however, few studies to examine the determinants of aggregate dividend smoothing.
The papers that do report evidence of smooth dividends [for example, Kang and Kumar
(1991) and Leary and Michaely (2010)], are based on empirical observations, rather
than studied using a macroeconomic approach. Shiller (1981) raises the issue that the
stock returns are far too volatile within a standard discounted dividend model given the
low volatility of aggregate dividends. Motivated by prior work, in this chapter, I aim
to investigate simultaneous interactive movements of optimal aggregate dividends and
stock prices in the presence of capital adjustment costs (CAC) and habit formation in
a production economy. This field has not been examined in depth by previous papers.
My first calibration is to construct a DSGE model in which the labour is fixed and
productivity shocks are extremely high [Jermann (1998)]. I find that, when the economy
has both frictions of capital adjustment costs and habit formation, it becomes difficult
for corporations to reduce consumption fluctuations via adjusting the production plan.
This result is consistent with the claim by Jermann (1998) that a joint effect from cap-
ital adjustment costs and habit formation reduces consumption smoothing. However,
an increase in the level of CAC increases the volatility of consumption if and only if the
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labour input is restricted to equal one. In addition, in this labour-fixed model, the vari-
ability of the countercyclical aggregate dividends in the case of high capital adjustment
costs is not very different to that in the case of low capital adjustment costs.
My second calibration extends the Jermann model to include an endogenous labour
with standard exogenous technology shocks in the economy. Jermann (1998) assumes
that the labour supply is fixed and the economy is hit by high technology shocks.
These assumptions limit (a) the model’s ability to explain labour supply and (b) the
equilibrium is influenced heavily by stochastic shocks. After adjusting the specifications
for the model, I find that optimal aggregate dividends become more sensitive to (a) the
determinants of firms’ production functions and (b) the strength of capital adjustment
costs. This work examining the impact on optimal aggregate dividends is performed by
adjusting the capital adjustment costs within a wide range in the DSGE model. Two
parameters are taken to determine the strength of capital adjustment costs. The first
value determines very low capital adjustment costs [Gershun (2010)] and the second
parameter gives very costly capital adjustment costs [Jermann (1998)]. My results
show that optimal aggregate dividend volatility is very small when it is costly for the
firm to change its capital base. I also find that aggregate dividends are smooth while
the variability of stock prices increases in equilibrium in an economy with production
frictions. These findings help to resolve Shiller’s (1981) that stock index movements
are volatile while market-wide dividends are smooth.
My third investigation in this chapter is that, since capital adjustment functions take
different forms in different papers, I present another model (called the control model)
in which the alternative form of capital adjustment costs used in Collard and Dellas
(2006) is adopted. Comparing these results to my previous models, I find that results
in the control model are similar to the previous model with low capital adjustment
costs. Optimal aggregate dividends, as hypothesised, are volatile in the models with
low capital adjustment costs, rather than with high capital adjustment costs. This
implies that corporate dividend policy is determined to a large degree by costly capital
based frictions.
In this chapter, my fourth calibration is to construct a DSGE model in which both
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(a) the firm is utility-maximising (UM) instead of value-maximising (VM) and (b)
habit formation is considered, but with no capital adjustment costs. While the model
is without any capital frictions, the equilibrium economy of firms with risk aversion is
similar to firms with capital adjustment costs. This work is inspired by Cárceles Poveda
(2003) but she has not taken habit formation into account and does not examine
aggregate dividends in detail. This is an interesting topic for investigation because an
individual firm’s investment cash flows become inelastic when the firm is risk averse to
uncertain future cash flows, and consequently aggregate dividend policy is less volatile.
This is similar to the result that high CAC smooths aggregate dividends.
I depict this analogy by modelling these two cases: individual firms with CAC versus
with risk aversion. The results are consistent with the finding by Cárceles Poveda
(2003). I find that optimal aggregate dividend payouts are very smooth in an economy
in which the firm is risk averse. This finding gives the interesting result that, if the
individual firm is utility-maximising oriented, rather than value-maximising, optimal
aggregate dividends become nearly smooth in the long run while share prices fluctuate
greatly per output unit. However, it is difficult to tell whether the individual corporation
is risk averse or wishes to maximise its expected cash flows. It is then not straightforward
to examine which approach is more accurate to represent the real economy.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a detailed
literature review on capital adjustment costs in DSGE models. Section 5.3 presents
the fixed-labour DSGE model with capital adjustment costs and discusses the results.
Section 5.4 performs an endogenous-labour DSGE model and examines the results.
Section 5.5 demonstrates a DSGE model in which firms and households are utility-
maximising but with no capital adjustment costs. A series of results and discussion are
also presented in this section. Section 5.6 reports the results of impulse responses to
the technology shock for each model of this chapter. Section 5.7 concludes. Section
5.8 provides appendices.
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5.2 Literature review: capital adjustment costs
(CAC)
Capital adjustment costs (CAC) are the spending that corporations need to take account
of when they plan to change the flow of the capital stock between periods. CAC
have been discussed extensively in the literature on investment. In general, CAC are
considered in the capital accumulation function in order to study the impact of CAC on
investment decisions. The leading pioneer is Jermann (1998). Several popular papers,
Boldrin et al. (2001), Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Lettau (2003), Bouakez et al.
(2005), Cárceles-Poveda (2009), Santoro and Wei (2010) and Gershun (2010), consider
CAC in their models for different research objectives.
5.2.1 Why are CAC important in DSGE models?
Jermann (1998) brings up the issue that a macroeconomic model can successfully ex-
plain the observed equity premium. He claims that the essence of modelling a theoretical
economy is to consider both habit formation and capital adjustment costs. A finding
from Rouwenhorst (1995) makes a key point: researchers have overcome the problem
of exogenous consumption in the endowment economy by taking the methodology of
DSGE modelling to study asset prices because this model allows consumption to be de-
termined endogenously. This method, however, entails another problem: Endogenous
consumption in the production economy moves smoothly over time. The less volatile
consumption, the smaller the equity premium. A model with endogenous consumption
still cannot solve the equity premium puzzle due to an underestimated risk premium.
Jermann (1998) then takes advantage of the fact that CAC makes the firm reluctant
to adjust its investment plan for the next period since it is costly. Consequently, the
corporation cannot easily adjust the production plan to reduce fluctuations in consump-
tion. That is, CAC increases consumption volatility. The model, as a result, is able to
generate an equity premium which is consistent with the historic average. The paper
of Jermann (1998) thus becomes a guidebook to academics subsequently studying the
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asset pricing implications of RBC-based DSGE models.
Adjustment costs not only play an important role in asset pricing implications,
but also in explaining economic cyclical facts. Christiano and Fisher (1995) apply
adjustment costs to Tobin’s q and show that CAC are related to the cyclical properties
of equity prices and investment goods. Therefore, it is important to take the issue
of adjustment costs into account when studying macroeconomic and financial market
facts.
5.2.2 Specification of CAC
The purpose of considering CAC in the model is to reduce the household’s ability to
smooth consumption and further to estimate a high equity premium. CAC can directly
affect the firm’s investment decision and indirectly influence the market’s equilibrium.
The capital accumulation function with CAC used in Jermann (1998) is given by:
Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + g
(
It
Kt−1
)
Kt−1
The function g() captures capital adjustment costs and is a function of the investment
and capital ratio:
g(
It
Kt−1
) =
b
1− 1
ζ
(
It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ + c
where b and c are parameters. ζ is defined as the elasticity of the investment and capital
ratio. There is no explicit specification of b and c in Jermann (1998). However, it is not
difficult to define the parameter values for b and c. If there is no CAC in the economy
(i.e. ζ = ∞), the capital accumulation function is Kt = (1 − η)Kt−1 + bIt + cKt−1,
which is the same as in the previous chapters if and only if b = 1 and c = 0. The role
of b and c is to maintain the same steady state values over periods in the economy
with CAC, which means the steady state values are unchanged for any given value
of ζ. When ζ = ∞, there is no capital adjustment costs in the economy. With the
assumption that 0 < ζ <∞, the smaller the value, the greater CAC.
Table 5.2.1 on page 156 displays a summary of specifications of CAC corresponding
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to different papers. The specification I.a. of CAC is used in Jermann (1998) which is
borrowed by Boldrin et al. (2001), Cárceles Poveda (2003), Santoro and Wei (2010)
and Gershun (2010) for studying asset returns in a production economy. Specifications
I.b and I.c of CAC are derivatives of Specification I.a. Specification II is used by some
researchers in the field of monetary economy with DSGE modelling [Danthine and
Donaldson (2002), Collard and Dellas (2004), Canzoneri et al. (2005) and Collard and
Dellas (2006)].
The behaviour of macroeconomic variables should be likewise in any form of CAC
hypothetically, which means investment tends to vary less and consumption varies more
over time. In section 5.4, I provide an explicit discussion among the results of both
specifications.
There is no one standard value for the parameter of ζ since the CAC formulation
varies from one paper to another. However, there is a guideline: Jermann (1998)
reports a range of ζ as [0.16:∞] and he applies the value of 0.23 in his model. Gershun
(2010) however uses a value of 40 which implies much lower adjustment costs than
Jermann (1998)’s.
5.2.3 Studies of DSGE models with CAC
5.2.3.1 Asset pricing implications
Jermann (1998) influences most researchers who study asset pricing implications through
RBC-based DSGE models. He contributes one central point for better understanding
the equity premium. In his production economy, the household’s habit formation causes
smooth consumption. In order to solve this problem, he introduces CAC. This vital fac-
tor is called capital adjustment costs (CAC). Once the theoretical economy incorporates
this friction, aggregate investment is no longer as flexible as an economy without CAC.
The higher the level of CAC, the greater the volatility of consumption. The agent’s
consumption fluctuates over time because of inelastic dividends, which are derived from
the costly investment decision. Boldrin et al. (2001), Cárceles Poveda (2003), and San-
toro and Wei (2010) borrow the specification of CAC from Jermann (1998) and provide
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Table 5.2.1: A summary of literature building DSGE models with capital adjustment
costs
This table reports two capital accumulation functions with different specifications used in the invest-
ment decision literature. Specification I includes a proportional-type of capital adjustment costs. The
capital adjustment costs are a part of a function of the investment-capital ratio. Specification II
includes an additive-form of capital adjustment costs. Capital adjustment costs are the additional
expenses after the capital accumulation process.
Specification I Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + g( ItKt−1 )Kt−1
a. where function g( It
Kt−1
) is simply defined as b
1− 1
ζ
( It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ + c
Papers: Jermann (1998), Cárceles Poveda (2003), Gershun (2010)
b. where function g( It
Kt−1
) = (exp(x¯)−1+η)
1
ζ
1− 1
ζ
( It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ + 1−η−exp(x¯)
ζ−1
Paper: Boldrin et al. (2001)
(x¯ denotes mean value of the persistence of technology (shown on p.151 in
Boldrin et al. (2001))
c. where function g( It
Kt−1
) = η
1
ζ
1− 1
ζ
( It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ + η
1−ζ
Papers: Gershun (2010)
Specification II Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + It − 12ζ( ItKt−1 − η)2Kt−1
Papers: Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Collard and Dellas (2004),
Canzoneri et al. (2005), Collard and Dellas (2006)
Nomenclature:
K - capital; I - investment; η - the depreciation rate; g(.) - a capital adjustment cost function;
b and c - parameters; x¯ - a mean value of the persistence of technology ;
ζ - a value for capital adjustment costs.
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further detailed information about calibration.
Boldrin et al. (2001) emphasise that a two-sector RBC model is better than a one-
sector model to account for asset returns and business cycles simultaneously. Influenced
by Boldrin et al. (2001), Gershun (2010) presents two models (one-sector and two
sectors) with habit formation and CAC to account for financial market facts under a
self-fulfilling expectation assumption. In her paper, she assumes agents’ behaviour is
based on expectation which results in multiple equilibria. The result shows that one-
sector DSGE models with self-fulfilling expectation fail to explain business cycle stylised
financial facts. The two-sector DSGE model generates a low risk-free rate but is unable
to explain the equity premium (i.e. it is lower than the historical value). Even though
these two papers have different findings, both of them have a common objective, which
is to investigate the asset pricing implications in DSGE models by incorporating habit
formation and capital adjustment costs.
Furthermore, researchers consider several frictions to examine the business cycles
and study asset pricing implications in an incomplete market. Danthine and Donald-
son (2002) apply CAC and a labour market friction in the DSGE model. With these
additional frictions, their model can well account for the equity premium when the
risk aversion is low and agents are heterogeneous. Their CAC formulation is another
standard specification (see table 5.2.1, specification II). As mentioned in their paper,
CAC cause variable asset returns through volatile dividends. From the equity pricing
formula, the gross return on equity displayed in Danthine and Donaldson (2002, p.45)
is:
Ret−1,t =
Pt +Dt
Pt−1
=
Kt+1 +Dt
Kt
Intuitively, adjustment costs cause a small standard deviation of capital. Then the
variation of the market return on equity is expected to depend on high fluctuation in
dividends. Thus, equity premium puzzle can be explained when the economy is with
the friction of capital adjustment costs.
Another extension of Jermann (1998) is provided by Santoro and Wei (2010). The
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authors study the implication of corporate dividend taxation on asset pricing by using
Jermann (1998)’s RBC framework and incorporating corporate taxation issues. They
conclude that corporate income taxes greatly influence firm value and the volatility of
dividends, investment and consumption in a general equilibrium model.
5.2.3.2 CAC and risk aversion
The effect of CAC on business cycles and financial markets has been discussed exten-
sively. To corporations, CAC smooth the deviation of capital and investment inputs but
these are not the only factor influencing the movement of investment. Risk aversion
could as well cause inelastic investment. A risk-averse firm is less willing to gamble
its profits for any uncertain gains/losses. As a result, the firm has inelastic invest-
ment plans, and over time, aggregate investment moves smoothly. Cárceles Poveda
(2003) has made an important contribution to this field. His paper verifies that there
is a supportive relationship between CAC and corporate risk aversion in DSGE models.
What he proves is that the equilibrium of a DSGE model with CAC is the equivalent of
another optimal economy with a representative risk-averse firm and without CAC.
No matter if the economy is changed from one with a risk-neutral firm and CAC to
another one with a risk-averse firm but no CAC, the steady states of macroeconomic
variables stay completely identical. The firm’s objective in the former economy is value
maximising (VM) and in the latter it is called utility maximising (UM). It is an absolutely
instinctive idea because both frictions (CAC and risk aversion) have one character in
common, that is, to make aggregate investment less variable.
5.2.3.3 Monetary economics with CAC and others
Apart from building RBC-based DSGE models, there is another stream called New
Keynesian (NKS) based DSGE models working with CAC. NKS models are another
school of DSGE models. These models are tailored for analysing monetary and fiscal
policy when prices are assumed to be sticky, which is different to RBC models (i.e. the
economy in RBC models is under the assumption of flexible prices).
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Bouakez et al. (2005) focus on the effect of nominal monetary stock in investor’s
preferences and further examine the persistent effects of monetary shocks on output
and consumption. They take the method of maximum likelihood and use quarterly data
to estimate a DSGE model which incorporates habit formation, CAC and sticky prices.
They emphasise that habit formation interacts with CAC to enlarge the propagation of
monetary shocks. With the presence of costly adjustment costs to capital, investment
and output respond weakly to shocks. This implies that the volatility of investment is
small. As a result, the net cash flows are not very variable over time.
However, the model fails to capture the behaviour of labour demand and the inflation
rate. Collard and Dellas (2006), in a study using a DSGE model with price rigidity
for inflation stability, assess the property of inflation in a NKS model incorporating
several production and monetary frictions including adjustment costs, money demand
and government expenditures. They conclude that the question of inflation stabilisation
in the economy remains unsolved. The impact of the capital accumulation on the
deviation of output with other frictions is, however, related to the case for inflation
stabilisation. In particular, it is successful in generating reasonable estimates for inflation
if the model is with low CAC and other strong monetary frictions (e.g. monetary shock).
Besides the study of monetary economics with CAC, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
concentrate on the nature of CAC and the relationship between investment and prof-
itability. Their empirical results show that a model mixing convex and non-convex
adjustment cost functions can match observed investment behaviour and profitability.
5.3 The value-maximising model with fixed labour
supply
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate macroeconomic models by incorporating
production friction for the study of the variability of aggregate dividend policy. In this
section I present how I develop a DSGE model with the friction of CAC.
Compared to previous chapters, the major difference is that the firm’s objective
function is in a utility form. This framework allows us to examine two cases: (1)
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firms are value maximising (VM) when they are risk neutral and (2) firms are utility
maximising (UM) when they are risk averse.
Within both VM and UM models, a representative firm that has a technology shock,
a quarterly trend in labour augmenting technical change, and capital adjustment cost
function are involved. In the investor’s utility specification, the objective function has
a momentary utility function involving consumption, internal consumption habits and
leisure. The market will achieve equilibrium when both of their optimisation problems
are solved simultaneously.
This section introduces a VM-based DSGE model with fixed labour supply to simplify
the optimisation process. In the next section, I display another VM-based DSGE model
but allow the labour supply to be variable. As to the calibration of the UM-based
model, details are presented in section 5.5.
5.3.1 Specification of the Social Planners
The firm The representative firm aims to maximise its present value of future cash
flows (D) by solving the optimal labour Ld, capital K and investment I inputs:
max
Ldt ,Kt,It
Et
[ ∞∑
h=0
φt,hUF (Dt+h)
]
(5.3.1)
where UF (Dt+h) represents the firm’s utility function of its future cash flows. φ denotes
a discount factor and D denotes the firm’s net cash flows. The superscript d on Ld is
meant to indicate “demand” in the labour market.
It is assumed that the firm’s objective function is based on a power form of the
utility function:
UF (Dt+h) =
D1−γFt+h
1− γF (5.3.2)
where γF is the coefficient of the firm’s risk aversion. In general, the firm in the
standard DSGE model is assumed to be risk neutral. That is, γF = 0 in the above
equation stands for a value-maximising (VM) firm in the economy. The firm’s objective
function is to maximise its present value of future cash flows. When γF > 0, it implies
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that the representative firm is risk averse to its future cash flows.
Dividend payouts made after the investment decision are defined as:
Dt = Yt −WtLdt − It (5.3.3)
where W is the wage rate. It is assumed that a representative firm produces according
to a Cobb-Douglas production technology which is given by:
Yt = Ztf(Kt−1, xLdt ) = ZtK
α
t−1(xL
d
t )
1−α (5.3.4)
where Y , Z, f() and x denote output, a stochastic technology shock, a type of Cobb-
Douglas production function of capital and labour inputs and the deterministic trend in
labour augmenting technical change respectively1. α and 1−α are capital and effective
labour ratios respectively. The technology shock process is assumed to follow a first
order autoregressive process (AR(1)) in logs and evolves exogenously (see chapter 3).
All the subscript notations t and t − 1 are at the point in time at which the input
actually happens.
The capital accumulation process is given by
Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + g( It
Kt−1
)Kt−1 (5.3.5)
where η denotes the capital depreciation rate. g( I
K
) is a concave capital adjustment
cost function. It captures the costs the firm needs to spend if it adjusts the stock of
capital for each period. Because of the concavity of the function of CAC, it is costlier to
adjust the investment-to-capital ratio upwards than adjust the ratio downwards. This
type of capital adjustment costs have been used in Danthine and Donaldson (2002),
Canzoneri et al. (2005) and Collard and Dellas (2006)2.
1The specification of the firm’s production function is borrowed from Jermann (1998).
2Capital adjustment costs are not always considered in the function of capital accumulation but
are considered in the goods clearing condition. This is because some scholars assert the influence
of capital adjustment costs is on the amount of output, not the amount of capital. For the case
of not putting capital adjustment costs in capital accumulation form, see Danthine and Donaldson
(2002). For papers considering capital adjustment costs in the function of the capital accumulation,
see Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Cárceles Poveda (2003), Gershun (2010). I follow the
latter one as I believe that capital adjustment costs influence the level of new capital input. Thus,
the capital adjustment costs should be formed in the function of capital accumulation
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The investor The representative investor solves an optimisation problem:
max
Ct,Lst ,Nt
Et[
∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, Ct+h−1, 1− Lst+h)] (5.3.6)
subject to
Ct +QtNt+1 = WtL
s
t + (Qt +Dt)Nt (5.3.7)
where Ls is the quantity of the labour supplied by the household. For simplification of
the household’s specification, I assume that there are no transactions on bonds.
5.3.2 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing is achieved when three market conditions hold. Firstly, in the
goods market:
Yt = Ct + It (5.3.8)
The second market clear condition is in the labour market:
Ldt = L
s
t = Lt (5.3.9)
Thirdly, the equity holdings are normalised:
Nt = 1 (5.3.10)
5.3.3 Model implementation
This section outlines the required conditions and specifications of the equilibrium includ-
ing the representative investor and the representative firm together with the parameter
setting for implementing the model to capture a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
economy.
The optimisation problems of the representative firm and investor (equations 5.3.1
and 5.3.6) are solved simultaneously and simulated to reach an equilibrium status. Car-
rying out the simulation through MATLAB and DYNARE for DSGE models requires
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four first order conditions (FOCs) of the optimisation problems. To obtain the main
FOCs, each decision maker’s problem is solved by maximising the key variables. The
agent’s optimisation process is to maximise his/her utility of consumption, labour sup-
ply and the equity holdings. It is similar to the representative firm, in that the firm
maximises its utility based on capital, labour and investment inputs. The main FOCs
are in the form of:
Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(5.3.11)
1
gpI(
It
Kt−1
)Kt−1
= Et{φD
−γF
t+1
D−γFt
[Zt+1
∂f
∂Kt
+
1− η + g( It+1
Kt
) + gpK(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
gpI(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
]} (5.3.12)
Rt+1 = Zt+1
∂f
∂Kt
+
1− η + g( It+1
Kt
) + gpK(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
gpI(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
(5.3.13)
Wt =
∂U(Ct,Ct−1,1−Lst )
∂Lst
∂U(Ct,Ct−1,1−Lst )
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1,Ct,1−Lst+1)
∂Ct
(5.3.14)
Qt = Et[Mt+1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)] (5.3.15)
where Mt+1 =β(
∂U(Ct+1,Ct,1−Lst+1)
∂Ct+1
+ β
∂U(Ct+2,Ct+1,1−Lst+2)
∂Ct+1
∂U(Ct,Ct−1,1−Lst )
∂Ct
+ β
∂U(Ct+1,Ct,1−Lst+1)
∂Ct
) (5.3.16)
R is defined as the return on capital. M represents the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in consumption from the representative household’s section.
Finally, the equilibrium can be established when these conditions and the market
clearing conditions (in section 5.3.2) are satisfied. The results including steady state
values, standard deviations and cross-correlations are displayed below.
To implement a general equilibrium for a VM model, we have to specify three
functions: (1) the discount factor from the firm’s utility function, φ, (2) CAC and (3)
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the household’s utility function. The mathematical process is reported below:
(1) To specify the firm’s discount factor:
In a value-maximising environment, the firm’s stochastic discount factor is assumed
to be equal to the intertemporal substitution with respect to consumption Mt+1 which
is identified by the representative household’s optimisation process.
The FOC of capital (equation 5.3.12), for a VM-based DSGE model, is therefore
calibrated and displayed as:
1
gpI(
It
Kt−1
)Kt−1
= Et
{
Mt+1[αZt+1K
α−1
t (xLt+1)
1−α +
1− η + g( It+1
Kt
) + gpK(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
gpI(
It+1
Kt
)Kt
]
}
(5.3.17)
(2) To specify the firm’s CAC function
The specification of the capital adjustment cost (CAC) function is borrowed from
Gershun (2010) whose paper presents a detailed CAC function. The form is given by:
g(
It
Kt−1
) =
η
1
ζ
1− 1
ζ
(
It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ +
η
1− ζ (5.3.18)
This specification of CAC is close to the form used in Jermann (1998). η is the
depreciation ratio coming from the firm’s capital accumulation process. With this CAC
function, the capital accumulation function (equation 5.3.5) is rewritten as:
Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + g( It
Kt−1
)Kt−1 (5.3.19)
⇒ Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + [ η
1
ζ
1− 1
ζ
(
It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ +
η
1− ζ ]Kt−1 (5.3.20)
⇒ Kt =
[
1− η + η
1
ζ
1− 1
ζ
(
It
Kt−1
)1−
1
ζ +
η
1− ζ
]
Kt−1 (5.3.21)
The above rearranged capital accumulation function clearly shows that the relation-
ship between previous and current capital is determined by three factors: the investment
and capital ratio, the depreciation ratio and the CAC parameter.
Since the depreciation ratio is given (which is constant) and the ratio of investment
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and capital is stable in equilibrium, the major factor that causes fluctuations in capital is
the CAC parameter. The computational test shows that the greater CAC (which means
the smaller the CAC parameter), the less volatile the capital accumulation process.
With the given CAC function, the partial derivatives of the function g() at Kt, It
and It+1 can be obtained and used for the FOC of capital, which are:
g′K(
It+1
Kt
) = (−1)η 1ζ (It+1
Kt
)−
1
ζ
It+1
K2t
(5.3.22)
g′I(
It
Kt−1
) = η
1
ζ (
It
Kt−1
)−
1
ζ
1
Kt−1
(5.3.23)
Applying the above equations to equation 5.3.17 gives a FOC of capital for the
general equilibrium economy as:
1
η
1
ζ ( It
Kt−1
)−
1
ζ
= Et
{
Mt+1[αZt+1K
α−1
t (xLt+1)
1−α +
1− η + η
1−ζ
η
1
ζ ( It+1
Kt
)−
1
ζ
+ (
1
ζ − 1)(
It+1
Kt
)]
}
(5.3.24)
The formula placed in middle brackets
[ ]
on the right-hand of the above equation
5.3.24 can be defined as the expected gross return on capital:
Rt+1 = αZt+1K
α−1
t (xLt+1)
1−α +
1− η + η
1−ζ
η
1
ζ ( It+1
Kt
)−
1
ζ
+ (
1
ζ − 1)(
It+1
Kt
) (5.3.25)
In the case that a DSGE model incorporates CAC, the gross return is derived not
only by output but also by the CAC parameter and the investment and capital ratio.
Consequently, the model would generate a volatile gross rate of return on capital. The
more CAC, the greater the standard deviation of the gross return. This is because it is
less feasible for the firm to adjust the investment plan, and the consumer has to face
more uncertainties regarding the rate he/she invests at.
(3) To specify the investor’s utility function
This chapter utilises the previous chapter’s specification of the momentary utility
5.3. THE VALUE-MAXIMISING MODEL WITH FIXED LABOUR SUPPLY 166
function to define the agent’s preferences. It is a multiplicative form of consumption
and leisure and consists of a linear (or separable) internal habit:
U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = [(Ct − ξCt−1)
ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]1−γ
1− γ (5.3.26)
Given that the consumer’s utility is determined only by the choice of consumption
when ρ = 1, the hours worked from the labour supply market could not be decided
simultaneously in equilibrium. Jermann (1998)’s model is calibrated with this specifi-
cation that there is no optimal labour in the general economy. The first model of this
chapter presents how the economy reacts in this kind of situation, where the value for
ρ is set equal to one.
5.3.4 Calibration
Now I provide parameter values for an example of simulating this model. The model
is parameterised on a set of values for technology and preferences. Apart from capital
adjustment costs, I use standard values for all other parameters which are borrowed
from Jermann (1998). Table 5.3.1 on the next page presents the parameter values.
Technical change and technology shock The capital elasticity of output α is
given a value of 0.36. Accordingly, the labour share for the overall output is 0.64. The
depreciation rate η is set equal to a quarterly value of 0.025 (10% at an annual rate).
A quarterly trend in labour augmenting technical change, x, is assumed to be 1.005
implying a quarterly growth rate of 0.005 (2% at an annual rate). The economy is
under a stochastic technology shock: Z is assumed to follow an autoregressive process
of order 1 ((AR(1)) with the persistence parameter ψ = 0.99 and the standard deviation
σ = 0.01.
Capital adjustment costs In order to examine the sensitivity of real aggregated
variables to the level of capital adjustment costs, I vary the value of CAC parameter.
The first value, suggested in Gershun (2010), is given as ζL = 40. This implies
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Table 5.3.1: Parameter values for the VM model with fixed labour supply
This table lists the parameter values used to solve and simulate the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) value-maximising (VM) model with fixed labour. All the parameters are categorised
into two groups. The first group, Technology, includes parameters in the firm’s production function
and capital adjustment cost (CAC) function. The value of the CAC parameter, ζL = 40, is taken
from Gershun (2010) which implies low capital adjustment costs. The value of the CAC parameter,
ζH = 0.23, is given by Jermann (1998) and leads to high capital adjustment costs. The second group,
Preferences, is calibrated for the firm’s and the investor’s utility function. A value-maximising firm
does not compute its profits based on utility, and therefore the coefficient of relative risk aversion for
the firm is zero. The individual household has an internal habit formation. The value for the habit
persistence is taken from Constantinides (1990). The model is with an exogenous labour which is
L = 1. Hence, the individual’s utility is only on consumption as the given assumption that the value
for determining the time allocated to market activities (consumption) is one.
Technology
Capital share to output α 0.36
Depreciation ratio η 0.025
Trend in labour augmenting technical change x 1.005
Persistence of the technology shock ψ 0.99
Standard deviation of the technology shock σ 0.01
A value leads to low capital adjustment costs ζL 40
A value leads to high capital adjustment costs ζH 0.23
Preferences
Coefficient of relative risk aversion - the firm γF 0
Subjective discount factor - the investor β 0.99
Coefficient of relative risk aversion - the investor γ 5
Habit persistence ξ 0.82
Value for determining the time allocated to market activities ρ 1.00
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low capital adjustment costs. The second value, given by Jermann (1998), is set to
ζH = 0.23 which leads to high capital adjustment costs.
Firm’s preferences The coefficient of the risk aversion for the firm, γF , is set equal
to zero, implying the economy is with a value-maximising firm which is risk neutral to
its future cash flows.
Investor’s preferences The quarterly discount rate, β, is equal to 0.99. The relative
risk aversion γ is set to 5 in both of the models. The estimate of the agent’s internal
consumption habit persistence parameter ξ is the equivalent of 0.82. The weighted ratio
of time devoted to consumption (ρ) in the momentary utility function is assumed to be
one implying that the agent’s expected utility totally depends on consuming goods. In
terms of this parameter value, the investor’s preferences in the model are analogous to
that of Jermann (1998).
5.3.5 Solving methods
The moments of the economic variables are computed and evaluated by running simu-
lations with two techniques: MATLAB and DYNARE.
5.3.6 Results and discussion
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with costly capital adjustment costs
provides the important finding that the fluctuation of aggregate dividends decreases
while the variance of stock prices increases. This result gives a message that the
equity market is volatile in the presence of smoothing aggregate dividend policy in the
economy.
Considering the friction of CAC in a DSGE model therefore enables us to examine
the feasibility of aggregate dividend policy. The higher the CAC, the more inelastic the
aggregate dividend policy.
Table 5.3.2 presents the simulated and observed results of (1) volatility of each
variable and (2) volatility of each variable relative to the volatility of output.
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5.3.6.1 The statistics for the US economy
I report the observed macroeconomic business fluctuations of the US economy in four
different periods: The first US quarterly data on the period 1955.3-1984.13 is taken
from Hansen (1985). In addition, I compute quarterly fluctuations of the US economy
for the periods 1955.3-1984.1, 1985.1-2009.4 and 1959.1-2009.4.
Hansen (1985) uses quarterly US data including real gross national product (GNP),
total consumption expenditures, gross private domestic investment, nonresidential equip-
ment and structures for the capital stock, and the total hours for persons at work in
non-agricultural industries for the work hours. Other US time series in different ob-
served periods are from two sources. I use the online data provided by Shiller (1992) for
data of dividends, consumption and stock prices. GNP and private fixed investment for
output and investment respectively are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
All real data are detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
5.3.6.2 Cyclical variability
The volatility of dividends, σD, is decreasing from 6.16% to 4.56% when CAC are
greater. This is intuitively consistent with an inflexible investment decision. Therefore,
dividend policy is inelastic over time. Adjustment costs make the firm less willing
to alter its capital accumulation process. This consequence influences the variability
of dividend payouts. Since the firm is not flexible to alter the investment decision,
dividends determined by its residual earnings after the investment decision become less
volatile when it comes to higher capital adjustment costs.
The observed volatility of personal dividend income on the period 1985.1-2009.4 is
2.01% which is far below to the simulated result. However, the variability of aggregate
dividends to output, σD
σY
, in the high CAC case, is 3.44 which is close to the observed
statistics, 3.19. Both theoretical and empirical results imply that aggregate dividends
fluctuate roughly three times more than output does.
The volatility of consumption, σc, in the high CAC framework is nearly two times
3The number after the decimal is the number of quarters in a year. For example, 1955.3 is defined
as the third quarter, which is from July to September, of the year 1955.
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Table 5.3.2: Fluctuations of economic variables for the VM model with fixed labour
supply
This table reports the relative standard deviation (RSD) of each variable (dividends (D), consumption
(C), output (Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share
price (Q)) and each RSD to the RSD of output in fixed-labour value-maximising (VM) models under
cases of no capital adjustment costs (CAC), low CAC, high CAC and habits. For the US data, four
data sets are provided. a: The first US quarterly data for the period 1955.3-1984.1 is borrowed from
Hansen (1985). He uses quarterly US data of real gross national product (GNP), total consumption
expenditures, gross private domestic investment, the total of nonresidential equipment and structures
for the capital stock, and the total hours for persons at work in non-agricultural industries for the work
hours. b, c and d: I compute quarterly fluctuations of the US economy for the periods 1955.3-1984.1,
1985.1-2009.4 and 1959.1-2009.4. The data for US time series in different observed periods are from
two sources: I use the online data provided by Shiller (1992) for data of dividends, consumption and
stock prices; GNP and private fixed investment for output and investment respectively are from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED). All real data are detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Section I: Relative standard deviations (RSD) in percent of economic variables
σD σC σY σK σI σR σQ
No CAC; with habits 4.63 0.76 1.33 0.31 4.09 4.12 4.56
Low CAC (ζL = 40); with habits 6.16 0.57 1.317 0.34 4.20 0.15 0.37
High CAC (ζH = 0.23); with habits 4.56 1.02 1.325 0.21 3.16 13.78 13.92
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1)a - 1.29 1.76 0.63 8.60 - -
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1)b 1.62 0.51 1.12 - 2.76 - 7.22
US quarterly data (1985.1 - 2009.4)c 2.01 0.38 0.63 2.22 - 8.27
US quarterly data (1959.1 - 2009.4)d 1.72 0.45 0.89 - 2.49 - 7.78
Section II: Relative standard deviations (RSD) of each variable to RSD of output
σD
σY
σC
σY
σY
σY
σK
σY
σI
σY
σR
σY
σQ
σY
No CAC; with habits 3.48 0.57 1.00 0.23 3.08 3.10 3.42
Low CAC (ζL = 40); with habits 4.68 0.43 1.00 0.26 3.19 0.11 0.28
High CAC (ζH = 0.23); with habits 3.44 0.77 1.00 0.16 2.38 10.40 10.51
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1)a - 0.73 1.00 0.36 4.89 - -
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1)b 1.44 0.45 1.00 - 2.46 - 6.45
US quarterly data (1985.1 - 2009.4)c 3.19 0.60 1.00 - 3.52 - 13.10
US quarterly data (1959.1 - 2009.4)d 1.94 0.51 1.00 - 2.81 - 8.76
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that of the low CAC case (1.02% vs. 0.57%). The message of this finding is as follows:
Since dividends vary slightly, the investor has to stay with a volatile consumption to
balance its budget constraint over periods.
In equilibrium, the result shows that the level of CAC do not have a significant impact
on the magnitude of fluctuations in output. From an analytical point of view, this is
consistent with a higher volatility of consumption and a lower volatility of investment
deriving a flat output over time if the equilibrium condition of the goods market holds.
The total value of products is equal to the sum of consumption and investment in the
market.
In section II of Table 5.3.2, the results of values of the relative standard deviation
of each variable to the standard deviation of output (e.g. σD
σY
, σC
σY
, σI
σY
, σQ
σY
) help us
evaluate the sensitivity of the real economic variable to output. With low CAC, the
variability of dividends is about five times that of output. This figure moves down to,
roughly, three and half times that of output when CAC increases. The reason is that
dividends become less volatile while output remains the same. The same happens to
capital and investment.
Consumption fluctuates much more in the high CAC framework than in the low CAC
one. They are, respectively, around 43 and 77 percent of the output’s fluctuation in
the low and high CAC cases. The standard deviation of the gross return on capital gets
greater when CAC are higher. It is obvious that consumption absorbs the variability
of output when the firm’s investment and dividend payout decision are invariable over
time.
Overall, aggregate capital adjustment costs substantially affect the fluctuations of
dividends, consumption and investment but have less impact on aggregate output.
The aggregate investment decision is not independent of aggregate consumption. This
model verifies the theorem in Jermann (1998), that aggregate investment breaks the
scheme of smoothing consumption in the DSGE model if there are CAC in the pro-
duction economy. Consumption volatility increases when capital adjustment costs are
higher. In addition, the more volatile consumption, the smaller the volatility of ag-
gregate dividends (details in chapter 3). Thus the standard deviation of aggregate
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dividends becomes small because high CAC influence the variability of consumption.
The more costly the CAC, the more stable the aggregate dividend policy.
5.3.6.3 Cross-correlations
Table 5.3.3 presents the co-movements between dividends, output, investment, equity
prices, consumption and capital.
The model shows that dividends are negatively related to economic fluctuations
(countercyclical variable), which is not in line with the empirical results of Chapter 2 that
have shown the observed net cash flows have a positive relationship with Gross National
Product during the sample period (see Section 2.2.8). The reason that the simulated
result is not consistent with the observed data may be because theoretical models
apply several assumptions, such as the residual dividend policy, capital adjustment cost
function and habit formation, leading to differences in the results for some variables
(e.g. dividends) from the empirical result.
The value, corr(D, Y ), from -0.87 drops to -0.46 while the economy is with high
CAC instead of low CAC. It is apparent that the firm with high adjustment costs is less
flexible on adjusting the dividend policy.
The price of equity is significantly associated with aggregate dividends when there
are huge CAC. The value of corr(D,Q) from -0.31 (low CAC) to -0.88 (high CAC).
This implies that there is a strong and negative connection between the equity market
and the aggregate dividend policy when there is high CAC in the economy.
Row 4 of Table 5.3.3 shows the result that there is no strong change in relationship
between dividends and consumption when the level of CAC changes. Consumption is
strongly procyclical. The model simulates a significantly positive correlation with the
overall state of the economy when CAC are increasing. The value of corr(C, Y ) is 0.83
in the case of high CAC and 0.67 of low CAC. The results are as expected, investment,
capital and equity prices are positively related to the business cycle in both situations
of high and low CAC (last three rows of Table 5.3.3).
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Table 5.3.3: Cross-correlations between economic variables
This table reports the cross-correlation (Corr(., .)) between several macroeconomic variables including
dividends (D), output (Y ), investment (I), the share price (Q), consumption (C) and capital (K) in
the DSGE models with low and high capital adjustment costs. The observed US data is computed
by using the data of dividends, consumption and stock prices provided by Shiller (1992). GNP and
private fixed investment for output and investment respectively are from Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED). All real data are detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Capital adjustment costs US quarterly data
Low (ζL = 40) High (ζH = 0.23) (1985.1 - 2009.4)
corr(D,Y ) -0.87 -0.46 0.20
corr(D, I) -0.98 -0.85 0.24
corr(D,Q) -0.31 -0.88 -0.06
corr(D,C) -0.23 0.11 0.20
corr(C, Y ) 0.67 0.83 0.58
corr(C, I) 0.431 0.425 0.48
corr(C,Q) 0.97 0.38 0.25
corr(Y, I) 0.96 0.86 0.71
corr(Y,K) 0.50 0.70 -
corr(Y,Q) 0.72 0.83 0.34
5.4 The advanced value-maximising DSGE model
That the utility function only depends on the choice of consumption in the economy is
debatable. The investor’s utility should involve not only consumption but also leisure
(the substitution of working). Since Jermann (1998)’s model does not maximise the
household’s objective function with respect to labour, it is still an issue whether the
variation of consumption is greater or unchanged by the friction of CAC in the general
equilibrium economy. Will the theory, that the model with habits and CAC increases
fluctuations in consumption, still hold if the optimal labour is solved simultaneously in
both the firm’s and the household’s objective functions?
This section revises the previous model by allowing for the choice of leisure in the
representative household’s utility function. In addition, the given parameter value for the
shock persistence is too high, so that the productivity has to take some time and wait
for the shock to disappear accordingly. Therefore, this section is to demonstrate another
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model, called “the advanced VM model” afterwards, by adjusting three parameter values
to improve its effectiveness in the real business cycle: (1) an endogenous labour by
adjusting the fraction of time devoted to consumption; (2) the shock persistence;
and (3) the standard deviation of the technology shock. The results display different
implications of CAC to the fluctuation in optimal aggregate payouts.
5.4.1 Calibration and solving method
The previous setting up for the parameter ρ, ρ = 1 implies that the household does not
take his/her choice of leisure into account in determining utility. If there is no leisure
in the representative investor’s utility function, it is impossible to solve the investor’s
optimisation problem through maximising the labour supply (e.g. hours worked). As a
result, the general equilibrium economy is unable to obtain an optimal level of labour.
In order to obtain an optimal level of labour from both decision makers (the firm and
the household), the parameter for the fraction of time devoted to consumption is set
to 0.36. The investor’s momentary utility function therefore involves both consumption
and leisure under this assumption. Given that the time endowment between leisure time
and the labour market is normalised to one, the expected utility is solved by maximising
the labour supply. The more time an employee spends working, the less time left for the
activity of leisure. Hours worked certainly influence the investor’s utility accordingly.
The value for shock persistence, another parameter used in the previous model, is
also adjusted here. The last section used a value of 0.99 as given in Jermann (1998).
But I find that this figure is close to the upper bound of a benchmark range [0.95, 1.00].
Hansen (1985) measures the production function residual by using US data on output,
capital and labour inputs and obtains an autocorrelation coefficient for the technology
shock persistence of about 0.95. If the parameter value used in the previous model is
adjusted to a lower value, ψ = 0.95, it is then expected that the model will obtain a
reasonable procyclical labour.
Meanwhile, the standard deviation of the technology shock might also have been too
high in the previous calibration. According to Hansen (1985), the standard deviation of
the technology shock lies in the interval [0.007, 0.01]. His paper set a value of 0.00712.
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The purpose is to satisfy the condition that the theoretical mean standard deviation of
output is equal to the observed US GNP for the economy, which is σY = 1.76%. I set
the value of the standard deviation of the technology shock as 0.00712. In addition,
the observed standard deviations of GNP for the US economy in the most recent five
decades (from 2nd quarter of 1959 to 4th quarter of 2009) and a shorter period (from
1st quarter of 1985 to 4th 2009) are computed subsequently.
Overall, the table below summarises the changes between the previous model and
the new model.
Parameter values ρ ψ σ
Previous setting up 1.00 0.99 0.01
Revised setting up 0.36 0.95 0.00712
Parameter ρ is a value for determining the time allocated to market activities, e.g. consumption, ψ is
for the value of the technology shock persistence with a given standard deviation of the shock σe.
Solving methods To solve the model, I provide a complete DYNARE code for this
calibration in Appendix 5.8.1 on page 201.
5.4.2 Results and discussion
This subsection reports examples of simulating the advanced VM model with the dif-
ferent set of parameter values. I develop four scenarios which display the economy is
(1) without habits and CAC (benchmark 1); (2) with habits but no CAC (benchmark
2); (3) with habits and low CAC; and (4) with habits and high CAC respectively. Table
5.4.1 provides a summary of the criteria that each scenario fulfils.
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Table 5.4.1: Criteria for each scenario of the advanced VM model
This table lists the similarities and differences of four models in this chapter. Two benchmark models
are not calibrated with capital adjustment costs (CAC) and one of them does not have habit formation.
Two value-maximising (VM) models are with capital adjustment costs and habits but one is with costly
capital adjustment costs and another is with a lower level of capital adjustment costs.
CAC habits Parameter valuesa
Benchmark 1: no CAC and no habits - - ζ →∞; ξ = 0.00
Benchmark 2: no CAC but habits - v ζ →∞; ξ = 0.82
Advanced VM model - case 1: low CAC and habits v v ζ = 40; ξ = 0.82
Advanced VM model - case 2: high CAC and habits v v ζ = 0.23; ξ = 0.82
aThe parameter ζ determines the level of capital adjustment costs (CAC), the higher the
number, the lower the level of CAC. ξ decides the strength of habit motive.
5.4.2.1 Fluctuations and cyclical variability
Table 5.4.2 presents the performance of the advanced VM models in cases of low and
high capital adjustment costs (CAC). The model successfully shows that CAC are a fric-
tion that strongly affects the production economy. Results show that high CAC reduce
the volatilities of dividends and investment dramatically. With variable labour supply,
the relative standard deviation of aggregate dividends reduces dramatically compared
to the model with fixed labour supply. Results show that, in the equilibrium economy,
aggregate dividend policy remains stable over time while stock prices are volatile in the
presence of high costly CAC.
The optimal labour (hours worked) fluctuates greatly within an economy with high
CAC. In addition, fluctuations in financial variables (the gross return) are increasing in
the presence of high adjustment costs. This model delivers an important message that
the level of CAC enormously affects the firm’s investment and dividend decisions.
In the case of high CAC, the volatility of dividends, output, capital and investment
drops dramatically compared to the case of low CAC. When the level of capital adjust-
ment costs is high, dividends fluctuate from 6.12% to 1.06% while the variability of the
equity price, Q, moves from 0.37% (low adjustment costs) to 3.42% (high adjustment
costs). The firm having costly capital adjustment process hesitates to alter future in-
vestment plans and remain a smooth dividend policy over time. In fact, a smooth and
stable path of dividend payments in the long run attracts households because there
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Table 5.4.2: Fluctuations of economic variables for the advanced VM model
This table reports the relative standard deviation (RSD) of each variable (dividends (D), consumption
(C), output (Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share
price (Q)) and each RSD to the RSD of output in various variable-labour value-maximising (VM) DSGE
models with/without capital adjustment costs (CAC) and habits. I also compute quarterly fluctuations
of the US economy on periods 1955.3-1984.1, 1985.1-2009.4 and 1959.1-2009.4. The data for US
time series in different observed periods are from two sources. I use the online data provided by Shiller
(1992) for data of dividends, consumption and stock prices. GNP and private fixed investment for
output and investment respectively are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). All real data
are detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Section I: Relative standard deviations (RSD) in percent of economic variables
σD σC σY σK σL σI σR σQ
Benchmark 1 - no CAC; no habits 3.44 0.57 1.20 0.28 0.43 3.07 0.04 0.28
Benchmark 2 - no CAC; with habits 6.29 0.35 1.21 0.35 0.43 4.19 0.04 0.35
Advanced VM model:
low CAC; with habits 6.12 0.348 1.18 0.35 0.39 4.08 0.14 0.37
high CAC; with habits 1.06 0.350 0.40 0.06 0.93 0.78 3.39 3.42
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1) 1.62 0.51 1.12 2.76 7.22
US quarterly data (1985.1 - 2009.4) 2.01 0.38 0.63 2.22 8.27
US quarterly data (1959.1 - 2009.4) 1.72 0.45 0.89 2.49 7.78
Section II: Relative standard deviations (RSD) of each variable to RSD of output
σD
σY
σC
σY
σY
σY
σK
σY
σL
σY
σI
σY
σR
σY
σQ
σY
Benchmark 1 - no CAC; no habits 2.86 0.47 1.00 0.23 0.36 2.55 0.04 0.23
Benchmark 2 - no CAC; with habits 5.20 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.35 3.46 0.04 0.29
Advanced VM model:
low CAC; with habits 5.17 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.33 3.45 0.12 0.32
high CAC; with habits 2.61 0.86 1.00 0.16 2.29 1.92 8.36 8.44
US quarterly data (1955.3 - 1984.1) 1.44 0.45 1.00 2.46 6.45
US quarterly data (1985.1 - 2009.4) 3.19 0.60 1.00 3.52 13.10
US quarterly data (1959.1 - 2009.4) 1.94 0.51 1.00 2.81 8.76
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is less uncertainty of variability of firms paying dividends. Investors can benefit from
stable cash incomes and smooth their consumption. On the contrary, a firm becomes
less flexible to utilise its free cash flows, some positive NPV investment projects are
delayed. The stock market, as a consequence, is much volatile in the economy with
high CAC.
The magnitude of the fluctuation in dividends to that of output drops from five
times to two and a half times (see σD
σY
in Table 5.4.2, Section II). There is less deviation
between dividends and output in the general equilibrium economy when CAC are very
high to the firm.
Interestingly, the impact of high CAC on the social planner’s consumption is weak.
In both situations, results for the volatilities of consumption are similar, 0.348% and
0.350% in the low and high CAC case respectively. The reason why the variation of
consumption does not change greatly is because of labour market fluctuations. When
changing investment plans wastes more profits than adjusting labour, the firm prefers
to alter the labour input. Therefore, labour becomes volatile when CAC are high.
As mentioned before, the individual’s working hours fluctuate over periods due to
the sticky production plan; σL = 0.93% when CAC are high and σL = 0.39% when
CAC are small. Given that the economy involves high level of CAC, every unit increase
of the volatility of output is driven by roughly two and a half unit increases of the
volatility of labour input (see σL
σY
in Table 5.4.2, Section II).
However, since the variability of output is decreasing, the variability of consumption
to output is comparatively greater in the economy with high capital adjustment costs
rather than with low adjustment costs.
The theoretical standard deviation of output, σY , is 1.18% in the low CAC economy
and it is 0.40% in the high CAC economy. An assumption introduced in Hansen (1985)
is that the theoretical result of σY should be equal to the observed value when the
standard deviation of technology shock is σ = 0.00712. I compute the standard
deviation of GNP taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and obtain a
value of 0.89% for the most recent five decades (see σY in Table 5.4.2, Section I, Row
4). It is not equal, but close to that in the case of low CAC. Since the focus here is
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not a precise value for the standard deviation of technology shock, I leave this finding
for scholars who specialise in the research area of estimating parameters for general
equilibrium models.
The variability of investment, σI , in the case of low CAC is 4.08% which is higher
than the observed US data (1959.1 - 2009.4), 2.49%. In effect, this model (with low
CAC) could be used to explain the variation of investment by introducing slightly more
CAC. However, the case of high CAC, with the value of σI equal to 0.78%, implies an
underestimated variation in investment. Danthine and Donaldson (2002) point out that
a dramatically high parameter value of adjustment costs (ζ) causes an unacceptably
low estimate of the variability of investment. The result from the model with high CAC
verifies their viewpoint.
The gross return on capital becomes very volatile following high capital adjustment
costs. Its volatility, respectively, is 0.14% for low CAC and 3.39% for high CAC.
Corporations are less willing to alter physical capital plans and tend to adjust the
amount of labour needed. This phenomenon makes the labour market significantly less
stable over time.
5.4.2.2 Co-movements
In Table 5.4.3, it can be seen that as before aggregate dividends are countercyclical
in the cases of without CAC or low CAC. Indeed, in a bull market, corporations prefer
to have flexible cash flows for investment opportunities instead of paying dividends.
Paying no dividends has a lesser effect on shareholders as long as the value of shares is
increasing when corporations invest in projects with a NPV greater than zero.
However, the correlation between dividends (consumption) and output becomes
weaker (stronger) when corporations have costly capital adjustment process. Labour
is also negatively correlated with output in the presence of high frictions of capital
adjustments. Net cash flows are inelastic and strongly correlated to capital input when
the firm is unwilling to alter its investment plans because of costly capital adjustment
process. The agent’s labour income is also influenced by inelastic cash flows of the
firm. As a consequence, the agent’s consumption smoothing plan is distorted. This is
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Table 5.4.3: Correlations of the benchmarks and the advanced VM models
This table displays the cross-correlation between output (Y ), dividends (D), consumption (C), capital
(K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share price (Q) in various
models with/without (low/ high) capital adjustment costs (CAC) and habits. The advanced value-
maximising (VM) model, different to previous fixed-labour VM models, includes an endogenous labour.
The first advanced VM model is with low CAC and the parameter value for low CAC is taken from
Gershun (2010). The second advanced VM model includes high CAC and its parameter value for
high CAC is taken from Jermann (1998). The results are reported in three sections. Section I is the
cross-correlation of output with other variables. Section II includes the cross-correlation of dividend
with other variables. The final section presents the cross-correlation of consumption with others.
Section I Corr(Y, .)
D C Y K L I R Q
Benchmark:
1 - no CAC; no habits -0.99 0.99 1.00 0.29 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.29
2 - no CAC; with habits -0.95 0.60 1.00 0.41 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.41
Advanced VM model:
low CAC; with habits -0.95 0.61 1.00 0.41 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.64
high CAC; with habits -0.20 0.91 1.00 0.67 -0.72 0.84 0.80 0.81
Section II Corr(D, .)
D C Y K L I R Q
Benchmark:
1 - no CAC; no habits 1.00 -0.97 -0.99 -0.15 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -0.15
2 - no CAC; with habits 1.00 -0.32 -0.95 -0.11 -0.98 -0.99 -1.00 -0.11
Advanced VM model:
low CAC; with habits 1.00 -0.32 -0.95 -0.10 -0.97 -0.99 -1.00 -0.37
high CAC; with habits 1.00 0.22 -0.20 0.47 0.83 -0.70 -0.75 -0.74
Section III Corr(C, .)
D C Y K L I R Q
Benchmark:
1 - no CAC; no habits -0.97 1.00 0.99 0.40 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.40
2 - no CAC; with habits -0.32 1.00 0.60 0.95 0.51 0.44 0.35 0.95
Advanced VM model:
low CAC; with habits -0.32 1.00 0.61 0.95 0.53 0.44 0.37 0.98
high CAC; with habits 0.22 1.00 0.91 0.87 -0.37 0.55 0.48 0.50
the reason that consumption is smooth in the only-with-habit model but not anymore
in the with-CAC-and-habit model.
5.4.3 Robustness: the control model with an alternative
CAC function
This section presents that a DSGE model with an alternative form of capital adjustment
costs (CAC) as used in Collard and Dellas (2006). The results of the variability of the
main macroeconomic variables - dividends, consumption, output and investment are
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going to be compared with the advanced VM model. The hypothesis here is that the
previous advanced VM model should be supported by the model here even though the
CAC functions are different.
The objective of this study is to explore the similarities and differences between two
different CAC functions. This section replaces previous CAC function with that used by
Collard and Dellas (2006). The same or close business statistics capturing the general
equilibrium condition are expected.
The results show that the general equilibrium economy would stay similar regardless
of the capital accumulation process containing inseparable or separable capital adjust-
ment costs. However, the correlation of equity price is less related to the production
economy in the control model. This suggests the use of the inseparable CAC in the
DSGE model for the study of asset pricing implications.
5.4.3.1 Assumption
Collard and Dellas (2006) use a different function of capital adjustment costs. They
consider separate independent adjustment costs in the capital accumulation process,
which are:
Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + It − ζ
2
(
It
Kt−1
− η)2Kt−1 (5.4.1)
where the last term represents CAC. ζ is defined as the CAC parameter. If ζ = 0, there
are no capital adjustment costs and the economy is with a standard capital accumulation
process (i.e. Kt = (1 − η)Kt−1 + It). In this model, the greater ζ, the more CAC in
the economy.
5.4.3.2 Model implementation
All the first-order conditions (FOCs) remain the same, except the one for solving the
aggregate capital. The FOC of Kt is revised because of a different CAC incorporated
into the model, which is:
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1 = Et{Mt+1[αZt+1Kα−1t (xLt+1)1−α + 1− η +
ζ
2
((
It+1
Kt
)2 − η2)]} (5.4.2)
From the right-hand-side (RHS) of the above equation, we can obtain the gross return
on capital:
Rt+1 = αZt+1K
α−1
t (xLt+1)
1−α + 1− η + ζ
2
((
It+1
Kt
)2 − η2) (5.4.3)
The equilibrium can be solved by simulating all FOCs (equations 5.3.11, 5.3.14,
5.3.15 on page 163and 5.4.2 on page 182) and market clearing conditions (equations
5.3.8, 5.3.9 and 5.3.10 on page 162) simultaneously.
5.4.3.3 Calibration and solving method
The parameter value for the CAC, ζ, is set equal to 10 as given by Collard and Dellas
(2006). The rest of the parameter values are the same as in the previous advanced VM
model. For example, the production process is assumed to have a standard technology
shock following the persistence of ψ = 0.95 and the standard deviation of σ = 0.00712.
The investor’s momentary utility function involves both consumption and leisure inputs.
A complete DYNARE code for calibrating the control model is provided in Appendix
5.8.2 on page 202.
5.4.3.4 Results and discussion
Table 5.4.4 presents the results of the advanced VM model in low and high CAC
cases and the model with the CAC function of Collard and Dellas (2006) (called “the
control model” afterwards). It is expected that regardless of the DSGE model having an
inseparable or separable CAC function to the capital accumulation function, the model
should display the same or close business statistics.
The results successfully indicate that the control model is able to produce similar
results, including variability and cross-correlations to VM model does in the low level
CAC case.
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Table 5.4.4: Fluctuations of economic variables - DSGE Models with different CAC
functions
This table reports cyclical statistics for two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models,
including the relative standard deviation (RSD) of each variable (dividends (D), consumption (C),
output (Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share
price (Q)) and each RSD to the RSD of output. The first model, called the advanced value-maximising
(VM) model, is calibrated with (a) low capital adjustment costs (CAC), suggested by Gershun (2010),
and (b) high CAC suggested by Jermann (1998) (note: Jermann (1998) and Gershun (2010) use the
same CAC function). The control VM model is constructed with a different CAC function used by
Collard and Dellas (2006). Section I reports the first set of statistics, the relative standard deviation,
and Section II includes each variable’s movement with output.
Section I: Relative standard deviations (RSD) in percent of economic variables
σD σC σY σK σL σI σR σQ
The advanced VM model
with low CAC 6.12 0.35 1.18 0.35 0.39 4.08 0.14 0.37
with high CAC 1.06 0.35 0.40 0.06 0.93 0.78 3.39 3.42
The control VM model
with Collard and Dellas (2006)’s CAC 6.58 0.36 1.25 0.37 0.50 4.36 0.07 0.42
Section II: Relative standard deviations (RSD) of each variable to RSD of output
σD
σY
σC
σY
σY
σY
σK
σY
σL
σY
σI
σY
σR
σY
σQ
σY
The advanced VM model
with low CAC 5.17 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.33 3.45 0.12 0.32
with high CAC 2.61 0.86 1.00 0.16 2.29 1.92 8.36 8.44
The control VM model
with Collard and Dellas (2006)’s CAC 5.24 0.28 1.00 0.29 0.40 3.48 0.06 0.33
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There, nevertheless, are slight differences between these two models. The reason is
that CAC in the control model are additional costs which are separable to the standard
capital accumulation function. However, the disparities of business fluctuations between
the advanced VM with low CAC and the control model are very small. They are,
respectively, 0.0046 for dividends, 0.0011 for labour fluctuations, 0.0007 for output,
0.0026 for investment 0.0007 for gross return and 0.0005 for the equity price.
Table 5.4.5 reports the results of correlations across real variables for the control
model and the advanced VM models in the low and high CAC cases. The results support
the hypothesis that the inseparable CAC and the separable CAC display similar results
of correlations. Aggregate dividends are countercyclical while labour and investment
are procyclical. Consumption is procyclical when CAC are high in the economy.
My simulated results in this section, therefore, imply that these two CAC functions
(Gershun (2010) and Collard and Dellas (2006)) respectively can derive highly similar
general equilibria. The interesting finding, however, is the disparity of the relationship
of the gross capital return and the equity price. In the advanced VM model (with low
CAC), the equity price has a positive but moderately weak correlation with the gross
return (the figure is 0.4). In the control model, there is no economically significant
relationship between them (the figure is -0.10). Accordingly, the correlations of the
equity price to dividends, output, investment and labour individually in the control
model are different to that in the advanced VM model.
To sum up, this section suggests that for studying the asset pricing implications of
DSGE models the CAC function used by Jermann (1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), Cárce-
les Poveda (2003), Gershun (2010) is a better choice rather than the form of equation
(5.4.1). The reason is that the type of CAC that Collard and Dellas (2006) used in
their paper shows a weak relationship between production and financial economics. The
equity price does not have as strong an association with output as in the advanced VM
model. Its correlations with dividends, labour, investment and return on capital are
extremely low.
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Table 5.4.5: Cross-correlations of the advanced VM models
This table reports the cross-correlation of dividends (D), consumption (C), output (Y ), capital (K),
labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share price (Q). Section I shows the
results simulated from the advanced value-maximising (VM) models with low capital adjustment costs
(CAC). The parameter for low CAC is taken from Gershun (2010). Section II includes results simulated
from the same advanced VM model but with expensive CAC. The value for the CAC parameter is
taken from Jermann (1998). The specification of the CAC function in the advanced VM model is
used in Jermann (1998) and Gershun (2010). Section III presents the results from the model with an
alternative capital adjustment cost function used by Collard and Dellas (2006).
Section I: The advanced VM model - with low CAC
Corr(, ) D C Y K L I R Q
D 1.00 -0.32 -0.95 -0.10 -0.97 -0.99 -1.00 -0.37
C -0.32 1.00 0.61 0.95 0.53 0.44 0.37 0.98
Y -0.95 0.61 1.00 0.41 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.64
K -0.10 0.95 0.41 1.00 0.31 0.23 0.14 0.96
L -0.97 0.53 0.99 0.31 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.56
I -0.99 0.44 0.98 0.23 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.49
R -1.00 0.37 0.96 0.14 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.41
Q -0.37 0.98 0.64 0.96 0.56 0.49 0.41 1.00
Section II: The advanced VM model - with high CAC
Corr(, ) D C Y K L I R Q
D 1.00 0.22 -0.20 0.47 0.83 -0.70 -0.75 -0.74
C 0.22 1.00 0.91 0.87 -0.37 0.55 0.48 0.50
Y -0.20 0.91 1.00 0.67 -0.72 0.84 0.80 0.81
K 0.47 0.87 0.67 1.00 -0.04 0.23 0.15 0.17
L 0.83 -0.37 -0.72 -0.04 1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.99
I -0.70 0.55 0.84 0.23 -0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
R -0.75 0.48 0.80 0.15 -0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Q -0.74 0.50 0.81 0.17 -0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Section III: The control model - VM with Collard and Dellas (2006)’s CAC
Corr(, ) D C Y K L I R Q
D 1.00 -0.30 -0.95 -0.11 -0.98 -0.99 -1.00 0.11
C -0.30 1.00 0.59 0.96 0.46 0.42 0.34 0.89
Y -0.95 0.59 1.00 0.41 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.20
K -0.11 0.96 0.41 1.00 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.98
L -0.98 0.46 0.99 0.27 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.05
I -0.99 0.42 0.98 0.23 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.02
R -1.00 0.34 0.96 0.14 0.99 0.99 1.00 -0.08
Q 0.11 0.89 0.20 0.98 0.05 0.02 -0.08 1.00
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5.5 The utility-maximising DSGE model
So far, this chapter has examined a DSGE model with CAC for the aggregated mar-
ket. The advanced VM model shows that the firm is unwilling to alter its production
plan because it is costly to do so. This information entails another discussion. There is
another factor which possesses the same character of reducing the fluctuation of invest-
ment; risk aversion. When the firm is risk averse to future uncertainty, its investment
plan becomes inelastic. Therefore, the variation of investment over periods is flatter
and it results in more volatile consumption than in the case of a risk neutral firm.
The objective of the study in this section is to investigate whether the impact of
a risk averse firm on equilibrium economy without CAC is equivalent to the influence
of a risk neutral firm with CAC on the economy. The hypothesis is that both frictions,
risk aversion and CAC, possess the function of smoothing the variation of investment.
In particular, the steady states in both economies are supposed to be similar.
My calibration results support the claim by Cárceles Poveda (2003) that the steady
state values for a standard DSGE model with CAC are equal to those for a model with
a risk-averse firm but without CAC.
Interestingly, aggregate dividends are less volatile in the UM model than in the
advanced VM model. The results imply that a firm’s risk-averse objective function
helps to smooth aggregate dividends more than the friction of capital adjustment.
5.5.1 Assumption
The representative UM firm aims to maximise its expected utility of cash flows with
two assumptions:
Assumption 1: The objective function is with a coefficient of risk aversion γF > 0.
The firm is risk averse to future uncertainties.
Assumption 2: There is no capital adjustment costs in the economy so the parameter
for CAC in equation 5.3.18 is assumed to be ζ →∞.
5.5. THE UTILITY-MAXIMISING DSGE MODEL 187
5.5.2 Model implementation
By solving the optimal aggregate labour Ld, capital K and investment I , the firm
maximises its utility on profits (D):
max
Ldt ,Kt,It
Et [
∞∑
h=0
βFUF (Dt+h)] (5.5.1)
subject to Kt = (1− η)Kt−1 + It
Yt = ZtK
α
t−1(xL
d
t )
1−α
logZt = ψ logZt−1 + t
where UF (Dt+h) =
D1−γFt+h
1− γF , γF > 0
As to the investor’s optimisation, it remains the same as in equation 5.3.6. For viewing
convenience, it is displayed again here:
max
Ct,Lst ,Nt
Et[
∞∑
h=0
βhU(Ct+h, Ct+h−1, 1− Lst+h)] (5.5.2)
subject to Ct +QtNt+1 = WtLst + (Qt +Dt)Nt
where U(Ct, Ct−1, 1− Lt) = [(Ct − ξCt−1)
ρ(1− Lt)1−ρ]1−γ
1− γ , ξ, ρ, γ > 0
The first order conditions (FOC) are obtained by solving both representatives’ optimi-
sation problems. FOCs for the labour demand, the labour supply and the equity price
are the same as those of advanced VM models, which are equations 5.3.11, 5.3.14 and
5.3.15. The only and main difference is the FOC for capital because the model in this
section is with a risk-averse firm and no capital adjustment costs. A revised FOC for
aggregate capital is given by:
1 = Et[βF (
Dt
Dt+1
)γF (Zt+1
∂f
∂Kt
+ 1− η)] (5.5.3)
The above formula can also be expressed as an asset pricing formula 1 = E(mR) where
m = βF (
Dt
Dt+1
)γF and the expected return on capital is Rt+1 = Zt+1 ∂f∂Kt + 1− η on the
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period [t, t+ 1].
Equilibrium can finally be reached when these FOC are satisfied along with goods,
labour and equity market clearing conditions (equations 5.3.8, 5.3.9 and 5.3.10).
5.5.3 Calibration for the UM firm’s preferences
Table 5.5.1 on the following page summarises parameter values for the UM DSGE
model. For simplification, I take an assumption from Cárceles Poveda (2003) to define
the firm’s stochastic discount factor as a subjective discount factor: φ ≡ βF for the
UM model. The values of the firm’s discount factor and the risk aversion coefficient are
taken from Cárceles Poveda (2003): βF = 0.99 and γF = 1.44 in the firm’s preferences.
The values for the technology shock persistence and the standard deviation are set
to be the same as in the advanced VM model (ψ = 0.95 and σ = 0.00712). The
investor’s momentary utility is determined by both consumption and leisure. Therefore,
the parameter value for deciding the time allocated to market activities is set to be the
same as before (ρ = 0.36). Other related parameter values for the UM model remain
the same as those in the advanced VM model.
For a complete DYNARE code for this calibration, refer to Appendix 5.8.3 on
page 204.
5.5.4 Results and discussion
5.5.4.1 Steady state values
Cárceles Poveda (2003) proves that the equilibrium for the economy of a standard DSGE
model with CAC and that for the economy with a representative risk-averse firm but
no capital installation costs should have the same impact on the steady state of each
macroeconomic variable. Table 5.5.2 lists the steady state values of the advanced VM
models and the UM model. There are two cases (low and high CAC) in the advanced
VM models. The results successfully demonstrate that both VM and UM economies
achieve a similar equilibrium in terms of the economic behaviour.
The capital output ratio is 10.26 when the economy is in the optimal equilibrium.
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Table 5.5.1: Parameter values for the UM model
This table lists the parameter values used to solve and simulate the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) utility-maximising (UM) model. In the UM model, the firm maximises its profits with
a utility function and there are no capital adjustment costs. All the parameters are categorised into
two groups. The first group, Technology, includes parameters in the firm’s production function. The
second group, Preferences, is calibrated for the firm’s and the investor’s utility function. A utility-
maximising firm has a coefficient of relative risk aversion. The individual household has an internal
habit formation. The value for the habit persistence is taken from Constantinides (1990). The model
is with an endogenous labour. Hence, the individual’s utility is both on consumption and leisure. The
value for determining the time allocated to market activities (consumption) is taken from Campbell
(1994).
Technology
Capital share to output α 0.36
Depreciation ratio η 0.025
Trend in labour augmenting technical change X 1.005
Persistence of the technology shock ψ 0.95
Standard deviation of the technology shock σ 0.00712
Preferences
Subjective discount factor - the firm βF 0.99
Subjective discount factor - the investor β 0.99
Coefficient of relative risk aversion - the firm γF 1.44
Coefficient of relative risk aversion - the investor γ 5
Habit persistence ξ 0.82
Value for determining the time allocated to market activities ρ 0.36
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Table 5.5.2: The steady state values in the advanced VM and UM models
This table summarises results of the steady state values of dividends (D), consumption (C), output
(Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share price (Q)
for the value-maximising (VM) and the utility-maximising (UM) model. The VM model is with capital
adjustment costs (CAC) which make the firm less willing to change its investment decision. The UM
model considers a risk-averse firm in the economy and hence the investment flow is inelastic. In the
VM model, two calibrations are made. One is with low CAC (Gershun (2010)) and another is with
high CAC (Jermann (1998)). Cárceles Poveda (2003) shows that the equilibrium of the VM model is
analogous to the UM model, which means the steady state values are the same.
Steady state value Type of DSGE models
VM UM
low CAC high CAC
D 0.13 0.13 0.13
C 0.93 0.93 0.93
Y 1.25 1.25 1.25
K 12.83 12.83 12.83
L 0.34 0.34 0.34
I 0.32 0.32 0.32
R 1.01 1.01 1.01
Q 12.83 12.83 12.83
This figure demonstrates that the firm needs to increase capital by roughly ten units
when it wants to produce one unit of output. Meanwhile, every output needs nearly one
third unit of the labour input (the labour output ratio is 0.27). In general equilibrium,
the ratio of consumption and output is 0.74, which means that one unit of aggre-
gate consumption is equal to 74 percent of one unit of aggregate output. Aggregate
dividends are about 10 percentage of one unit of output.
5.5.4.2 Cyclical variability
Even though the steady states are the same in both the VM and UM models, the busi-
ness cycle fluctuations are not identical. Table 5.5.3 presents the results of macroeco-
nomic statistics of the VM (low and high CAC) and the UM models.
My simulated results show that the variability of optimal aggregate dividend pay-
outs, σD, in the UM model is 0.05%, in the low (high)-CAC VM model is 6.12%
(1.06%.), which imply that aggregate payouts are much more sensitive to the firm’s
utility compared to the case with costly capital adjustment process. The UM model
calibrates a representative risk-averse firm in the economy, which means the firm is
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Table 5.5.3: A summary of macroeconomic statistics for VM and UM models
This table reports cyclical statistics for value-maximising (VM) and utility-maximising (UM) models.
The VM model is with capital adjustment costs which make the firm less willing to change its in-
vestment decision. The UM model considers a risk-averse firm in the economy. In the VM model,
two calibrations are made. One is with low CAC (Gershun (2010)) and another is with high CAC
(Jermann (1998)). The simulated results are categorised into two sections. Section I includes the
relative standard deviations (RSD) of aggregate dividends (D), consumption (C), output (Y ), capital
(K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share price (Q). Section II
includes the relative standard deviations of each variable to that of output.
Section I: Relative standard deviations (RSD) in percent of economic variables
σD σC σY σK σL σI σR σQ
Advanced VM (low CAC) 6.12 0.35 1.18 0.35 0.39 4.08 0.14 0.37
Advanced VM (high CAC) 1.06 0.35 0.40 0.06 0.93 0.78 3.39 3.42
UM 0.05 0.30 0.35 0.06 1.19 0.48 0.01 3.84
Section II: Relative standard deviations (RSD) of each economic variable to RSD of output
σD
σY
σC
σY
σY
σY
σK
σY
σL
σY
σI
σY
σR
σY
σQ
σY
Advanced VM (low CAC) 5.17 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.33 3.45 0.12 0.32
Advanced VM (high CAC) 2.61 0.86 1.00 0.16 2.29 1.92 8.36 8.44
UM 0.14 0.87 1.00 0.17 3.41 1.37 0.03 11.02
unwilling to change investment decisions and try to avoid taking any risk as much
as possible. Since the firm is utility-maximising, similar to the case of investor’s risk
aversion, it has a similar pattern of smoothing its cash flows over time. I find that,
ceteris paribus, optimal aggregate output, investment and dividends are very smooth
compared to models with capital adjustment costs. Dividend smoothing to risk-averse
firms is as consumption smoothing to investors.
The UMmodel shows that optimal aggregate dividends are nearly as much as volatile
as optimal aggregate output ( σD/σY = 0.14, Table 5.5.3, Section II) while share
prices are dramatically volatile than aggregate output volatility (σQ/σY = 11.02, Table
5.5.3, Section II). This calibration, compared to existing investigations, particularly
demonstrates that both smooth optimal aggregate dividends and volatile share prices
exist in the economy. This result is consistent with my previous calibration of models
with capital adjustment costs.
Interestingly, apart from dividends and investment, these two types of models (VM
and UM) produce similar fluctuations in consumption, labour, output, capital and the
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equity price. The magnitude of the movements of consumption to output in the UM
model is the same as that in the high CAC VM model. The outcomes of the high
CAC VM and the UM models show that every increase in the standard deviation (s.d.)
of consumption is roughly eighty to ninety percent of the s.d. of aggregate output.
Investment in the UM model, however, varies about 1.37 times output’s fluctuation. It
moves much more smoothly than when it is in the VM models.
The variance of the equity price is about 3.84% in the UM model, which is close to
the result in the high CAC VM model (3.42%). However, it seems that the equity price
movements in the UM economy are stronger than in the VM models. Every increase
of the s.d. of the equity price is approximately eleven times that of output in the UM
model, which is much higher than that in the VM model.
Table 5.5.4 reports the correlations between variables for the UM model. Compared
to results of the advanced VM model, the correlation between aggregate dividends and
stock prices is much weaker in the case of the UM model. However, aggregate labour
is countercyclical in the UM model. This is inconsistent to the observed data.
The UM model simulates procyclical dividends, which is different to previous cali-
brations in this thesis. The result is consistent with the observed data, shown in Section
2.2.8 of Chapter 2, that net cash flows are procyclical. If gross dividends are the major
or the only part of net cash flows, net cash flows are very much equal to gross divi-
dends. As gross dividends are positively correlated to Gross National Product (GNP),
net cash flows are therefore expected to have a positive correlation with GNP. There-
fore, the UM model simulates procyclical dividends which are much closer to observed
gross dividends. The cyclicality of dividends is, to some extent, influenced by the firm’s
characteristic, i.e. in this case, a firm is risk averse to its future cash flows.
In summary, the equilibrium in the economy with CAC is the same as in the economy
with a risk-averse firm but without CAC. This has been proved by the results of steady
states in both VM and UM models. Optimal equilibrium around steady states is the
same but each model produces different business cycle fluctuations. In the UM economy,
the firm prefers secured dividend policy and investment decision. As a result, investment
and dividends both become smooth. Therefore, the variations of aggregate investment
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Table 5.5.4: Cross-correlations for the UM model
This table displays the cross-correlation (Corr(., .)) between dividends (D), consumption (C), output
(Y ), capital (K), labour (L), investment (I), the gross return on capital (R) and the share price (Q)
for the utility-maximising (UM) model. This model has a risk-averse firm and a risk-averse investor.
Corr(, ) D C Y K L I R Q
D 1.00 0.70 0.69 0.76 -0.12 0.67 0.57 0.22
C 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.26 -0.26 1.00 0.98 0.41
Y 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.25 -0.27 1.00 0.99 0.41
K 0.76 0.26 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.22 0.08 -0.44
L -0.12 -0.26 -0.27 0.50 1.00 -0.27 -0.36 -0.99
I 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.22 -0.27 1.00 0.99 0.41
R 0.57 0.98 0.99 0.08 -0.36 0.99 1.00 0.49
Q 0.22 0.41 0.41 -0.44 -0.99 0.41 0.49 1.00
and dividends are much smaller than in the VM economy. Moreover, since the UM
economy faces a flat production process, the variations of the labour and the equity
price then become slightly more volatile to balance smooth dividends, the s.d. of labour
(equity price) is about four (eleven) times the s.d. of output. There is not a great
difference with regard to an investor’s consumption pattern between these two VM
(high CAC) and UM economies.
5.6 Impulse responses to a technology shock
Figures 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 displays two models: one is without both consumption habit
formation and CAC, another is with habits but no CAC. In the previous chapter, I exam-
ined models with habit formation and showed that they produce smooth consumption
and volatile dividends. Consistent with the previous findings, one can see that aggre-
gate dividends respond to the technology shock greatly in the model with habit rather
than the model without habit. Consumption becomes smooth in the early years after
the shock when the individual has a consumption habit.
Figures 5.6.3, 5.6.4, 5.6.5 and 5.6.6 present the deviation of the real variable from
its steady state in terms of the impulse responses to a technology shock. Several
findings can be easily picked up by viewing the visual results.
1. Dividends fluctuate less when the economy has a high level of CAC (compare
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Figure 5.6.3 to Figure 5.6.4). However, the variation of consumption remains
the same in the first ten years after the technology shock. There is a difference
regarding the fluctuations in consumption in the long run, but it is small. High
CAC smooth not only investment but also capital over periods. Interestingly, the
greater CAC the more volatile the gross return on capital. The fluctuation of the
gross return on capital is possibly influenced by the volatile equity price in the
early-years stage after the shock.
2. Even though my advanced VM model demonstrates that aggregate dividends vary
less in the case of high CAC, the UM model shows more inelastic dividends in the
long run (compare Figure 5.6.4 to Figure 5.6.6). Through the calibration, this
chapter provides evidence that the case of a risk-averse firm in the DSGE model
supports the DSGE model with a high level of CAC rather than a low level of
CAC. Their equilibrium economies are the same.
3. The labour charts in Figure 5.6.4 and Figure 5.6.6 convey the information that
when there are CAC in the production process or the firm is risk averse in the
economy, labour is much more volatile than in the case of low CAC. This implies
the firm prefers to adjust the labour input for the production process instead of
the costly capital installation.
4. Comparing Figure 5.6.3 to Figure 5.6.5, economic fluctuations in the control
model are very close to those in the case of low CAC in the advanced VM model.
The main difference is the variation of the gross return. The control model with
a separable form of CAC in the capital accumulation function demonstrates a
smooth gross return. It is less efficient than the advanced VM model with an
inseparable form of CAC in terms of providing a volatile return to equity.
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Figure 5.6.1: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the advanced VM model
- Benchmark 1 (no CAC; no habits)
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Figure 5.6.2: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the advanced VM model
- Benchmark 2 (no CAC; with habits)
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Figure 5.6.3: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the advanced VM model
in the low CAC case (with habits)
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Figure 5.6.4: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the advanced VM model
in the high CAC case (with habits)
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Figure 5.6.5: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the control model
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Figure 5.6.6: Impulse responses to a technology shock for the UM model
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5.7 Summary
The objective of this chapter is to explore the impact of the level of capital adjustment
costs on aggregate dividend policy. CAC result in the firm smoothing investment
variation, thereby the fluctuation in consumption is much higher than in the economy
without CAC. That the smoothness of consumption is reduced due to the CAC friction,
brought up by the pioneer paper by Jermann (1998), has been proven by my first
calibration in this chapter. From this simulation, I notice a disadvantage of this type
of calibration, that is, the household does not maximise his/her flows of labour. That
is, the model does not generate an optimal level of labour when both the firm and
the household maximise their objectives simultaneously. My second calibration, called
the advanced value-maximising (VM) model, then extends this to include endogenous
labour. The results show that the level of CAC does not influence the fluctuation of
consumption but makes dividends high smooth when CAC are high. This is the first
main finding in this chapter.
This chapter further demonstrates another CAC function, a type of separable form
to the capital accumulation function. The results of this control model are close to
the advanced VM model in the case of low CAC. Even though most macroeconomic
variables’ business statistics are close to the VM model, the major disparity is that
the control model with a separable form of CAC has a less volatile gross return. This
calibration shows that this type of CAC function may not be suitable for the study of
asset pricing implications.
My fourth contribution is that I examine a hypothesis that the equilibrium with CAC
can be generalised by another DSGE model in which there is no CAC but a risk-averse
firm. In particular, the business fluctuations in the utility maximising firm model are
close to the value maximising firm model with a high level of CAC. This is the second
main finding and implies that if there is a representative risk averse firm in the economy,
the general equilibrium market reacts analogously to the case of the economy having
a very high level of CAC. While the steady state values are similar in both economies,
optimal aggregate payouts are much smooth in the utility-maximising (UM) model.
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This finding implies that there is a stronger impact on optimal aggregate dividends if
firms are risk averse compared to firms facing costly adjustment expenses on capital.
Corporations are reluctant to take uncertain risk and become conservative to their free
cash flows across time, and consequently dividend payouts are smooth.
The VM model with the technology shock is found to have countercyclical aggregate
dividends and the UM model shows that theoretical aggregate dividends are procyclical.
A very recent paper by Jermann and Quadrini (2009) points out that the addition of
financial shocks can better explain the movements of real and financial variables and
their findings show that equity payouts are procyclical. Without considering financial
shocks, my UM model simulates procyclical aggregate payouts. It implies that the
cyclical behaviour of aggregate payouts is strongly related to the specifications of both
firms’ and investors’ optimisation problems. In Chapter 2, both net cash flows and
gross payouts are positively correlated to Gross National Product (GNP) during 1973
- 2000 and several non-overlapping sub-periods. In this chapter, two different types
of DSGE models are presented and one (the VM model), involving a costly capital
adjustment function, simulates countercyclical dividends while another model (the UM
model), introducing risk-averse firms, calibrates procyclical dividends. It is interesting
to see that either the firm’s production function and its capital accumulation process
or the firm’s characteristic leading to maximise its future cash flows can affect the
cyclicality of dividends.
Assuming that some empirical studies take gross payouts (the empirical data) as
dividends, the fact that my UM model simulates the result of procyclical theoretical
aggregate dividends is accordingly in line with the empirical result using data for gross
dividends. In that case, results of dividends in the VM model then contradict the
empirical data. However, if the so-called dividends are the net cash flows, it is found
that an inverse relationship between net cash flows and GNP exists during some periods.
The cyclicality of net cash flows varies more than gross payouts. Thus, net cash flows
are not as positively related to GNP as gross payouts. Hence, as prior theoretical
studies, countercyclical theoretical cash flows could explain some cyclical patterns of
net cash flows instead of gross payouts.
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Overall, high capital adjustment costs cause the investment plan and dividend policy
to become less volatile. They also drive a volatile labour market. This chapter helps
us understand the economy’s cyclical movements by analysing different frictions. As a
possible extension, research could work on incorporating investment adjustment costs.
Related research papers are Christiano et al. (2005) and Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier
(2005)) who use models with investment adjustment costs to study monetary policy
and asset returns.
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5.8 Appendices
5.8.1 DYNARE code for the VM model
% the model in section of advanced calibration
% file name: CAC201 (means ["Capital" Adjustment Costs 201])
% try paper Carcedes Poveda (2003) "VM" firm objective with capital
adjustment cost from Gershun(2009)
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
%periods 20100;
var k, c, y, l, i, r, z, g, d, q;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology
varexo e;
parameters beta, delta,alpha, sigma, zeta,xi, psi, gamma, rho, x;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
% A = 2.85;
xi = 0.82; % habit persistence
beta = 0.99;
delta = 0.025; % depreciation share
alpha = 0.36; % capital share
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock (for 0.99 0.95)
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units (for 0.01 .00712)
zeta = 40; % the elasticity of investment and capital ratio 1/0.565=1.77; 0.23 (Jer-
mann)
gamma = 5; % coefficient of risk aversion
rho = 0.36; % time endowment 0.36
x = 1.005; % the deterministic trend in labor augmenting technical change (from
Jermann (1998))
% (run 1) psi=0.99 / sigma = 0.01 / rho =1
%(run 2) psi =0.95 / sigma = 0.00712/rho =0.36
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 /((delta^(1/zeta))*((i/k(-1))^(-1/zeta))) = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/
(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1)*((1-l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)
-rho))/(((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(rho-gamma*rho-1)*((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))
^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta) *r(+1) );
r=alpha*exp(z)*(k(-1)^(alpha-1))*(x*l)^(1-alpha)+ ((1-delta+(delta/(1-zeta)))/
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((delta^(1/zeta))*(i/k(-1))^(-1/zeta)))+(1/(zeta-1))*(i/k(-1));
c=xi*c(-1)+((rho/(1-rho))*(1-alpha)*(exp(z))*(k(-1)^alpha)*((x*l)^(1-alpha))
*(1-l)/l*(1-xi*beta*((1-l(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(1+rho*(gamma-1))*((1-l)
/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(rho*(1-gamma)-1)*((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^gamma));
y = exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*((x*l)^(1-alpha));
k = (1-delta)*k(-1)+ g*k(-1);
g = ((delta^(1/zeta))/(1-(1/zeta)))*((i/k(-1))^(1-(1/zeta))) + (delta/(1-zeta));
q = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1)
*((1-l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/( ((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))
^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta)
* (q(+1)+d(+1)) );
y = c+i;
d = alpha*y - i;
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 11;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
i = 0.28;
g = 0.025;
z = 0;
e = 0;
q = 0.3;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)))./oo_.mean(1:10);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic1,10,9,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic2,10,8,4);
5.8.2 DYNARE code for the control model
% a model with Collard and Dellas (2006)’s capital adjustment cost function
% file name: CAC005 (means ["Capital" Adjustment Costs 005])
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%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
%periods 20100;
var k, c, y, l, i, r, z, g, d, q;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology
varexo e;
parameters beta, delta,alpha, sigma, zeta,xi, psi, gamma, rho, x;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
xi = 0.82; % habit persistence
beta = 0.99;
delta = 0.025; % depreciation share
alpha = 0.36; % capital share
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
zeta = 10; % the elasticity of investment and capital ratio
gamma = 5; % coefficient of risk aversion
rho = 0.36; % time endowment
x = 1.005; % the deterministic trend in labor augmenting technical change (from
Jermann (1998))
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1)
*((1-l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/( ((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(rho
-gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta) *r(+1) );
r = alpha*exp(z)*(k(-1)^(alpha-1))*((x*l)^(1-alpha)) + (1-delta)+ 0.5*zeta
*((g^2)-(delta^2));
c = xi*c(-1)+((rho/(1-rho))*(1-alpha)*(exp(z)^(1-alpha))*(k(-1)^alpha)
*(l^(1-alpha))*(1-l)/l*( 1 - xi*beta*((1-l(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(1+rho*
(gamma-1))*((1-l)/(c-xi*c(-1)))^(rho*(1-gamma)-1)*((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^gamma));
y = exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*((x*l)^(1-alpha));
k = (1-delta)*k(-1) + i - 0.5*zeta*((g-delta)^2)*k(-1);
g = i/k(-1);
y = c+i;
d = alpha*y - i;
q = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *
((1-l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/( ((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))
^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta)
*(q(+1)+d(+1)));
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
end;
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%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 11;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
i = 0.28;
g = 0.025;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)))./oo_.mean(1:10);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic1,10,10,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic2,10,8,4);
5.8.3 DYNARE code for the UM model
% file name: CAC202 (means [risk averse firm without capital adjustment costs])
% try paper Carcedes Poveda (2003) "UM" firm objective (firm is risk averse/ DSGE
is without capital adjustment costs)
%—————————————————————-
% 0. Housekeeping
%—————————————————————-
close all;
%—————————————————————-
% 1. Defining variables
%—————————————————————-
%periods 20100;
var k, c, y, l, i, r, z, g, d, q;
% output, consumption, capital, labor, interest, investment, technology
varexo e;
parameters beta, delta,alpha, sigma, xi, psi, gamma, rho, x, gammaf;
%—————————————————————-
% 2. Calibration
%—————————————————————-
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xi = 0.82; % habit persistence
beta = 0.99; % beta = beta_F
delta = 0.025; % depreciation share
alpha = 0.36; % capital share
psi = 0.95; % autocorrelation of technology shock
sigma = 0.00712; % standard deviation of technology shock units
gamma = 5; % coefficient of risk aversion
rho = 0.36; % time devoted to consumption
x = 1.005; % the deterministic trend in labor augmenting technical change (from
Jermann (1998))
gammaf=1.44; % the coefficient of firm’s risk aversion
%—————————————————————-
% 3. Model
%—————————————————————-
model;
1 = beta*( ((d/(d(+1)))^gammaf ) *r(+1) );
r = alpha*exp(z)*(k(-1)^(alpha-1))*(x*l)^(1-alpha)+ 1-delta;
c = xi*c(-1)+((rho/(1-rho))*(1-alpha)*(exp(z))*(k(-1)^alpha)*((x*l)^(1-alpha))*
(1-l)/l*( 1-xi*beta*((1-l(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))^(1+rho*(gamma-1))*((1-l)/(c-xi*c(-1)))
^(rho*(1-gamma)-1)*((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^gamma));
y = exp(z)*(k(-1)^alpha)*((x*l)^(1-alpha));
k = (1-delta)*k(-1)+ g*k(-1);
g = i/k(-1);
y = c+i;
d = alpha*y - i;
q = beta*( (1- xi*beta*((c(+2)-xi*c(+1))/(c(+1)-xi*c) )^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *
((1-l(+2))/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho))/(((c-xi*c(-1))/(c(+1)-xi*c))
^(rho-gamma*rho-1) *((1-l)/(1-l(+1)))^(1-gamma*(1-rho)-rho) - xi*beta)
*(q(+1)+d(+1)));
z = psi*z(-1) + e;
end;
%—————————————————————-
% 4. Computation
%—————————————————————-
initval;
k = 11;
c = 1.33;
l = 0.31;
i = 0.28;
g = 0.025;
d = 0.4;
z = 0;
e = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var e = sigma^2;
end;
stoch_simul(hp_filter = 1600, order = 1);
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%—————————————————————-
% 5. Some Results
%—————————————————————-
statistic1 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)))./oo_.mean(1:10);
dyntable(’Relative standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’REL. S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic1,10,9,4)
statistic2 = 100*sqrt(diag(oo_.var(1:10,1:10)));
dyntable(’standard deviations in %’,strvcat(’VARIABLE’,’S.D.’),
M_.endo_names(1:10,:),statistic2,10,8,4);
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
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6.1 Introduction
In this thesis, I have used a macroeconomic, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE), approach to study the simultaneous interaction between aggregate dividend
policy and corporate and investor’s activities; including investment decisions, production
processes and consumption. Using this aggregated approach, which contrasts with
the more usual firm-level analysis that is standard in the corporate finance literature,
I have examined the role of market-wide dividend policy in the presence of market
frictions. This issue has rarely been discussed in both the standard corporate finance
and macroeconomic literature. In addition, I took a combined MATLAB and DYNARE
technique to simulate results, which improves the speed of the simulation process and
provides more robust results than the standard, second-order Taylor’s series expansion
approach.
This thesis was motivated by Marsh and Merton (1987) who suggest that it might
be fruitful to investigate corporate and investor activities from a macroeconomic point
of view. A number of existing theoretical and empirical papers have studied corporate
finance issues such as taxation theory, asymmetric information, signalling theory, agency
theory, incomplete contracts and transaction costs. Their work, however, is developed
within a microeconomic, rather than aggregate economy, analysis. While several papers
in the last recent decade have studied corporate finance from a macroeconomic per-
spective but their foci are on asset returns, dividend taxation, and the tax benefits on
debt financing, rather than on the role and the variability of optimal aggregate payouts.
My thesis contributes to this stream of literature by considering how dividend policy,
investment decision and consumption, can be examined from an aggregated analysis.
In this chapter, I conclude this thesis with a summary of findings in section 6.2 and
suggestions for future research in section 6.3.
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6.2 Summary of findings
In chapter 2, I briefly reviewed two streams of literature: (a) micro-based dividend theory
and empirical evidence and (b) business cycles and economic growth theory. It is helpful
to review prior studies on standard corporate dividend issues from an individual firm’s
perspective as it provides an opportunity to compare and contrast this approach against
the macroeconomic angle that I take. For instance, dividend taxation makes individual
agents reluctant to invest in dividend-paying stocks. In an aggregated market, however,
investors, who wish to smooth consumption, need to use dividend income to balance
out any changes in other source of income, such as salaries. In part (b), I reviewed the
foundation of a general equilibrium model, which is my main methodology. The rest of
the literature review in this thesis was placed in subsequent chapters and organised as
follows. Chapter 3 calibrates a much-cited Hansen (1985) model plus two extensions,
and provides a literature view on real business cycle based DSGE models. In chapter 4, I
studied aggregate dividend policy volatility in the presence of habit formation in DSGE
models, following a detailed literature view on DSGE models with habit formation.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of capital adjustment costs on dividend policy, and
includes a review of the literature on DSGE models with capital adjustment costs.
In chapter 3, I calibrated three models. The first model is the well-known Hansen
model. It is a stochastic growth model with an endogenous probability of working.
There is an optimisation problem solved from the representative household’s side. My
results are analogous to those in the original paper and are also similar to observed
economic statistics: output, capital, labour and investment. The standard Hansen
model does not take dividend policy into account and therefore is not suitable to
investigate the variability of dividends. I then extend it to that the case when the net
cash flow is determined jointly with labour wages and investment decisions. Both my
simulated standard deviations of aggregate dividend payouts and investment are very
large. My third investigation in this chapter calibrated a DSGE model in a competitive
market by taking external financing and a credit process into account. My results
showed that dividends are much more volatile than the observed results. This analysis
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led to my following studies in subsequent chapters, which I examined whether market
frictions influence the variability of optimal aggregate payouts in equilibrium.
In chapter 4, I initially built three DSGE models with different internal habit forma-
tion utility functions. This is a substantive contribution as there are not many previous
papers that study the simultaneous interaction of optimal aggregate payouts and the
investor’s utility in a DSGE model. Comparing my three incorporated-habit DSGE
models and one benchmark (no-habit) model, I found that:
1. The three with-habit models provided similar results in that the variability of
optimal aggregate dividends to the variability of output in each with-habit model
is greater than the no-habit model. It implies that aggregate dividend policy is
influenced by investors’ consumption habit formation.
2. Simultaneously, the volatilities of aggregate consumption in with-habit models
decrease in all three with-habit models compared to the figure of the no-habit
model. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that agents prefer having
smooth consumption.
3. Aggregate dividends are countercyclical while aggregate labour is procyclical.
These findings can be explained from a conservative firm’s position. When the
economy is booming, individual firms prefer to hold onto more cash flows for
positive NPV projects. As a consequence, they decide to cut dividend payments.
At the same time, companies recruit more labour in order to meet their growing
sale targets across time. The marginal utility of consumption therefore becomes
lower as labour income is high. My results show that there was a low correlation
between consumption and labour in the with-habit models.
My second contribution in this chapter is that I captured changes in the variability of
optimal aggregate payouts by changing the strength of the habit motive. There are
two main findings discovered from this investigation:
1. My first finding is that the stronger the habit motive the more volatile (smoother)
is optimal aggregate dividend growth (consumption). As expected, agents prefer
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to have steady consumption in the long run, and consequently they need to
balance out changes in their incomes by adjusting their dividend and labour
availability when their consumption habits change. In this equilibrium, dividends
are countercyclical and labour is procyclical. Dividend policy plays an important
role as a mechanism to help investors hedge themselves from the volatility of the
business cycle.
2. I further found that the strength of investors’ habit motives influences corporate
financial activity. When the habit motive gets stronger, there is a greater asso-
ciated volatility in optimal real aggregate investment, and also of debt derived
from external financing.
My last investigation in this chapter looked at the reaction of optimal aggregate dividend
behaviour when the agent’s risk aversion changes. My simulated results showed that the
volatility of optimal aggregate payouts decreases when the coefficient of risk aversion
increases for all levels of habit motive. When the economy has investors who have
extremely strong risk aversion, investors prefer having smooth dividend incomes as
steady payouts help investor to stay away uncertain changes in their saving and spending
plans. This is an interesting opposite effect to optimal dividend policy compared to the
investor’s habit motive.
In chapter 5, I demonstrated that aggregate dividend policy is inelastic across time
when the production process has high capital adjustment costs (CAC) and an internal
habit in a DSGE model. My initial model is a fixed-labour DSGE model in which labour
is an exogenous variable. My findings in terms of this basic model are summarised as
follows:
1. Optimal aggregate dividend payouts do not vary greatly when the strength of
capital adjustment costs changes. This is also true for real investment. The
observed data is much smoother than these theoretical results.
2. Aggregate dividends remain as a countercyclical variable to the business cycle but
have a weak relationship with aggregate output in the presence of high capital
6.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 212
adjustment costs. The correlation between optimal aggregate dividend payouts
and share prices becomes stronger when capital adjustment costs increase.
3. My findings are consistent with Jermann (1998)’s result that the volatility of
aggregate consumption in with-CAC-and-habit model is greater than that in the
only-habit model. Jermann (1998) found that consumption smoothing is distorted
when a DSGE model incorporates both habit formation and capital adjustment
costs. This statement, however, exists if and only if (a) labour is an exogenous
variable and (b) capital adjustment costs are very expensive.
I then extended my first calibration to release the assumption of fixed labour. My
second investigation was based on a variable-labour model and I found that:
1. With an endogenous labour supply, my advanced model showed especially smooth
optimal aggregate payouts in the presence of expensive capital adjustment costs.
There is also a smaller associated volatility in real investment. These findings are
consistent with my conjecture that capital adjustment costs impede corporations
to use their cash flows in investment projects in a flexible way, and consequently
net cash flows become less volatile across time. It is also consistent with prior
empirical observations that dividend smoothing is a significant signal part of
business performance.
2. Simultaneously, the volatility of share prices increases with costly capital adjust-
ment fees. This is due to that the rigid production process and firms are unable
to invest in positive NPV projects at all times.
I have also constructed an additional model (the control model) in which the capital
adjustment cost function of Collard and Dellas (2006) is considered. This calibration
helped to examine the variability of aggregate dividends to a different form of capital
adjustment costs. I have compared these results to my previous models with high/low
capital adjustment costs and found that the strength of capital adjustment costs in the
control model is similar to the model with a costly capital adjustment function.
My final contribution in chapter 5 is that I examined whether an economy that has
utility-maximising (UM) firms with risk aversion but without capital adjustment costs,
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is equivalent to another economy in which there are value-maximising (VM) firms and
capital adjustment costs. Cárceles Poveda (2003) emphasises that these two economies
have identical equilibrium behaviour around the steady states of variables. From my
simulated results, I found that:
1. The UM model generated similar steady states of aggregate dividends, invest-
ments, consumption and other variables to those in the VM model. These two
models, as hypothesised, have an analogous equilibrium.
2. As to the cyclical variability of each variable, both aggregate payouts and real
investment are much smoother in the UM model, rather than in the VM model
while aggregate consumption volatility is similar. In both economies, net cash
flows are smooth across time since firms face inelastic investments. Optimal
aggregate dividend policy and investment decisions are influenced by high capital
adjustment costs or by risk aversion.
3. Interestingly, the UM model resulted in procyclical aggregate dividends. This is
in line with the empirical data for gross dividends and in contrast to previous
calibrated results of the VM model that show there is an inverse relationship
between dividends and output. As presented in Chapter 2, during several periods,
the empirical data for net cash flows displays a positive relationship with Gross
National Product (GNP). It seems that a firm’s characteristic has an impact to
the cyclicality of total payouts.
4. Firms are more cautious in their attitude to investing in uncertain investment
projects. A smaller correlation coefficient between aggregate dividends and output
in the UM model, than in the VM model, is found.
Overall, this thesis studied corporate dividend policy from a market-wide viewpoint.
From an aggregated perspective, I showed that optimal aggregate dividends are greatly
influenced by not only corporate but also investor activities.
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6.3 Future development
In this thesis, I have shown that smooth consumption and the capital accumulation
process are closely related to the variability of optimal aggregate payouts. I believe
that this opens a large number of areas for future research as the results presented here
are likely to be sensitive to the exact specification of the optimisation problem of the
individual, the firm and the bank. This work could therefore be extended, for exam-
ple, by (a) examining optimal aggregate dividend and investment policy when there is
irreversible investment; (b) investigating the impact of taxation on cash dividends1 in
a general equilibrium state, and the influence of firms’ financing and investment deci-
sions on dividend tax reform. For a related discussion, see Hutton and Kenc (1998),
Santoro and Wei (2009) and Gourio and Miao (2010); (c) to consider financial shocks
in the models. A recent paper by Jermann and Quadrini (2009), finds that additional
financial shocks make the model perform more in line with observed economic be-
haviour; particularly the movements of output and labour. In their report, they also
demonstrate that a model with both frictions of technology and financial shocks result
in optimal dividends being positively correlated with output while a model only with
technology shocks has countercyclical dividends. This then helps to explain why models
only with technology shocks (for example, this thesis) produce the result that dividends
are negatively correlated with output.
In conclusion, this thesis indicates that corporate finance issues can be examined
from an aggregated market dimension. It contributes to a deeper understanding of
corporate finance activity by taking many factors and frictions into account in order to
provide a substantial and integrated macroeconomic approach. This work should be of
interest to both academics and practitioners with an interest in payout policy.
1Suggested by participants at the 17th Annual Global Finance Conference which was hosted by
Poznan University of Economics in Poznan, Poland, June 27-30, 2010.
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193
time-inseparable, 89
time-separable, 89
Tobin’s q, 23, 95, 154
utility function, 88, 160, 165, 168, 173
utility maximising; UM, 152, 158, 160, 186, 204
value maximising; VM, 152, 158, 160, 173, 201
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